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Abstract
The amount of data processed by computer networks is growing faster than
processing and memory performance. Network devices like switches, bridges,
routers, and firewalls are subject to a continuous development to keep up with
ever-rising requirements. As the overhead of software network processing already
became the performance-limiting factor for a variety of applications, also former
software functions are shifted towards dedicated network processing hardware.
Although such application-specific circuits allow fast, parallel, and low latency
processing, they require expensive and time-consuming development with minimal
possibilities for adaptions. Security can also be a major concern, as these circuits
are virtually a black box to everyone except for the manufacturer. Moreover, the
highly parallel processing capabilities of specialized hardware are not necessarily
an advantage for all kinds of tasks in network processing, where sometimes a
classical CPU is better suited.
This work introduces and evaluates concepts for building hybrid hardware-
software-systems that exploit the advantages of both hardware and software
approaches in order to achieve performant, flexible, and versatile network pro-
cessing systems. We focus on the use case of firewalls and the underlying network
packet classification problem. The approaches are evaluated on standard soft-
ware systems, extended by a plug-in card for hardware acceleration based on
programmable hardware circuits (FPGAs) to provide full control and flexibility.
The hybrid approach further allows the use of logic-level optimized, resource
efficient hardware filtering circuits on the FPGA. One key achievement of this
work is the identification and mitigation of challenges inherent when a hybrid
combination of multiple packet classification circuits with different characteristics
is used. We introduce approaches to reduce redundant classification effort to a
minimum, like re-usage of intermediate classification results and determination of
dependencies by header space analysis. In addition, for some further challenges in
hardware based packet classification like filtering circuits with dynamic updates
and fast hash functions for lookups, we describe feasibility and optimizations. At
last, the hybrid approach is evaluated using a standard SDN switch instead of the





Die Menge an in Computernetzwerken verarbeiteten Daten steigt stetig und
schneller als verfügbare Rechenleistung und Speicher. Dies stellt Netzwerkgerä-
te wie Switches, Bridges, Router und Firewalls vor Herausfordungen, die eine
kontinuierliche Weiterentwicklung erfordern. Die Performance der verbreiteten,
CPU/softwarebasierten Ansätze für die Implementierung dieser Aufgaben ist
durch den inhärenten Overhead in der sequentiellen Datenverarbeitung limitiert,
weshalb solche Funktionalitäten vermehrt auf dedizierten Hardwarebausteinen
realisiert werden. Diese bieten eine schnelle, parallele Verarbeitung mit niedriger
Latenz, sind allerdings aufwendiger in der Entwicklung und weniger flexibel. Nicht
jede Anwendung kann zudem für hochgradig parallele Verarbeitung optimiert
werden.
Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit hybriden Ansätzen, um eine bessere Ausnutzung der
jeweiligen Stärken von Soft- und Hardwaresystemen für Netzwerkanwendungen
zu ermöglichen, mit Schwerpunkt auf der Paketklassifikation. Es wird eine Fire-
wall realisiert, die sowohl Flexibilität und Analysetiefe einer Software-Firewall
als auch Durchsatz und Latenz einer Hardware-Firewall erreicht. Der Ansatz
wird auf einem Standard-Rechnersystem, welches für die Hardware-Klassifikation
mit einem rekonfigurierbaren Logikbaustein (FPGA) ergänzt wird, evaluiert. Das
hybride Konzept ermöglicht dabei die Verwendung von hochgradig optimierten Fil-
terungsschaltkreisen, welche den Ressourcenverbrauch auf dem FPGA minimieren.
Eine wesentliche Herausforderung einer hybriden Firewall mit verschiedenartigen
Klassifikationssystemen ist die Identifikation von Abhängigkeiten im Regelsatz. Es
werden Ansätze vorgestellt, welche den redundanten Klassifikationsaufwand auf
ein Minimum reduzieren, wie etwa die Wiederverwendung von Teilergebnissen
der hybriden Klassifikatoren oder eine exakte Abhängigkeitsanalyse mittels Header
Space Analysis. Für weitere Problemstellungen im Bereich der hardwarebasierten
Paketklassifikation, wie dynamisch konfigurierbare Filterungsschaltkreise und
schnelle, sichere Hashfunktionen für Lookups, werden Machbarkeit und Optimie-
rungen evaluiert. Der hybride Ansatz wird im Weiteren auf ein System mit einer
SDN-Komponente statt einer FPGA-Erweiterung übertragen. Auch hiermit können
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1.1 Motivation and Outline
Since the widespread emergence of computer networks and the Internet in partic-
ular, the continuous, exponential growth of transmitted data has been a reliable
observation. As more and more devices are connected, services are moved to cloud
services and requirements are rising. This growth can be expected to continue.
According to Cisco, the annual global Internet Protocol (IP) traffic was 1.2 ZB in
2016 and will reach 3.3 ZB per year by 2021 [44]. More tangible, this means
16 GB of traffic per capita in 2016 and 35 GB in 2021. An often cited law by GERRY
BUTTER postulated an even higher growth—doubling every nine months—in
optical networks [124]. Regardless of the exact numbers, this significant rise
increases the requirements for all devices handling this traffic. This includes
switches, routers, gateways, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to
name but a few. On the physical layer, new technologies and standards are regu-
larly introduced to increase bandwidth and throughput. The de-facto standard for
local area networks, Ethernet, defines standards for link speeds of up to 100 Gbit/s
(100GBASE), while 400 Gbit/s is currently developed [110]. That alone, however,
is only one part of the problem as these network devices need to perform more or
less complex tasks with the actual packet.
A common operation that is done by almost all of the network devices is network
packet classification, which compares certain properties of a packet against a set
of rules to determine an action to perform. We will refer to systems dedicated to
this task as packet classification systems. While this task can be accomplished on
systems based on either software or dedicated hardware, software systems hardly
meet line-speed requirements due to the inherent processing overhead [49]. Con-
sequently, systems like switches and routers can commonly be found equipped
with application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). Such ASICs often include
configuration registers and memory which allow a limited, dynamic configura-
tion. ASICs dedicated for network operations are also called network processing
units (NPUs). Switches dedicated for software-defined networking (SDN) also
mostly rely on ASICs for the data plane when higher throughput is needed. For
security systems like firewalls and IDS however, evolving attacks lead to higher
requirements exceeding simple rules that only classify based on, e.g., port num-
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bers and addresses [26]. Examples for such complex analysis include stateful
packet filtering or statistical analysis and go up to application-layer functions
like proxying and intercepting protocols and malware detection [107]. These
sort of inspections do not scale well on dedicated hardware, especially when
algorithms need to be updated frequently [20]. In summary, hardware-based
devices provide unrivaled high throughput and low latency as long as the tasks are
stateless and comparatively simple. Network processing can also be implemented
on field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) [20, 25, 49, 59], which can, to some
extent, exploit advantages of hardware-based approaches, while the hardware
design can—in contrast to ASICs—easily be replaced. Software-based systems are
limited in throughput, but benefit from a fast general purpose central processing
unit (CPU) and virtually unlimited memory for advanced tasks. Still, also software
systems need to perform a significant amount of simple classification work in the
first place. This motivates to evaluate whether a combination of different packet
classification systems—each working as a compartment in a hybrid setup—is fea-
sible. The combination of a software- and a hardware-based system is particularly
interesting, as both bring diverse characteristics.
Hence, we formulate the first research question:
How can we realize a combination of two packet classification systems
so that each compartment processes the tasks it is best suited for
in order to achieve high throughput, flexibility and comprehensive
analysis capabilities?
FPGA-based network packet processing in particular bears certain challenges
that are inherent to the technology. However, hardware-centric approaches
promise great potential for better performance. This leads to the second research
question:
Which network packet processing tasks are desirable and feasible
for FPGA implementation and what implementation approaches and
optimizations are possible?
Hybrid systems may also be implemented with three or more subsystems. Nev-
ertheless, this case is not within the scope of this thesis, apart from identifying
possible starting points. Apart from this, for practical applications, the portability
of the approaches is of interest. This thesis aims at a concept that is not only ap-
plicable to a certain test setup. Moreover, modifications on standard components
like the software firewall used in the hybrid system should be avoided. The third
research question is therefore:
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How can the hybrid classification approach be applied to other types
of packet classification systems if one goal is to avoid modifications to
the components themselves?
1.2 Results and Contributions
The key achievements and contributions of this thesis are the following:
• We demonstrate the feasibility of a hybrid firewall system. This involves
the combination of different packet classification systems with different
characteristics with regard to matching capabilities, performance, rule set
capacity, update effort, and costs. This is evaluated with a combination of a
standard software firewall and an FPGA-based plug-in card, the latter using
a logic-level optimized filtering approach. The proposed hybrid system
ensures the correct classification result given by the rule set under all
conditions.
• Using logic-level optimized hardware classification circuits on FPGAs allows
resource-efficient implementations, but implicates slow update cycles. The
proposed hybrid firewall can bridge update delays by temporarily reverting
to the other packet classification compartment without interrupting the
network traffic until the hardware packet classification circuit is regenerated.
• We show that our hybrid approach can mitigate the drawbacks of hardware-
and software-based firewall systems, respectively. This results in a firewall
system that profits from the expressiveness and versatility of a software
firewall solution as well as the speed and latency of a hardware classifi-
cation system. From an economic perspective, the approach allows using
cheaper standard components compared to, e.g., developing a full-fledged
classification and analysis on a hardware firewall.
• We develop and describe a protocol for managing hybrid firewall systems.
The protocol is prototypically implemented in a tool that serves as an
abstraction layer between administration level and the hybrid subsystems.
For this purpose, it keeps track of the rule set and updates to the rule set,
providing the corresponding configuration for both of the hybrid subsystems.
It is equipped with analysis algorithms in order to calculate an efficient
solution in terms of redundant classification effort. This way, significant
performance gains can be achieved by the hybrid firewall. Only an interface
comparable to a standard software firewall needs to be exposed to the user.
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• Compared to logic-level optimized hardware packet classification circuits,
hardware packet classification circuits with support for dynamic updates,
i.e., generic circuits with on-the-fly configuration of the rule set, require
significantly more resources and power. We exploit the fact that in practise,
large parts of firewall rule sets are rarely changed and propose and evaluate
a concept to effectively combine static, optimized, and dynamic circuits on
a single FPGA. This approach can reduce power and resource consumption
of the overall classification circuit.
• One key component for further extending network packet processing on
FPGAs is the key-value-lookup, which typically relies on fast hash func-
tions. We analyse efficient hash algorithms on FPGAs. We show that many
commonly used hash functions are in fact not well-suited for hardware-
implementation with regard to latency. For certain types of hash table
applications typically used in network systems, we show that cryptographic
security properties of hash functions are important for a proper use of the
hash result. We provide a recommendation for such hash table use cases on
FPGAs.
• We demonstrate that the developed hybrid approach can also be applied
to other constellations, i.e., a standard software firewall in combination
with an SDN switch. This exploits the SDN switching hardware as a fast
bypass mechanism for simple classification decisions. Complex decisions,
which would normally be diverted to an SDN controller via a slow control
link, are offloaded to the software firewall using high-speed data links. This
concept allows the integration of full-fledged firewalls in SDNs without relin-
quishing the high throughput and low latency of dedicated SDN networking
hardware.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis continues with a formal introduction of the network
packet classification problem and the discussion of related work in Chapter 2.
Different implementation approaches used for tackling this problem are given
with examples and their characteristics. As a major part of this thesis focusses
on FPGA-based network packet classification, the related work on this topic and
the evaluation system is introduced. In Chapter 3, the hybrid software/FPGA
firewall HyPaFilter is introduced. Several strategies for distributing rules and
traffic in hybrid systems are described and evaluated with regard to the packet
classification performance and update latency. This work is extended in Chapter 4,
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where HyPaFilter is augmented by an optimized packet routing decision. The
chapter finishes with a comprehensive evaluation and comparison. In Chapter 5,
we analyse certain subtopics regarding FPGA-based network packet processing.
For two of those, i.e., dynamically updatable classification circuits and hash
tables, implementation approaches and recommendations are given. Chapter 6 is
dedicated to hybrid firewalls with SDN components. The techniques elaborated
with HyPaFilter are applied to software firewall in conjunction with an SDN switch.
Chapter 7 summarizes this thesis and gives a brief outlook on further research
opportunities.




The vast majority of computer networks implement packet-based protocols for data
transfer [90]. Therefore, any device attached to such networks must be able to
process and handle network packets. The complexity of this task strongly depends
on the desired purpose, i.e., the protocol layer on which it has to operate on and
the nature of the protocols running on these layers. In this chapter, we focus on
one central challenge for networking devices: the packet classification problem.
Furthermore, different types of systems used for network packet processing are
introduced and compared. Based on this, we propose several types of packet
processing approaches to be used for the following work.
2.1 Packet Classification
Analyzing packets based on header fields of the Internet Protocol (IP) and Transmis-
sion Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram Protocol (UDP) headers is commonly
described as the packet classification problem. Due to its importance, it is a widely
discussed topic in the research community [35, 88]. For this work, we use the
following definition of a header H. Let
H = (H1 ∈ D1, . . . , HK ∈ DK)
be a tuple of header field values with Dj being the domain of the jth header
field. In this work, Dj is a range of non-negative integers, so header fields like
IP addresses or TCP/UDP port numbers can be described. The set of all possible
header values is
U = D1 × . . .×DK
so that H ∈ U . Devices relying on network packet classification will typically
determine the result within a set of multiple rules. This rule set itself consists of a
prioritized list of rules Ri, so we define a rule set as
R = ⟨R1, . . . , RN ⟩.
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-d 192.0.2.1/32 -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT # Rule R1
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
-s 192.0.2.0/24 -p udp -j ACCEPT # Rule R2
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
-d 192.0.2.0/32 -p tcp --dport 23 -j DROP # Rule R3
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
-d 192.0.2.1/32 -p icmp -j ACCEPT # Rule R4
Listing 2.1: Example rule set R in iptables syntax.
The rules, in turn, include one or more checks in order to determine the match.
Therefore, each rule Ri incorporates K checks C
j
i : Dj → {true, false}, so that
Ri = C1i ∧ . . . ∧ CKii .
The matching of a rule Ri with regard to the header tuple H is denoted by Ri(H).
It is true if Cji (Hj) is true for all j ∈ {1, . . . , Ki}. The common first rule match
mode is used for this thesis—this means in a given rule set R, out of all matching
rules Ri(H), the one with the lowest index i is decisive, i.e., is the one with the
highest priority 1. Therefore, the packet classification problem can be described
as for a given R and H, finding the rule with the lowest index i∗ such that rule
Ri∗ matches H. Each rule is associated with an action, e.g., ACCEPT, REJECT, or
DROP, which can then be applied to the packet if a match is found.
Listing 2.1 shows a toy example of a rule set in the netfilter/iptables-firewall
syntax style which will be used throughout this work. This example rule set
would allow TCP traffic to address 192.0.2.1 and port 80 (usually used for
the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)), allow UDP traffic from source network
192.0.2.0/24, forbid TCP connections to 192.0.2.0/24 and port 23 (usually the
protocol Telnet) and allow Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packets to the
address 192.0.2.1.
2.2 Extended Packet Classification Problem
The challenge of the packet classification problem can be extended by introducing
two rule sub-types, with regard to the complexity of the matching criterion. The
rules described in Section 2.1 contain checks C, which will be called simple checks.
In practise, these criteria are not sufficient for a firewall setup [26], where more
sophisticated techniques like connection tracking, probability-based matching or
deep packet inspection are desired. The firewall still needs to be able to classify
1This stands in contrast to the last rule match, which is used by, e.g., pf [119]. Here, the rule with
the highest index i is decisive, unless a rule with a lower index is tagged with a certain keyword
that forces ending the matching process. It is possible to convert rule sets of both types to an
equivalent rule set of the other type [94].
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-d 1.2.3.4/32 -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT # Rule R1
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 1.2.3.0/24 -p tcp -j ACCEPT # Rule R2
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 1.2.3.5/32 -p udp --dport 3306 -m string # Rule R3
--string " SELECT " --algo bm -j DROP #
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 1.2.3.4/32 -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT # Rule R4
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 1.2.3.6/32 -p udp --dport 53 -m string # Rule R5
--hex - string "|11|2|00|" --algo bm -j DROP #
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 1.2.3.6/32 -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT # Rule R6
Listing 2.2: Example rule set R in iptables syntax.
the packet against simple criteria as well. A rule in a firewall supporting complex
checks can be described as:
Ri = C1i ∧ . . . ∧ CKii ∧ Ei,
where Ei are the summarized complex checks for each rule, specific for each rule
Ri. A rule Ri is called a simple rule iff it does not contain any complex matching
criteria. If complex checks are present, Ri is called a complex rule. For a given
rule set R, we denote the sublist of simple rules by RS , and the sublist of complex
rules by RC . Therefore, RS ∪RC = R and RS ∩RC = ∅. For every simple rule
Ri ∈ R, let RS(i) be the index of rule Ri in RS .
Listing 2.2 shows an example rule setR = ⟨R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6⟩ that consists of
the simple sublist RS = ⟨R1, R2, R4, R6⟩ and the complex sublist RC = ⟨R3, R5⟩.
Each rule specifies simple checks on source or destination addresses, the transport
layer protocol, or the destination port (indicated through the flags -s, -d, -p,
or --dport, respectively). Rules R3 and R5 are complex, as they define string
matches on the packets’ payload. It can be seen that the simple rules R4 and R6
are located at the indices 3 and 4 in RS , hence RS(4) = 3 and RS(6) = 4.
2.3 Classification Systems
The processing of packets in networking devices is typically structured in protocol
layers. For the lowest layer, the computational challenges arise mostly due to
physical effects while encoding and decoding the frame to and from the desired
medium [74]. For higher layers, the processing complexity depends on the
protocols that are used. An example for a demanding task in this context are
application layer protocols running on top of, e.g., TCP/IP, where features for
these protocols like packet reordering, fragmentation, and error control must be
considered first before the application protocol can be processed. Typical network
security devices like firewalls focus on the protocols running at the layers above
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Fig. 2.1: Typical entities involved for packet processing on a standard software system.
the lowest-level ones responsible for physical and medium access. For example,
those protocols include IPv4, IPv6, ICMP, TCP, and UDP, to name but a few. It
is also becoming increasingly important to implement capabilities to analyse the
payload contained in, e.g., TCP and UDP packets to prevent more sophisticated
attacks [84].
2.3.1 Software-based Systems
Software-based network packet processing can be implemented with relatively
small effort, as common operating systems often include necessary drivers, proto-
col stacks, and application programming interfaces (APIs). Consequently, a large
number of software packet classification systems like firewalls have been devel-
oped. The firewall netfilter is a popular example of a pure software packet
classification system. An interesting measure for software-based classification
systems is the processing overhead. In a standard software-based setup based
on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware running an operating system, data
needs to be transferred from the network interface card (NIC) via several buses
and switches to the hosts memory, where a software application can fetch the
data and execute operations on the CPU. Figure 2.1 visualizes this path. For mini-
mum sized Ethernet frames of 64 B (plus preamble, start frame delimiter (SFD)
and interframe gap (IFG)), the maximum packet rate for a 40 Gbps link is about
60 Mpps. This means in the worst case, about every 17 ns one packet must be
processed, including all the inherent overhead due to the sketched processing
path which comes on top on a packet-by-packet basis. For comparison, this equals
the required time for about 50 clock cycles on a 3 GHz single core CPU. This
overhead is a significant limitation for the achievable throughput and latency of a
software-based networking device. Such COTS software systems are therefore not
suitable for line-speed requirements [49].
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2.3.2 Optimizations for Software-based Systems
Several techniques have been introduced to improve the handling of network
traffic on standard COTS systems. These approaches can be categorized into purely
algorithmic optimizations of the classification process and general improvements
of the processing flow.
Algorithmic Optimizations for Software Packet Classification
Optimizing software classification algorithms has been of major interest in the
research community [10, 36, 6, 87]. Most common software classification systems
like netfilter [127] and pf [119] use a plain linear search algorithm to find
the first matching rule. Other approaches exist in the form of decision tree
algorithms [36, 82], bit vector searches [10, 54], or hash maps [87]. These
approaches aim at improving the search algorithm, which often results in a better
classification performance [35, 38]. In addition, rule set transformation techniques
can be applied to the rule set itself in order to achieve an equivalent rule set R′
that can be traversed faster. The effectiveness of, e.g., rule set minimization or
decision tree structures has been shown in [38, 56].
Processing Optimizations
The probably most popular optimization for network packet processing on stan-
dard systems is the Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK) [126]. The DPDK achieves
significant performance gains in comparison to packet processing using stan-
dard operating system functions. In particular, DPDK uses optimized drivers,
avoids context switches, and uses polling instead of interrupts [29, 32]. Plain
performance tests show that DPDK-systems can achieve line rate for packet sizes
of 128 Byte or larger [45]. The DPDK does not, however, natively implement
layer 3-functions such as IPsec or firewalling. Reverting traffic to a standard
software firewall would therefore require to waive some of the key factors for
its performance. The firewall project pfSense incorporates the features of DPDK
and has the goal to achieve a packet filtering throughput of 10 Gbps [63]. An-
other popular framework is netmap, which claims to achieve similar data rates by
using techniques like, amongst others, memory-mapping packet buffers [75]. A
different approach is used by the to-be standard firewall in Linux, the extended
Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF), where just-in-time (JIT) compilation is used to trans-
late firewall policies. The compiled sources are then executed in eBPF virtual
machines. Recent results show that eBPF can achieve significant performance
2.3 Classification Systems 11
gains for packet filtering of up to 45% compared to using the standard netfilter
framework [78]. However, the performance is still insufficient for achieving line
rate in complex use cases with high-speed interfaces (i.e., 40 Gbit/s and above).
Moreover, the measurements indicate that using eBPF can increase the packet
processing latency.
2.3.3 Hardware-based Systems
As noted before, classification systems can be implemented as a software appli-
cation or in dedicated hardware components. While the advantage of software
systems lies in the flexibility and availability, hardware-based systems can operate
faster and with lower latency. On hardware, most approaches aim at exploiting
the possible parallelism in order to achieve high classification performance.
TCAMs
Simple classification tasks can be accomplished by ternary content-addressable
memory (TCAM)-like structures, in which the entire rule set is compared against
the packet’s header data in a small, constant number of clock cycles [73]. This
is achieved by storing all rules in a generic array of registers and distributing
the header data for logic comparison. This makes TCAMs fast and deterministic.
Hardware components—sometimes called network search engine (NSE) [102]—
for simple high-speed classification tasks in, e.g., routers or switches are often
based on TCAMs [86]. However, due to the massively parallel and generic layout,
their implementation occupies a lot of circuit resources [73]. With increasing
storage width and depth, TCAMs are therefore increasingly expensive and suffer
from high power dissipation.
A further challenge is the representation of rules in TCAMs and comparable
structures: they can only match on each bit position for 1, 0, or don’t care. Hence,
there is no native way to map negation (i.e., rules matching Cji (Hj) = false for
at least one j) or arbitrary range tests, like port ranges, into a TCAM [19, 93].
This can lead to possibly significantly reduced rule space due to necessary rule
transformations [76]. To illustrate this problem, take the following range (decimal
and binary) of IPv4 addresses:
192.168.1.1: 11000000.10101000.00000001.00000001 to
192.168.1.15: 11000000.10101000.00000001.00001111





Listing 2.3: IP addresses range 192.168.1.1 to 192.168.1.15 in CIDR notation.
0***1 covers numbers 1,3,....,15
0**10 covers numbers 2,6,10,14
0*100 covers numbers 4,12
01000 covers number 8
Listing 2.4: Range 1 to 15 in ternary representation with arbitrary wildcards.
If the classification system only supports ternary values, this range must be
transformed first. One possibility is the common Classless Inter-Domain Routing
(CIDR) block notation, which denotes IP networks by dividing an IP address
in a network prefix (most significant bits (MSBs)) and a host identifier (least
significant bits (LSBs)). The number of bits in the network prefix is given by a
decimal number. For example, the CIDR block 192.0.2.0/24 uses 24 bits for the
network prefix and therefore contains all addresses from 192.0.2.0 to 192.0.2.255.
An arbitrary range of IP addresses can be expanded to CIDR block addresses
for ternary representation, as shown in Listing 2.3 for the above given example
range.
In contrast to the longest-prefix match, where wildcards are only allowed to be
filled without gap from the LSB, classification systems like TCAMs allow wildcards
at arbitrary positions. In this case, the same range could also be represented as
shown in Listing 2.4. In either case, the given range expands to four rules. This
expansion is multiplicative if a single rule contains multiple fields with ranges.
Therefore, a rule set containing rules with multiple range fields can grow for
several orders of magnitude in size when implemented in ternary classification
units like a TCAM [19, 93].
Software-defined Networking Hardware
Modeling and managing computer networks using the concept of SDN is a topic
of major and ongoing interest [53]. SDN aims at providing an abstraction of
network packet processing in several layers:
• The application plane, where the desired network behaviour is described
using an abstract language,
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• the control plane, where an SDN controller translates requirements from the
application plane and is connected to the next lower layer,
• the data plane, where network elements represent the traffic processing
elements. In practise, this logical entity is typically an SDN switching
hardware.
Data plane devices like SDN switches usually rely on dedicated hardware packet
classification engines (e.g., ASICs with TCAMs) to process packets and match them
against flow tables and rule sets [64]. The advantage of using SDN hardware
lies in the standardization of the communication protocol between the layers,
which is—to some extent—independent of the actual type of hardware classifi-
cation system [53, 61]. The increasingly popular language P4 can be used to
describe network behaviour on the data plane [16]. Moreover, dedicated hard-
ware units with support for P4-compiled programs are available and promise fast
implementation [116].
Other Hardware-based Approaches
Due to their highly parallel processing capabilities, graphics processing units (GPUs)
have also been evaluated for network packet classification [91]. Finally, dedicated
NPUs [57, 70] are essentially ASICs that implement optimized packet classification
structures while also providing a certain level of programmability [48, 49, 57,
70].
The downside of hardware approaches is the limited functionality compared
to software firewalls, e.g., only stateless matching support. It should be noted
that such features can be implemented in hardware (like stateful IDSs [79]).
However, their implementation requires significantly more effort when compared
to software approaches [22, 84]. In contrast to software, hardware components
cannot be dynamically loaded on demand. Therefore, a hardware design needs
to directly implement all possibly needed functionalities. In this thesis, we use
hardware-based packet classification systems of different kinds—the concepts
are portable and can be realized with different approaches. In addition to the
introduced generic variants, we also evaluate using further optimized, rule set
specific hardware classification circuits.
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2.3.4 FPGAs for Network Processing Applications
FPGAs are a certain type of re-programmable integrated circuit. They allow
designers to directly describe the logical structure of the circuit without the need
to undergo a full hardware design cycle as it is necessary for ASICs. This way,
they can exploit advantages of dedicated hardware circuits while maintaining the
flexibility to alter the circuit. An FPGA achieves this by its generic layout, where
standard logic elements can be connected according to the circuit description. At
the time of writing, FPGAs can provide several million logic gates [103]. These
devices are usually programmed by describing the circuit using a language like
VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL) or Verilog [42, 43]. This description
is then translated in several synthesis and implementation steps into a vendor- and
device-specific configuration, which is often called the bitfile.
A typical FPGA comprises of several main elements [51]:
• Logic Blocks are the main logic resource and contain a standard set of logic
cells, like lookup tables (LUTs) and flip-flops (FFs). These cells can be
configured and connected to each other using a dedicated chip-wide routing
infrastructure. The LUTs can also be used as dynamic memory elements
for the design, this type of memory is called distributed random-access
memory (RAM). Depending on the vendor, logic blocks are often called
configurable logic blocks (CLBs) or logic array blocks (LABs).
• Hard Blocks or Hard IP Core: As using generic logic blocks for building
standard functions may be inefficient or not feasible, modern FPGAs also
provide several hard IP cores (note that IP stands for intellectual property in
this case). These blocks are essentially optimized hardware circuits which
can be connected to and used together with the FPGA’s logic elements.
Typical functions that are implemented in such blocks are transceivers,
due to the higher clock rate requirements. Processor cores like, e.g., an
ARM Cortex can also be found on FPGAs. Although it would be possible to
implement a processor architecture with logic blocks (called soft core), such
hard IP cores achieve a much higher density on the chip. Another important
type of hard blocks are internal memory blocks (e.g., RAM) or controllers
for external memory. Both enable access to larger quantities of memory in
comparison to distributed memory.
• Clocking and Reset: One of the main challenges in FPGA design is the timing.
All signal propagations are subject to delays due to logic transitions and
physical path delay. In the standard case of synchronous design, the config-
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ured circuit must ensure that all signal propagations are completed before
the corresponding edge of the clock signals triggers the next cycle. An FPGA
typically provides one or more dedicated clock and reset networks, which
will span a clock domain across the design or parts of it. The generation of
clocks is also implemented in dedicated blocks, in order to provide stable
and configurable sourcing of these networks.
Since the emergence of FPGAs in the mass market in the 1990s, they continued
to gain in performance and found new target applications [101]. Today they
are used, amongst others, for image processing, broadcast and radio communica-
tions, security, and hardware acceleration. FPGAs are also used for networking
applications. For devices like switches and bridges, they provide the flexibility of
the reconfigurability, but can still achieve the high throughput and low latency
within the range of an ASIC. The advantages in performance and availability of
standardized platforms made them also suitable for more advanced networking
applications [20]. A popular example is high frequency trading on the stock
market, where extremely low latency in network packet processing is required
for competitive results [59]. This cannot be achieved with software based sys-
tems. Although ASICs would possibly allow even lower latencies, they are not a
realistic option as the trading algorithms are adapted frequently and need to be
implemented as quickly as possible.
Further examples demonstrate FPGAs being used for packet classification [31, 48,
49]. Most of these works focus solely on stateless packet classification, as dynamic
state lookups are a challenging task on FPGAs [79]. FPGAs can also be used for
IDSs [11, 22, 84]. An IDS typically utilizes static string matching techniques,
which have also been widely discussed as FPGA implementations [84, 85].
The reconfigurability of an FPGA can be exploited to use the actual characteristics
of the rule set for optimizations during synthesis and implementation, resulting in
more efficient circuits that are also evaluated and used in this thesis [39]. Newer
FPGAs and development tools further allow a feature called partial reconfigura-
tion. Using this feature to dynamically replace an optimized packet classification
system as part of an FPGA design during runtime has also been briefly evaluated,
but showed no significant reduction of the update latency in comparison to re-
generating the full FPGA configuration. A major part of this thesis is dedicated to
hybrid combinations of different classification systems, rather than optimizing the
approaches themselves.
A typical FPGA networking platform like it is used in this thesis is either a stand-
alone board or a plug-in card like the peripheral component interconnect (PCI)
Express (PCIe)-based NetFPGA [96]. Using the example of the NetFPGA SUME,
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the data path begins with the transformation of incoming data from external
interfaces and a consolidation to a single internal pipeline. This internal data
pipeline operates on Ethernet frames. Within this pipeline, the desired operations
and modifications can be carried out. Afterwards, the packet is passed on to an
outgoing interface, which can either be an Ethernet interface or the host system
via direct memory access (DMA).
2.3.5 Hybrid Packet Classification Systems
The diverse characteristics of the different types of packet classification systems
have inspired hybrid networking systems that combine software systems with
fast hardware classification systems. For packet filters, a combination of an FPGA
with netfilter has been shown in [21]. The use of an FPGA as a hardware
acceleration extension for a software-based IDS has been shown in [92]. A similar
approach based on a dedicated NPU in conjunction with netfilter was described
in [7]. Both use the hardware entity to offload connections acknowledged or set
by the software. They do, however, not provide concepts how such a hybrid system
can be used in order to make best use of each of the compartments capabilities,
e.g., using the hardware for simple tasks and reverting to the software for complex
decisions. Further, the software firewall is largely agnostic about the hardware
classification process once connections were offloaded. Classification results of
the hardware classification system are only available to the hardware system itself
and are not forwarded.
The hybrid design in this thesis follows another approach: instead of classification
and offloading of flows, the firewall rule set is analysed with regard to the charac-
teristics of the rules. The rules are then distributed to the hybrid compartments
so that the overall classification result corresponds to a standard, non-hybrid
classification system using the full rule set. Several challenges arise for this
type of distribution, some of which have been described for distributed firewall
systems with regard to rule set anomalies in [80]. Special care must be taken
for stateful packet filtering rules that refer to connection states of other rules.
Software firewalls like netfilter use an implicit behaviour, i.e., stateful rules
may also refer to a state that was established by an actually stateless rule. Such
dependencies must not be disregarded if the semantic of the rule set should be
identical. Moreover, instead of using only generic hardware classification systems,
we evaluate our approach using logic-level optimized packet classification circuits
on FPGAs. The usage of our own hardware design further enables forwarding of
hardware classification results to the software classification system.
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2.4 Summary
The development of networking devices is driven by the continuously increasing
demand for higher throughput. For most of these devices, the packet classification
problem is the defining challenge: in order to determine the action for each packet,
a set of header fields is matched against a rule set. A variety of approaches have
been introduced for this task—reaching from dedicated, specialized hardware to
software-based systems running on standard hardware, all of which having their
specific advantages and disadvantages. Table 2.1 provides a qualitative overview
of some state-of-the-art examples that have been described in this Chapter.
Approach COTS Open Src. Flexibility Analysis Features HW-Offl. Perf.
Linux netfilter Yes Yes High Comprehensive None Limited
Linux eBPF Yes Yes High Comprehensive None Limited
DPDK/pfSense [63] Yes Yes Limited Limited None Up to line speed
The shunt [92] Partly2 Partly3 Medium Comprehensive Flows Up to line speed
NFShunt [62] Yes Yes Medium Comprehensive Flows Up to line speed
FPGA stand-alone Partly Partly3 Medium Limited Full Up to line speed
Com. HW firewall No4 No Limited Varies Full Up to line speed
Tab. 2.1: Qualitative comparison of different packet classification approaches for
firewalling.
2Modifications required to standard software components.
3Design contains closed-source components.
4Vendor-specific, not interchangeable.
In the following chapters, we will use two of these approaches as a basis for the
hybrid firewall HyPaFilter: netfilter, the standard software firewall on Linux,
and an FPGA-based hardware classification system. The latter was chosen to allow
the implementation of high-performance classification circuits, while offering the
flexibility for specific extensions. One of the design goals was to further avoid
changes to standard software components like the firewall itself and only using
built-in features. The HyPaFilter approach will also demonstrate how hardware
classification results can be used in the software classification process without the
need for modifications to the software firewall itself.
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Most firewall systems that can be seen in practise are either software-based fire-
walls like netfilter/iptables [127], pf [119], or ipfw [111], or otherwise
hardware-based systems from commercial manufacturers [113]. The advantages
and challenges of the different types were already discussed in Chapter 1 and
Chapter 2. Apart from raw performance, the level of security is a practical issue
and of major interest for firewall systems. Although hardware-based systems
like [113] are incorporating an increasing amount of features – often described as
next generation firewalls (NGFWs) – formerly only available in software-based sys-
tems, the depth of analysis is not comparable to application layer gateways [107].
Working evasion techniques for popular NGFWs have been shown in various
flavors [128]. Another issue is the fallback action that is executed once firewall
systems approach their limits, e. g., for the maximum number of states. Technical
documentation [106, 112, 120] suggests that default open is a commonly used
method to avoid network outages due to overload. Not least, the high costs for
hardware-based firewalls hinder a wide-spread use—costs that will further in-
crease if more capabilities are integrated. Therefore, it would seem more rational
to use hardware classification for simple classification tasks only, hereby keeping
matching circuit complexity and implementation effort on a practical level.
In this chapter, we will answer the first research question (regarding a combination
of two packet classification systems) by describing a newly introduced concept
for a hybrid firewall that combines the advantages of massively parallel matching
hardware and powerful inspection capabilities of software-based packet filters.
The HyPaFilter approach aims to reach the packet rate and processing latency
of a dedicated hardware firewall for common, easy to classify traffic, while
providing the flexibility and functionality of a software firewall for packets which
require complex processing. The hardware classification system is intended to
be implementable on various types of FPGAs and is therefore constrained to a
reasonable complexity and depth of analysis. HyPaFilter partitions a user-defined
packet processing policy into two parts. First, a hardware part which only contains
rules that can be handled by the specialized matching hardware. Secondly, a
software part, which is handled by the software firewall and contains rules that
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incorporate complex decisions or that are for other reasons required to determine
the correct classification result. Incoming packets are always analysed by the
hardware firewall first, so unambiguous decisions by the matching hardware
can be carried out quickly. Further, the hardware part has the ability to redirect
packets to the software firewall, if necessary. In the following, we will refer to this
redirection as shunting packets (not to be confused with [92], where the software
intrusion prevention system (IPS) shunts approved flows by putting them into the
hardware’s flow table). We found that a key challenge in such a hybrid design,
regardless of its concrete implementation, is the proper handling of dependencies
between different rules in the specified policy: if the hardware detects a rule match
of an incoming packet in the hardware part of the policy, it must ensure that the
packet does not match a more highly prioritized rule installed in the software filter
before the action specified by the hardware-detected rule is applied. However, it is
desirable to avoid a full-fledged software packet classification whenever possible
in order to achieve the full hardware speedup for a large number of packets. In
order to overcome this challenge, the HyPaFilter approach determines the largest
rule index in the simple rule set up to which a hardware-only classification is
safely possible.
Furthermore, even if complex processing for a packet is required, the matching
information from the hardware can be reused in order to narrow down the set
of rules the software filter has to match against this packet. Another difficulty
that a hybrid classification system has to cope with are policy updates: in a real
world setting, both the simple and complex parts of the rule set may change at
any time.
In summary, we must solve the following key challenges for our hybrid firewall:
1. partitioning rule sets without changing the semantics of the original rule
set,
2. avoiding the slow path (software) as much as possible,
3. avoiding redundant classification effort, and
4. handling updates to the rule set.
As FPGA-based systems are suitable candidates for high performance, low latency
network applications [69], we prototyped the HyPaFilter approach using a ded-
icated FPGA networking platform, the NetFPGA SUME [96]. For the software
firewall, we are using a standard Linux host with iptables/netfilter. In this
setup, the NetFPGA SUME is initially configured with tailored logic that matches
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packets against every simple rule in parallel, allowing it to perform basic fire-
walling tasks without involving the host at all at speeds of up to 40 Gbps for 64
byte frames. Complex rules and policy updates are implemented in netfilter
in order to allow for comprehensive packet analysis as well as short rule update
latencies. Whenever possible, updates that involve simple rules are moved from
the software filter to the hardware filter during the next hardware configuration
cycle.
The achievable performance of HyPaFilter depends on both the structure of the im-
plemented policy as well as on network traffic characteristics. However, previous
examination of real-world traffic in [7] showed that the fraction of traffic which
can be analysed by simple packet filter rules is large enough to expect a significant
performance gain in practical applications. Our evaluation results indicate that the
HyPaFilter system can significantly increase the maximum achievable classification
throughput over a software-only approach even for policies with many and widely
scattered complex rules. In the current state of development, stateful firewalling
relies on the software firewall only. Further, stateful firewalling requires an explicit
notion of all state-tracking functionality in the rule set, i.e., all rules affecting
or tracking states must be written as stateful rules by using the correspondent
parameter. Handling implicit state-tracking in a manner that is identical to the
behaviour of netfilter will be discussed in Chapter 4. The intended use case
prefers scenarios like bridging firewalls, denial-of-service protection, or demilita-
rized zone configurations, where many policies can be implemented by stateless
firewall rules.
In the following sections, we will describe in detail the hybrid setup and the
strategies used for separating the different types of rules. Further, we will evaluate
how the policies affect the throughput.
3.2 Related Work and Research Gap
Two important categories of research efforts are classification algorithms and
hardware architecture, both of which have been described in Chapter 2. Hy-
PaFilter employs rule set transformation techniques, which are orthogonal to the
employed classification algorithm/architecture. The goal is to transform an initial
rule setR into an equivalent rule setR′ which can be traversed faster for incoming
network packets. Existing approaches for rule set transformation are common,
e.g., rule set minimization [56]. Another approach is the encoding of decision tree
data structures into the rule set [38], which reduces the number of rules that must
be traversed for the classification in comparison to a plain linear search approach.
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HyPaFilter utilizes a variant of a decision tree optimization to install rules in
the software filter. In contrast to directly using the rule’s classification fields for
building the tree, hardware matching results are exploited. As all packets are
classified by the hardware classification system first, a preliminary classification
result is available for each packet. This result can be reused in the software fire-
wall to search through the tree branches, each containing pre-calculated groups
of rules.
The packet filters shown in [7, 21] demonstrate the feasibility of hybrid ap-
proaches, but do not answer the following key questions:
1. How should a packet processing policy be deployed in a hybrid system in
order to reach high classification performance while avoiding changing the
semantics?
2. How does the hybrid system implement rule set updates?
In order to provide an answer to these questions, we present three rule set
partitioning schemes as well as update mechanisms to handle rule set changes.
3.3 Hardware Classification Compartment
In order to support good classification performance, short rule set update laten-
cies, and expressive rule set semantics, the HyPaFilter system relies on a hybrid
matching algorithm that first processes every incoming packet on the FPGA. After
the packet is matched, the FPGA circuitry decides whether the packet requires
further complex processing in the host-based netfilter system.
The classification system implemented on the FPGA solves the packet classification
problem on the simple rule setRS , as introduced in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2. It
therefore implements every simple rule Ri ∈ RS . In order to achieve high match-
ing performance on the FPGA with a low, deterministic processing latency per
packet, we decided to use a massively parallel filtering circuit (MPFC). An MPFC
is a rule-set-specific parallel matching engine, which is generated by translating
every simple rule Ri ∈ RS at setup time into a specialized match unit MRS(i)
specified in the VHDL, building upon the technique proposed in [39]. Recall that
RS(i) is the index of rule Ri within the sublist RS . This process is illustrated in
Figure 3.1. Since each rule in RS is a conjunction of simple checks, such as subnet
tests or port range tests, the match units are composed of a small number of basic
comparator circuits. For example, a rule which matches TCP packets if the source
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Fig. 3.1: Translating simple rules of Listing 2.2 into match units.
IP address is in the subnet 203.0.0.0/8 with destination port 80 is translated into
three specific comparator circuits: the first one compares the packet’s transport
protocol field against the TCP transport protocol number 6, while the second and
third comparators compare the first octet of the packet’s source IP address against
203 and the packet’s destination port against 80, respectively. Finally, the results
of these comparators are ANDed to determine whether the rule matches.
As the match units are arranged in parallel, incoming network packets can be
matched against the entire simple rule set RS in a single clock cycle, which yields
a result bit vector Vres of size |RS |. Here, the entry at position RS(i) of the
result vector Vres, which we denote by Vres [RS(i)], stores a 1 if rule Ri matches
the current packet, and a 0 otherwise. As we are interested in the most highly
prioritized matching rule, we employ a priority encoder to determine the index of
the first enabled bit in Vres, which we will refer to as match_index. The hardware
matching process is sketched in Figure 3.2.
We opted to use the above described logic-level optimized (LLO) MPFC in our
FPGA-based prototype system due to its small hardware resource footprint. In
comparison to generic hardware matching techniques with comparable through-
put, such as StrideBV [33] or TCAMs [73], tailor-made matching circuitry is
significantly smaller and dissipates less power when implemented on an FPGA [1,
37]. During our experiments, the design toolchain was not able to generate a na-
tive TCAM implementation on the FPGA for capacities as low as 100 IPv6-capable
rules without timing errors, while the tailor-made matcher could support several
thousands of rules. Nevertheless, we point out that it is of course possible to
step away from an FPGA implementation platform and instead use a different
hardware matcher for simple rules, e. g., on the basis of a high-density ASIC-based
TCAM.
Up to this point, the packet classification problem is solved for the simple rule
set RS solely in hardware, as the match_index can be used in order to quickly
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Fig. 3.2: Parallel match of packet header data against RS .
look up the action ARS ,P that must be applied for the current packet P . If
the installed rule set R does not specify any rules with complex checks, i.e., if
RC = ∅ and thus RS = R, then the classification is complete at this point and
ARS ,P is applied to the current packet. However, if RC ̸= ∅, then additional
processing may be required on the host system. Accordingly, some packets must
be shunted from the FPGA device to the software filter to compute the correct
classification result. However, as software-based classification of shunted packets
is expensive (in comparison to FPGA-only packet processing), the number of
shunted packets should be as small as possible. Furthermore, the shunting
decision itself should be computed at line speed in order to not bottleneck the
packet pipeline. HyPaFilter uses a simple shunting strategy that we call index-based
shunting.
This technique, which was introduced in [2], partitions the simple rule set RS
into an unambiguous rule set prefix and an ambiguous rule set suffix. When the
FPGA detects that an incoming packet P matches a rule in the unambiguous part,
it is processed entirely in hardware. Otherwise, P is shunted to the host system
for further processing. Here, a simple rule Ri ∈ R is called ambiguous if there
exists a complex rule Rj ∈ R with j < i, otherwise Ri is called an unambiguous
rule. Thus, a packet P is shunted to the software classification system whenever a
complex rule in RC installed on the host system could match the current packet
P with a higher rule priority than the matching rule in RS . In the following, we
will denote the smallest index of a rule in RS with complex checks by the term
shunt_index. We point out that this simple shunting strategy is agnostic to the
actual rules itself, which means the strategy only uses the index (i.e., the priority)
of the rule to determine a possible conflict. It is not further examined whether the
rules in question actually interfere with each other, which can consequently result
in a larger number of shunted packets than necessary.
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In the example shown in Figure 3.1, the unambiguous prefix consists of the rules
R1 and R2. In contrast, the ambiguous suffix contains the rules R4 and R6, as the
complex rule R3 is more highly prioritized and could potentially conflict with R4
or R6, respectively. For instance, consider the case that the hardware matching
circuit for the rule set sketched in Figure 3.1 computes that match_index is 3 for an
incoming packet P (that is, the packet matches the simple rule R4). In this case,
our hardware classification might be incorrect, as the complex rule R3 could also
match on the packet P . Thus, whenever match_index ≥ shunt_index, index-based
shunting sends the classified packet to the host for further processing.
This technique computes the correct classification result in every case, since
packets that might match a complex rule are always shunted to the host system.
Moreover, changes in the complex part of the rule set only require an update of
the register on the FPGA that holds the shunt_index. The hybrid operation can
also bridge the delay that may occur when the hardware filter core needs to be
updated. For this purpose, packets matching rules affected by the update are
shunted until the change in the hardware becomes active. This allows the use of
hardware filters where updates are costly in terms of time. Although this strategy
is easy to implement, a major drawback comes into effect if complex rules appear
with a high priority, which forces the shunting of all packets that match lower
prioritized rules. In the worst case, a single complex rule at the top of the rule set
would force all traffic to the host, which will consequently result in a setup equal
to a standard software firewall. An improved shunting strategy addressing this
constraint by analysing the rules for actual conflicts—in contrast to only using
their priority—will be introduced in Chapter 4.
3.4 Software Classification Strategies
The task of the software filter running on the host computer (netfilter in our
example) is to classify every shunted packet which cannot be handled exclusively
in hardware. However, simply installing only the complex rule set RC in the
software filter is not sufficient, since shunted packets P could still also match
simple rules in RS . This is the case when P is not matched by any complex rule
with a higher priority than the first matching simple rule. As a consequence, the
software filter must be able to reproduce the hardware classification result if the
most highly prioritized matching rule is in RS and not in RC .
The decision function fdec is used to decide whether a packet needs to be shunted
for this section. With index-based shunting, this function is a simple comparison
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Fig. 3.3: Different strategies to implement the complex rule set RA in the software filter:
full set strategy.
of match_index ≥ shunt_index. In this section, we present three different strategies
how the rule set in the software filter can be organized to achieve this goal.
3.4.1 Full Set Strategy
The most straightforward way to setup the software filter, which we call the full
set strategy, is to simply install the entire rule set R in the software filter. That
way, forwarded packets will always traverse rules in the correct order until the
first matching rule is found, as sketched in Figure 3.3 for the example rule set
from Figure 3.1. This approach allows for quick rule updates, since only one rule
in the rule set installed in the software filter has to be changed in addition to a
possible update of the shunting policies on the FPGA. This strategy is simple, but
has a major disadvantage: the software filter may process a large number of rules
for every shunted packet, including simple rules. It thus repeats significant work
already done in hardware. This can be particularly expensive as, in contrast with
the full-parallel match in the hardware filter, the rules are commonly processed
linearly in software packet filters.
3.4.2 Cut Set Strategy
The amount of redundant work that is done in software for shunted packets can be
reduced with a slight modification. Let β be an index such that a shunted packet
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Fig. 3.4: Different strategies to implement the complex rule set RA in the software filter:
cut set strategy.
can never match a rule Ri ∈ RS with i < β. In the case of index-based shunting,
β is equal to shunt_index. For example, consider the rule set from Figure 3.1 and
a packet P with match_index = 3. As match_index is equal to shunt_index , P
will be forwarded to the software filter, which will superfluously once again test
rules R1 and R2 against P . In order to avoid this potential extra work on the host
system, the cut set strategy installs only rules in RC and in {Rj |Rj ∈ RS ∧ j ≥ β}
in the software filter, as sketched in Figure 3.4.
In comparison to the full set strategy, the cut set strategy has a higher rule update
cost, as a potentially larger number of rules must be inserted or removed from the
software filter in case of an update. However, evaluation shows that the update
effort clearly pays off in terms of classification performance, as fewer rules must
be traversed by shunted packets.
3.4.3 Interval Strategy
The strategies described so far implement rule sets in the software filter that are
agnostic to the partial classification result tuple <match_index, ARS ,P > previously
computed on the FPGA for every shunted packet P . This results in wasted effort
on the software side and inflates the software-side rule set—also in case of the cut
set strategy. An example can be seen in Figure 3.5. Here, the rule set contains two
complex rules {R3, R5} ∈ RC . A packet that would match rule R9 would therefore
be shunted to the host and be matched again by the software firewall. In the
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Fig. 3.5: Redundant classification effort for simple rules.
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Fig. 3.6: Intervals in the rule set R.
best case, this match would require a traversal of {R1, R2, R3} and {R1, ..., R9} in
the worst case, both for the full set strategy. This is partly redundant, since all
simple rules, in this case {R1, R2, R4, R6, R7, R8, R9}, have already been checked
in the hardware classification unit. To avoid the re-computation effort, the interval
strategy relies on metadata handed over from the FPGA to the matching software
when a packet is shunted, i.e., the match index and action tuple <match_index,
ARS ,P >. Simply put, the goal of the interval strategy is that shunted packets
should only be tested against a subset of the complex rules RC and none of the
rules in RS in software again.
The idea behind the interval strategy is that groups of consecutive simple rules
Gk = {Ri, . . . , Ri+α} in R can be mapped to intervals Ik = [RS(i),RS(i + α)],
with [a, b] = {x ∈ N | a ≤ x ≤ b}. For instance, the simple rules from the example
rule set in Figure 3.6 form three groups G1 = {R1, R2}, G2 = {R4}, and G3 =
{R6}, with the corresponding intervals I1 = [1, 2] , I2 = [3, 3] , and I3 = [4, 4].
Each interval represents a range of match indices, which may be computed by
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the FPGA for an incoming packet P . If P is shunted to the host, the match_index
computed on the FPGA falls into exactly one of these intervals. The interval
strategy exploits this fact by pre-computing the chain of complex rules Qk for
every interval Ik that could contain a more highly prioritized matching rule for
a packet P whose hardware-computed match_index falls into interval Ik (i.e., P
matches a simple rule in group Gk). In the example shown in Figure 3.6, Q1 is
empty, since there are no complex rules in R that are more highly prioritized than
the simple rules R1 and R2. In contrast, Q2 = {R3}, as the complex rule R3 is
more highly prioritized than the simple rule R4 and thus could match on packets
that have been assigned to R4 by the FPGA. Similarly, Q3 is set to {R3, R5}, as
R3 and R5 are more highly prioritized than the simple rule R6. The function
BUILD_RULE_SET_INTERVALS in Algorithm 1 describes the general construction of
intervals and complex groups.
Algorithm 1 Build intervals and complex groups for interval strategy.
1: function BUILD_RULE_SET_INVERVALS(Rule set R)
2: I ← [ ] // set of intervals I
3: Q ← [ ] // set of complex rule groups Q
4: group_index← 1
5: in_simple← false
6: for Rule Ri ∈ R do
7: if IS_SIMPLE(Ri) then
8: // find the first simple rule of a consecutive group of simple rules
9: if not in_simple then
10: // set interval start to the index of the rule in RS
11: Igroup_index,first ← RS(i)
12: in_simple← true
13: Q ← Q+ Qgroup_index-1
14: if i = |R| then // stop if end of rule set is reached
15: Igroup_index,last ← RS(i)
16: I ← I + [Igroup_index]
17: else // Ri is a complex rule
18: if in_simple then
19: // Ri is the first complex rule after a simple rule
20: in_simple← false
21: // preceding simple rule is the end of the interval
22: Igroup_index,last ← RS(i− 1)
23: I ← I + [Igroup_index]
24: group_index← group_index + 1
25: Qgroup_index ← Qgroup_index-1
26: Qgroup_index ← Qgroup_index + [Ri]
27: if i = |R| then
28: Q ← Q+ Qgroup_index
29: return (I,Q)
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Algorithm 2 Look-up and build complex sub-group for packet P .
1: function GET_COMPLEX_SUBSET(I,Q, match_index, ARS ,P )
2: for Interval Ii ∈ I do
3: if match_index ≥ Ii,first & match_index ≤ Ii,last then
4: set action of match-anything-rule R∗ to ARS ,P
5: QP ← Qi + R∗
6: return (QP )
Whenever a packet P is shunted to the host, the FPGA driver fetches the tuple
<match_index, ARS ,P > from the hardware. Then, the FPGA driver code on the
host determines the index k of the interval Ik that contains the match_index.
Without referring to the technical implementation of the look-up procedure,
function GET_COMPLEX_SUBSET in Algorithm 2 formally describes how to resolve
the complex sub-group including the default action for each packet. In HyPaFilter,
before the actual netfilter packet classification starts, the index k, as well as
the hardware action code ARS ,P are written to the most significant 28 and least
significant 4 bits of the netfilter mark field, which is a 32 bit metadata field
attached to the packet P . With netfilter supporting tests on the mark field, we
can use this information to achieve two goals: first, we want to limit the set of
complex rules that must be tested in netfilter to only those that are more highly
prioritized than the first matching simple rule. Second, we want to apply the
hardware-computed action ARS ,P in netfilter without the need to re-traverse
any simple rule in software if there is no match in RC .
To this end, the rules that are installed in netfilter for the interval strategy
are implemented as search tree, following an approach introduced in [38]. In
HyPaFilter, this search tree is generated as follows: the netfilter rule set starts
with a sequence of rules which implement a binary search over the interval index
k encoded in the most significant 28 bits of the mark field, while the groups
of complex rules Qk are placed into separate chains. This allows netfilter to
quickly locate the chain of relevant complex rules Qk during the matching process,
as sketched in Figure 3.7. Finally, each chain containing Qk ends with fallback
rules, which can either be a group of one rule for each possible action, or a jump
instruction to an equivalent chain containing those rules. This fallback group uses
the least significant four bits of the mark field to determine and apply the action
ARS ,P to the shunted packet P if no complex rule matches.
In comparison to the full set and cut set strategies, the interval strategy requires
more complex preprocessing in case of a rule update, as the intervals for the
complex rules have to be re-computed and communicated to the hardware driver.
Furthermore, the netfilter binary search tree encoded in the filter rules must be
re-generated. However, this strategy shows the best average classification perfor-
30 Chapter 3 HyPaFilter: A Hybrid Firewall
Fig. 3.7: Different strategies to implement the complex rule set RA in the software filter:
interval strategy.
mance in software when tested with our evaluation rule sets. Here, the number of
traversed rules for each shunted packet P is orders of magnitude smaller than in
the full set and cut set strategies. We point out that for some constellations, i.e.,
software rule sets containing only a few rules, the base structure of the interval
strategy may also increase this number due to the inherent rules used for the tree
structure. Nevertheless, the difference in these cases is negligible. Furthermore,
this approach does not require a change of the netfilter source code in order to
use the hardware-computed matching information. Instead, we completely rely
on existing netfilter match functionality to accelerate the software matching
process.
3.5 System Architecture and Operation
The prototype system for the HyPaFilter system consists of two functional units.
One part is a standard host system, used to run the software firewall and the
toolchain for managing the system. This can even be an already existing firewall
appliance which needs to be upgraded in terms of performance. This system
is extended by the second part, a general purpose FPGA addon card, as shown
in Figure 3.8. These units must provide a sufficient communication path for
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Fig. 3.8: Proposed structure of a HyPaFilter system. The host can be any COTS system
capable of carrying the FPGA NIC.
transferring data and settings between them. The utilized plug-in card is a suitable
FPGA platform that can provide the required interfaces to both communicate with
external Ethernet networks as well as acting as a regular network interface card
in regard to the host system. For our setup, we used the NetFPGA SUME [96]. It
provides multiple network ports and can be plugged into a COTS system via PCIe.
The card acts as the primary network interface connected to both the internal
(e.g., LAN) and the external network (e.g., Internet). The hardware-based filtering
is handled on the FPGA.
The host system carries the FPGA NIC and communicates with it via PCIe. The host
runs the operating system where the software firewall netfilter with iptables
is installed. It also supplies the tools to configure the FPGA, and provides a user
interface for administrating HyPaFilter.
The host and the FPGA card are connected through several communication chan-
nels. For quick and simple configuration settings, the host system is able to set and
read predefined 32 bit registers on the FPGA via PCIe. Network traffic between
FPGA and host is handled via DMA. On the host side, a driver provides the
functionality and interfaces so that the operating system can access the FPGA like
a regular NIC. This is important since we do not want to rely on non-standard
customizations to netfilter for HyPaFilter to work. By using a programming
interface, the configuration of the FPGA can be updated. We used the Xilinx
Vivado software toolchain [129] to generate the FPGA configuration based on a
given rule set.
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Fig. 3.9: Flow of packets through the HyPaFilter system.
System Operation
Incoming packets received from any connected network are first matched against
the rules implemented on the FPGA. Based on the result and its validity with
respect to the rule dependencies, packets are either dropped, forwarded directly
(without interaction of the host system), or shunted to the host for further pro-
cessing. Whenever a packet is shunted, the matching information—match_index
and hardware action—is added to the packet in a driver-readable metadata field,
which is needed for the interval strategy.
For outgoing packets from the host system, the FPGA NIC acts like a standard
NIC. Such packets, e.g., packets shunted and processed by the software firewall
or packets generated by the host itself, are therefore sent out through the corre-
sponding network interface without further analysis. The packet flow is sketched
in Figure 3.9.
Note that in some rare cases, shunting can lead to packet re-ordering, if the rule
set is configured to shunt only a part of the flow’s packets, e.g., distinguished
by additional header fields. Re-ordering is allowed for IP packets, but should
be avoided due to, e.g., negative effects on the performance of the TCP [13].
However, rule constructions where this can occur are rather theoretical. Flows that
are targeted with rule sets that only test for fields examinable by the hardware
matcher are either always shunted or processed in hardware. In fact, in all
real rule sets we analysed during our evaluation (see Section 3.6.1), no packet
re-ordering takes place.
The administrator needs to be able to manage the system without the need to
understand the underlying complexity. In our implementation, we created a
Python command line interface management tool. The general workflow for using
HyPaFilter is shown in Figure 3.10.
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Fig. 3.10: HyPaFilter workflow with the management tool.
Fig. 3.11: Simplified dataflow structure of the NetFPGA SUME. The dashed elements are
available, but not used in our evaluation.
Packet Data Path
The data flow through the FPGA can be shown in two layers. The underlying struc-
ture for general networking and communication tasks is based on the NetFPGA
SUME pipeline [58]. The actual core that is responsible for filtering is embedded
into this pipeline and connected via the AXI4 stream protocol [97] as shown in
Figure 3.11. Internally, the HyPaFilter core uses a data bus width of 512 bits and
runs at 180 MHz. Hence, the theoretically achievable throughput of 92.16 Gbit/s
is enough to fully saturate all four 10 Gbit/s Ethernet ports including protocol
overhead. The NetFPGA SUME currently uses a bus width of 256 bits which is
converted before and after the hardware core.
Packets coming into the hardware core are first distributed (cloned) into a classifi-
cation path and a data path, with the latter being a simple FIFO queue of 64 kB.
In the classification path, the Header Parser extracts relevant information from
incoming packets. For a versatile operation, the header parser must take care of
the data alignment due to VLAN tag-stacks or various variable-length headers.
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Fig. 3.12: Dataflow inside the HyPaFilter hardware core.
Therefore, it is implemented as a multi-stage non-blocking pipeline architecture.
The preprocessed data is forwarded to the filtering module, which is generated by
the management toolchain. After the classification, the decision is forwarded to
the Output Processing, where the determined action is executed: DROP (read from
FIFO and discard), FORWARD, or SHUNT by adapting the output port field in the
packet’s metadata. The register interface can be accessed from the host directly
via PCIe. Figure 3.12 shows the described parts in the module.
As described in Section 3.3, the matching logic is able to classify packets in
constant time. Since the hardware filtering logic contains no components that
could cause a data-pipeline stall, it is clear that the HyPaFilter hardware core
is never the limiting factor for raw data throughput in this setup. Hence, a
reader might note that the separation into data and classification path yields no
advantages in terms of maximum throughput. However, as we aim to support
more complex decisions with possibly non-deterministic lookup time in hardware,
this structure allows for more flexible development. The hardware filter core is
able to extract and classify incoming packets against a variety of parameters like
IP addresses, protocol fields, MAC addresses, port fields and several flags.
3.6 Evaluation
In the evaluation of HyPaFilter, we focus on four important performance metrics
for packet classification architectures: packet rate, network latency, rule set
update latency, and consumption of resources. This stands in contrast to raw data
throughput measurements, which are more targeted at the data flow structure.
The following experiments were conducted:
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Fig. 3.13: Evaluation setup showing the relevant components. Traffic is generated on
the sender and directed through the bridging HyPaFilter firewall.
• determining the maximum number of rules which can be implemented into
the FPGA,
• measuring the maximum packet rate of the NetFPGA SUME architecture,
• measuring the performance of the HyPaFilter system and comparing the
impact of rule updates using different strategies,
• measuring the network latency,
• measuring delays of the update process and number of rules and
• comparing against a commercial OpenFlow SDN firewall setup.
To generate a high workload on the classification engine while avoiding influ-
ence of handling large payloads via PCIe, we used small packets at a high rate.
Packets carry just five arbitrarily chosen bytes as the application layer payload.
For our evaluation, we set up a typical bridging firewall scenario as shown in
Figure 3.13.
Traffic is generated and received by two dedicated machines, whose details can
be found in Table 3.1. We generated rule sets and traffic using the ClassBench
suite [89], which is widely used in this context. The system is easily capable of
saturating the connected networks with traffic. These sender and receiver hosts
are connected to the HyPaFilter system via optical fibre. We counted the number
of packets received by the MAC-Core MAC0 on the NetFPGA and those arriving on
the network interface of the receiver. Further network connections between the
systems to remotely start the test cycles and collect the results are not shown.
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Sender/Receiver Configuration
Host OS Ubuntu Linux
NIC Intel 82599ES Dual 10 Gbit/s
CPU Intel Core i7-7700K
FPGA Host Configuration
Host OS Ubuntu Linux
NIC Intel 82599ES Dual 10 Gbit/s
CPU Intel Xeon E5-1650 v3
FPGA PCIe Card NetFPGA SUME release 1.0.0
Development Software Xilinx Vivado 2014.4
Software Firewall netfilter and iptables v1.4.21
Tab. 3.1: System configuration.
The HyPaFilter host system carries the FPGA plug-in card and serves as the back-
end software firewall. Its details can also be found in Table 3.1. The hardware
filter core is integrated into a modified data pipeline based on the reference NIC
project of the NetFPGA SUME.
3.6.1 Test Rule Sets
To evaluate the classification performance under replicable conditions, we gen-
erated our test rule sets with ClassBench [89]. The number of rules we could fit
onto the FPGA was limited by the timing constraints and resulted in a maximum
of 1100 rules. For evaluating our classification algorithm and strategy, we created
three different UDP rule sets acl1k1, fw1k1 and ipc1k1, with all rules applying
the action ACCEPT. This way, the number of dropped packets can be regarded as
the packet loss solely due to the architecture. As we only evaluate stateless classi-
fication performance, no state handling is performed and the network protocol of
a packet has no influence on the processing speed.
ClassBench’s trace_generator was used to generate trace files corresponding to the
rule sets, using the parameter sets provided in [100]. A C program was developed
and used for generating and transmitting the test packet stream from such a trace
file. Besides, we were granted access to three confidential real-world rule sets by
one customer of the computer security company genua.
For each test, the rule set was processed by the HyPaFilter management tool,
integrated in the NetFPGA SUME pipeline, and afterwards synthesized and im-
plemented into an FPGA configuration bitfile. Table 3.2 shows the resource
utilization of the FPGA configuration for a Virtex 7 690T. The relevant parameters
are usage of FFs, LUTs, LUTs used as memory elements (Memory LUT), and block
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Resource acl1k fw1k ipc1k
FF 9.12% / 0.86% 9.12% / 0.86% 8.26% / 0.86%
LUT 15.07% / 1.69% 16.22% / 2.85% 13.38% / 1.83%
Memory LUT 1.07% / 0.01% 1.10% / 0.01% 1.10% / 0.01%
BRAM 16.73% / 2.72% 16.73% / 2.72% 14.01% / 2.72%
Tab. 3.2: FPGA resource utilization overall/HyPaFilter core with different rule sets.
Variance between different runs is negligible.
random-access memory (BRAM). Differences can be caused by the different rule
sets and heuristic algorithms used during the implementation process in Vivado.
To measure the impact of changes or occurrences of complex rules to the rule set,
we added in each test new rules to certain positions, starting from the end of the
rule set. We used the following policy:
-m string --algo bm --string BAD -m statistic\
--mode random --probability 0.99
This rule makes use of several modules that are available in netfilter, i.e., string
matching and statistical analysis. However, the implemented policy itself is a toy
example, as its main purpose is to implement a demanding rule in the rule set
which cannot be handled by the hardware classification system. To evaluate the
effect of the properties of these complex rules, we repeated the performance tests
with “best-case complex rules” that had no complex operation (i.e., they artificially
enforced shunting without additional processing steps in software). We found a
negligible average performance increase of 0.036 pp (σ = 0.15). Therefore, the
nature of the complex rules is not important for our evaluation.
3.6.2 Impact of Packet Shunting
In our first experiment, we measured the impact of shunting packets to the soft-
ware. As processing packets directly in hardware without any software interaction
provides the lowest latency and highest packet rate, we expect to achieve the best
packet rate if no packets are shunted at all. If the fraction of packets that are
shunted to the host increases, a drop in the obtained packet rate is to be expected.
For this test, the FPGA NIC was configured to forward a certain number of the
packets directly to the target, while the other packets were shunted to the host.
To exclude additional processing overhead on the host system, all shunted packets
were directly software-bridged to the outgoing interface without software firewall
interaction.
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Fig. 3.14: Impact of shunting packets without firewalling, standard deviation too small
to be visible.
We compared the number of ingress packets on the FPGA to the number of packets
received at the receiver. Each data point shows the average packet rate of ten test
runs, each lasting for 20 seconds. The standard deviation is too small to be visible.
Figure 3.14 shows the results of this experiment. When all packets are forwarded
by the FPGA, the test setup is capable of operating at line speed. With more
packets being shunted to the software, the performance drops continuously. When
all packets are shunted, the NetFPGA SUME basically acts as a simple NIC with
a simple DMA engine, no offloading mechanisms are utilized. In this case, only
5.59% of the packets can be handled by the evaluated system. This demonstrates
that in a hybrid system like the proposed one, FPGA-to-host communication is
expensive and should be avoided in order to reach line speed performance. In
comparison, the detection and output queue assignment of a shunted packet
extends the processing pipeline by just one clock cycle, which has no measurable
effect on the throughput or packet rate.
3.6.3 Architecture Packet Rate
Forwarding packets directly in hardware provides the lowest latency and highest
packet rate. Therefore, the first experiment was used to measure the maximum
packet rate dependent on the percentage of packets shunted to the software. We
will later compare the packet rate of the different strategies against these values.
As the generated packets by the sender will match the rule set at certain positions
with a predefined distribution, the hardware filter was used in combination with
the shunt_index to shunt parts of the traffic to the software. There were no








































Fig. 3.15: Packet rate of the underlying architecture as a function of the fraction of
packets forwarded through hardware. At shunt_index = 0 all packets are
shunted to the software, while at shunt_index = 1100 all packets are
forwarded.
We compared the number of ingress packets vs. packets received at the receiver,
which is the inverse of packets being dropped in the firewall. Each data point
shows the average packet rate of ten 20 second test runs, with distribution of the
workload being set by the shunt_index as the variable parameter. The average
number of ingress packets arriving at the HyPaFilter network interface in each
test run before any classification is 22 945 747 (σ = 230 847) in 20 s. Figure 3.15
shows the percentage of packets arriving at the receiver. The standard deviation
is too small to be visible in the plot. The architecture of the host system and the
NetFPGA SUME used as a simple NIC are only capable of processing on average
6.4% of the packets which arrive at the NetFPGA input interface. Increasing the
shunt_index and therefore reducing the fraction of shunted packets increases the
overall amount close to 100% when all packets are directly forwarded by the
FPGA NIC.
Strategy Comparison
To evaluate the performance of the different strategies described in Section 3.4,
the setup was adapted to use firewalling. Starting with a hardware-only scenario,
we measured the impact of rule insertions without updating the hardware filter
definition. The insertion of rules instead updates the shunt_index register on the
FPGA. This subsequently causes an increasing amount of packets to be shunted to
the software firewall.
We conducted our experiments by following a certain test cycle for all three
strategies and repeated them for each of the three sample rule sets acl1k1,
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ipc1k1, and fw1k1. During the test cycle, we measured the average packet
throughput after iteration n following these steps:
• implement the sample rule set onto the FPGA and set shunt_index to match
everything in hardware,
• for test run n = 0, insert a new rule at position P0 = 1100 and set
shunt_index = P0,
• for test run n, insert a new rule at position Pn = 1100 − 100n and set
shunt_index = Pn,
• repeat last step until Pn = 0.
For the first part of this test, we used the full set strategy and loaded the com-
plete rule set in netfilter. As mentioned in Section 3.4, this leads to a high
redundancy in the matching. For example, an update at position index P = 500
sets shunt_index = 500, therefore all packets with match_index ≥ 500 will be
shunted. These packets will, however, never match the first 500 rules in netfilter
(counting from index zero), making them essentially useless.
For large shunt_indexes, the tests confirmed the assumption that significant per-
formance gains can already be achieved by removing the parts of the netfilter
rule set that correspond to match_index < shunt_index (cut set strategy).
Figures 3.16, 3.17, and 3.18 show the packet throughput (received packets) for
complex string matching rules at different positions. For comparison, the average
packet throughput of an equivalent software-only netfilter setup is given. The
maximum relative packet throughput at shunt_index = 1100 reaches 30-fold
increase. The error bars show the standard deviation.
For the full set strategy, it can be clearly seen that the packet rate behaves non-
monotonic and dips near shunt_index = 800. This can be explained by the
combination of two contrary effects: first, with the shunt_index decreasing, an
increasing number of shunted packets causes the software performance to reach
its limit. Second, with the shunt_index increasing, the packets that are shunted
will only match a decreasingly smaller part at the end of the software rule set.
This means that the average number of rules traversed by the packets will also
increase, regardless of the constant total number of software rules.
To get a better overview of the performance increase by applying the improved














































Interval Cut set Full set
Fig. 3.16: Packet throughput of HyPaFilter with complex inserted rules and different














































Interval Cut set Full set
Fig. 3.17: Packet throughput of HyPaFilter with complex inserted rules and different














































Interval Cut set Full set
Fig. 3.18: Packet throughput of HyPaFilter with complex inserted rules and different
strategies, compared to the average software-only netfilter setup: ipc1k1
rule set.



































Fig. 3.19: Speedup of the enhanced strategies with complex inserted rules, compared to



































Fig. 3.20: Speedup of the enhanced strategies with complex inserted rules, compared to



































Fig. 3.21: Speedup of the enhanced strategies with complex inserted rules, compared to
the full set strategy: ipc1k1 rule set.
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relative speedup, again for using complex string matching rules in the insertion
process, can be seen in Figures 3.19, 3.20, and 3.21. Large gains of performance
of both the cut set and interval strategy can be seen due to the reduction of the
long path effect which is causing the equivalent dip for with the full set strategy
near shunt_index = 800. Slight breakouts below the value of one lie within
the standard error for the affected data points. With an increased amount of
complex software rules with high priority (low shunt_index), the advantage of our
hardware assisted binary search algorithm used in the interval strategy becomes
clear.
3.6.4 Network Latency
While the packet classification rate is the most interesting parameter to measure
for evaluation, the additional latency which is added by security appliances can
be a major issue for certain applications, e. g., in data centers [114]. Our network
latency measurement splits into two parts: the additional delay of the HyPaFilter
hardware core in the NetFPGA SUME pipeline, and the actual delay which can be
seen on network packets.
The internal additional delay in the FPGA could be determined in the Vivado
Simulator and is fully deterministic at 24 clock cycles. With a clock rate of
180 MHz, the core therefore adds an additional delay of 133 ns compared to the
NetFPGA SUME in NIC operation.
In order to check for the overall network latency imposed by the HyPaFilter
system, the round-trip time (RTT) was measured with ping, sending 50 packets
per test. While a direct connection between sender and receiver (without the
NetFPGA SUME) shows an average one way latency of 51 µs (σ = 3.2 µs), with
the HyPaFilter system present and forwarded packets only we saw a tolerable
increase to 52 µs (σ = 5.4 µs). For packets shunted through software without any
firewall interaction it further increased to 73 µs (σ = 3.5 µs). The highest average
delay of 96 µs (σ = 7 µs) occurred with shunted packets and an active software
rule set of 1100 rules loaded into netfilter.
With the limitation of the uncertainty of the measurement method, the results
show that our hardware filtering algorithm is suitable for low latency require-
ments.






















Full set  #installed rules    
Full set  #worst case rules
Cut set  #installed rules    
Cut set  #worst case rules
Interval #installed rules    
Interval #worst case rules
Fig. 3.22: Number of installed/worst case traversed rules for different strategies.
3.6.5 Rule Set Parameters
The strong influence of the number of rules in a software firewall on its classifica-
tion performance leads to the question how many rules are loaded into the firewall
for the three different strategies after applying the update cycle. These numbers
were determined by exporting the rules with iptables-save and counting the
correspondent lines. As HyPaFilter uses a binary tree searching algorithm, we
also evaluated the worst case path length, i. e., the highest number of potentially
traversed rules for incoming packets. Figure 3.22 gives an overview of the actual
number of rules which are active in netfilter for different strategies, as well as
the number of rules which have to be evaluated in the worst case.
3.6.6 Update Delay
Another interesting parameter is the time required for different types of updates
required for different strategies. We therefore measured the time for inserting
rules, updating the shunt_index register in the FPGA, and uploading a new config-
uration to the FPGA. According to our test cycle, the delays for the insertion were
determined for consecutive insertions of rules at certain positions, i. e., the test at
shunt_index = 900 is executed with the assumption of rules previously inserted
at position 1100 and 1000. The update process involves different operations for
each strategy:
• for the full set strategy, inserting a single rule with iptables and setting
shunt_index,
• for the cut set strategy, truncating the rule set, inserting and loading this set
with iptables-restore, and setting shunt_index,
• for the interval strategy, calculating intervals, inserting the chained rule set
































Interval Cut set Full set
Fig. 3.23: Update latency of different strategies.
Possible discrepancies in the classification result during the update process can
be avoided by initially setting the shunt_index to 0 and keeping the default drop
policy for the software firewall. Figure 3.23 shows the result of this test, as an
average of ten test cycles for each data point. Setting the shunt_index register on
the FPGA alone takes 1 µs. The measured time confirms our assumptions about
the cost for rule insertions (see Section 3.4).
The synthesis and implementation process that is used to generate the new
bitfile with one of the test rule sets requires about 45 minutes on the described
HyPaFilter evaluation host, using Vivado 2014.4. The Xilinx tool xmd, which is
used to configure the FPGA with this bitfile via the programming interface finishes
in 17.38 s. During this time, the network is interrupted. In our test cycles, no
hardware update was required to reach the stated results.
3.6.7 OpenFlow SDN
The logical division into a hardware filtering unit with a software backend is
in several aspects similar to the concept of an SDN. In a typical SDN switch
setup, a controller would place flows dynamically into the hardware, allowing fast
transmission of matching packets. For a firewall application, the requirements are
more complicated than for a simple switch. To build SDN firewalls, controllers with
such extended functionality exist [99]. We attempted to compare the performance
of HyPaFilter against such an SDN setup.
To this end, the NetFPGA was replaced with a Quanta Computer LB8 48-port SDN
[121] switch running PicOS. For a fair comparison, we used a publicly available
and stable controller, OpenIRIS v2.2.1 [99], which was installed on the HyPaFilter
host system. The OpenFlow 1.3 protocol is used for the communication with the
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switch. OpenIRIS includes a firewall module which can be controlled via the REST
API [123]. The number of incoming packets was determined through the web
interface of OpenIRIS.
We noticed several issues of the OpenIRIS firewall module during our evalua-
tion:
• Rules could not be added to certain positions. Although it is possible to
define a ruleid, the parameter seems to be ignored and replaced by a
random value which is not related to the actual (logical) position of the rule.
New rules are always prepended to the current rule set.
• The source and destination port could not be specified as a range.
• The port fields could not be set to values higher than 32767, obviously due
to sign conversion problems.
The update process therefore has to be carried out by first deleting all rules and
then adding all rules of our rule set in reverse order. Loading 1100 rules into
the module with the REST API takes 3.9 s on average. During our evaluation we
found out that the firewall only placed flows into the hardware for ICMP ping
packets and established TCP sessions. Our test data (UDP packets), as well as
generic TCP packets do not trigger this mechanism, therefore forcing each packet
into the slow path to the controller. Although not configurable, this behaviour
may be a protection against SYN flooding of the flow table, i. e., purposefully
trying to fill the flow table with useless entries. We concluded that due to these
effects, a fair comparison against our setup was not possible. These issues were
not further investigated.
Apart from this naive standard approach, a more sophisticated way of setting up a
hybrid SDN/software firewall is described in Chapter 6.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter we introduced HyPaFilter, a hybrid packet classification approach
which combines the parallel matching capabilities of specialized hardware with
the extensive matching semantics of widely used software packet filters. HyPaFil-
ter accomplishes this task by partitioning the implemented packet processing
policy into a simple and a complex part, where the simple part can be handled
directly in hardware and the complex part is installed in the software filter. In-
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coming network packets are first processed in hardware and are shunted to the
software filter only in the case where complex processing is required. We present a
novel strategy how the software-implemented part of the rule set can be organized
in order to reuse matching information from the hardware. This strategy can be
used on top of netfilter and does not require changes of the netfilter source
code. The actual hardware filter is not limited to our evaluation example. It can
be any suitable algorithm which provides the match index. Our evaluation of
HyPaFilter based on a combination of a NetFPGA SUME device and a Linux host
system demonstrates significant increases in the achievable throughput over a
software-only approach, even with rule set constellations where the majority of
incoming packets must be processed in software. A major potential for further
performance increase could be exploited by handling a larger share of the traffic
on the FPGA without involving the software firewall. This will be addressed in
the following chapter.
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In the previous chapter, we described approaches for building a hybrid FPGA-
software firewall classification system. A significant performance increase was
achieved by re-using hardware classification data in the software classification
process. However, the shunting decision (index-based shunting) follows a straight-
forward approach by using the index of the most highly prioritized complex or
modified rule as the threshold. Each packet that hits a rule beyond this shunt_index
is shunted to the software firewall, where optimizations mitigate the software clas-
sification effort. Nonetheless, the shunting of a packet itself is a severe bottleneck:
the evaluation results in Section 3.6.2 show that with all packets shunted, the
hybrid system only achieves about 6% of the hardware-only packet throughput.
In order to achieve higher throughput gains, especially with more demanding rule
set constellations, it is desirable to keep as much traffic on the FPGA as possible.
This leads to the question how we can define more precisely which traffic must be
shunted.
In this chapter, we therefore describe an analysis method for the rule set that
allows to further dissect whether simple rules actually have a logical dependency
with regard to the defined checks in the header to a complex rule. For this, we
make use of the geometric representation of those checks which will be introduced
in the following section. Using this representation, we can apply header space
analysis (HSA), which was introduced in [50] as a measure to analyse complex
firewall rule sets for configuration errors. A similar analysis approach used for
anomaly analysis in distributed firewall systems has also been shown in [34].
The extended HyPaFilter approach is called HyPaFilter+, where HSA is used to
check whether a complex rule has no logical dependency with a lower prioritized
rule. If this is the case, those independent, non-complex rules do not need to be
set as shunting rules, hereby reducing shunting traffic. As this requires a support
for selective flagging and shunting decisions, the hardware filtering circuit of
Chapter 3 needs to be adapted. The evaluation results show that both real and
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synthetic rule sets have few logical dependencies among their rules. HyPaFil-
ter+ can therefore sustain the up to 30-fold performance increase significantly
longer and for more demanding rule set constellations. In combination, both soft-
ware and hardware optimization approaches achieve a fast and versatile hybrid
FPGA firewall.
4.2 Geometric Representation of Rules
In order to apply an HSA to rule sets, the rule representation of Section 2.2
needs to be extended. Recall that every rule Ri consists of K checks C
j
i : Dj →
{true, false}. Here, the checks Cji are assumed to be equality, range, or subnet
tests, which are the most common types of tests used in rule sets [38, 54]. Every
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i ∈ Dj . Accordingly, every rule Ri has a geometric representation













We say that two rules Ri and Rk (i ̸= k) conflict iff there is a header tuple H that
matches both rules, i.e., iff
∃H ∈ U : Ri(H) ∧Rk(H),
or equivalently, G(Ri) ∩G(Rk) ̸= ∅.
In Section 2.2, the extended packet classification was described with rules con-
taining simple checks Ci as well as complex checks Ei:
Ri = C1i ∧ . . . ∧ CKi ∧ Ei.
In our setup, only the simple checks Ci are feasible for both hardware and software
classification and are therefore used in the geometric representation. Therefore,
for each rule Ri, we define the geometric reduction R−i , which projects Ri to its
simple checks Cji and removes the complex part Ei. The geometric reduction is
of major importance for the proposed packet classification architecture for two
reasons: first, if a rule Ri is a simple rule, then we can implement Ri in hardware
on the FPGA. Second, if a rule Ri is implemented in software due to being a
complex rule, we leverage its geometrical reduction R−i in a preprocessing step in
order to decide which packets must be shunted to the software packet processor
and which packets can be safely handled in hardware only.
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-d 1.2.3.4/32 -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT # Rule R1
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 1.2.3.0/24 -p tcp -j ACCEPT # Rule R2
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 1.2.3.5/32 -p udp --dport 3306 -m string # Rule R3
--string " SELECT " --algo bm -j DROP #
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 1.2.3.4/32 -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT # Rule R4
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 1.2.3.6/32 -p udp --dport 53 -m string # Rule R5
--hex - string "|11|2|00|" --algo bm -j DROP #
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 1.2.3.6/32 -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT # Rule R6
Listing 4.1: Example rule set R in iptables syntax.
4.3 Selective Shunting
The crucial contribution of HyPaFilter+ is a new shunting algorithm in contrast
to index-based shunting, as introduced in Section 3.3. Index-based shunting can
lead to situations where packets are shunted to the host system, although they
could not match any more highly prioritized complex rules.
For example, a TCP packet that matches on rule R4 in Listing 4.1 cannot match
the complex rule R3, since R3 and R4 are mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, using
index-based shunting, the packet would still be shunted to the host, because R3 is
more highly prioritized than R4. This, in turn, leads to a higher workload on the
software classifier and can eventually result in throughput penalties.
In this section, we introduce selective shunting, a method to optimize the shunting
decisions taken on the FPGA based on a formal HSA. The selective shunting
technique leverages the geometric representations (i.e., the header spaces) of
rules to safely narrow down the number of ambiguous rules that result in packets
being shunted to the host. In consequence, this increases the likelihood of a packet
to be processed by the FPGA alone. To this end, we compute a shunting vector
VRS that stores a single shunt bit for every simple rule Rj in RS . In the following,
we denote the jth bit in VRS by VRS [j]. Further, we denote the set of complex
rules in R that are more highly prioritized than Rj by Γj . A set shunt bit VRS [j]
indicates that there exists at least one possible packet header that matches both
the simple rule Rj and at least one complex rule in Γj . Hence, Rj conflicts with
at least one rule in Γj . Using the geometric representations of rules, the layout of





(G(R−) ∩G(Rj)) ̸= ∅
0, otherwise.
(4.1)
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R  ∈ R1 C



























R  ∈ R3 C
R  ∈ R2 S
Fig. 4.1: Example sketch for different rules in a reduced two-dimensional header space.
After the shunting vector VRS has been computed in a preprocessing step, it
is stored on the FPGA. Each time a packet is classified by the FPGA matching
circuitry, we use the determined match_index in order to look up the shunt
bit VRS [match_index]. This is in contrast to index-based shunting, where we
compared match_index with shunt_index. Only if the shunt bit is set, the packet is
sent to the host for further classification, because the matching simple rule could
be overruled by a more highly prioritized complex rule. Otherwise, it can be safely
treated entirely in hardware.
We use Figure 4.1 to visualize the difference between index-based and selective
shunting in a two-dimensional header space example. With index-based shunting,
all packets are shunted due to the complex rule R1 with the highest priority. In
contrast, with selective shunting only those packets are shunted that match the
simple rule R5 on the FPGA, since R5 is the only simple rule whose geometric
shape intersects with those of the complex rules R1 or R3.
The procedure SELECTIVE_SHUNTING_ANALYSIS (SSA) for the computation of
VRS is shown in Algorithm 3. It can be seen that SSA appends one bit to the
shunting vector VRS for every simple rule in the input rule set R. For each simple
rule, the bit is computed by testing whether the intersection of the geometric
representation of the simple rule with the geometric representation of any more
Algorithm 3 Compute the shunt vector from the rule set R.
1: function IS_SIMPLE_RULE(Rule R)
2: return G(R−) = G(R)
3: function IS_COMPLEX_RULE(Rule R)
4: return G(R−) ̸= G(R)
5: function SELECTIVE_SHUNTING_ANALYSIS(Rule set R)
6: VRS ← [ ] // Initialize VRS with an empty vector
7: for i ∈ {1, . . . , |R|} do
8: if IS_SIMPLE_RULE(R[i]) then
9: bit← 0
10: for j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1} do
11: if IS_COMPLEX_RULE(R[j]) then // check if rule R[j] is complex
12: if G(R[j]−) ∩G(R[i]) ̸= ∅ then
13: bit← 1
14: VRS ← VRS + [bit] // Append bit to VRS
15: return VRS
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highly prioritized complex rule in R is empty. Hence, the runtime complexity of














(for simple rule R1)
(for simple rule R2)
(for simple rule R4)
(for simple rule R6)
(4.2)
The rules R1 and R2, which are both simple rules, are the first and second rule in
R. Hence, they cannot conflict with any more highly prioritized complex rules, and
therefore, their corresponding shunt bits are zero. Since rule R4 does not conflict
with the complex rule R3 due to the different transport layer protocol check, R4’s
shunt bit is also set to zero. Finally, R6’s shunt bit is set to one, because it conflicts
with the more highly prioritized complex rule R5. The resulting shunting vector
[0,0,0,1] leads to fewer packet shunts than index-based shunting, since packets
that first match rule R4 can be processed entirely in hardware.
We now prove both the correctness and the HSA-ideality of shunting vectors
computed by the SSA procedure.
Definition 1. (False negative) A shunt bit b = VRS [RS(i)] that corresponds to
the simple rule Ri in R is false negative if b = 0 and if there exists a more highly
prioritized complex rule Rj with j < i in R that conflicts with R.
Definition 2. (Correctness) The shunting vector VRS for the rule set R is correct if
it does not contain false negative shunt bits.
Theorem 1. The application of SSA always results in correct shunting vectors.
Proof. Theorem 1 follows directly from Algorithm 3: for every bit b = VRS [RS(i)]
that corresponds to the simple rule Ri, every more highly prioritized complex rule
Rj with j < i in R is checked whether it conflicts with Ri. If such a complex rule
exists, b is set to 1 and thus cannot be a false negative. □
Definition 3. (False positive) A shunt bit b = VRS [RS(i)] that corresponds to the
simple rule Ri ∈ R is false positive if b = 1 and if there does not exist a more highly
prioritized complex rule Rj with j < i in R that conflicts with Ri.
Definition 4. (HSA-ideal shunting vector) An HSA-ideal shunting vector VRS for
the rule set R is correct and does not contain any false positive shunt bits.
Theorem 2. For any rule set R, the application of SSA always computes an HSA-
ideal shunting vector.
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Proof. Let VRS be the SSA-computed shunting vector for a given rule set R. The
correctness of VRS follows from Theorem 1. Assume that VRS contains a false
positive shunt bit b = VRS [RS(i)] for the simple rule Ri. Since b was set to 1 by
the SSA procedure, there must exist an index j with j < i, such that the rule Rj
is complex and conflicts with Ri. This contradicts the assumption that b is false
positive. □
We call a simple rule Ri ∈ R a shunting rule if the employed shunting technique
(i.e., index-based or selective shunting) decides that a packet with match_index
= RS(i) must be shunted to the host for further processing. If this is not the case,
we call Ri a non-shunting rule. Intuitively, it is desirable that many simple rules
in R are non-shunting rules, as this will allow hardware-only processing if these
rules are the highest prioritized matching ones.
In comparison to index-based shunting, selective shunting requires higher prepro-
cessing times in case of a rule set update in order to compute the shunt vector.
However, this effort is rewarded by possibly much fewer packets having to be
shunted to the host at runtime. This, in turn, leads to significantly higher packet
processing rates, as we will show in our evaluation.
We point out that it is possible to even further reduce the number of shunted
packets by installing the geometric reduction R−i of every complex rule Ri in
the hardware matcher. In this case, the size of the hardware-computed result
vector Vres increases from |RS | to |R|, as the hardware matcher also generates
one result bit for the geometric reduction of every complex rule. Consequently, a
packet P only has to be shunted if the most significant set bit Vres[i∗] corresponds
to a complex rule Ri∗ ∈ R. This approach requires modifications of our rule
set-tailored matching circuitry in case of a rule set update, which is very time-
consuming. In contrast, a software rule set update could be carried out in less
than two seconds in most cases. Hence, we opted for the proposed shunting
strategies. A hybrid approach exploiting this possibility by using dynamic update
capabilities will be treated in Chapter 6. For stateless rules, the analysis could also
further evaluate whether the action of a complex rule and a conflicting simple rule
is equivalent. In this case, the simple rule does not need to be set as a shunting
rule.
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-d 192.0.2.0/24 -s <EXTNET > -p tcp -m conntrack # R1
--ctstate ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT #
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 192.0.2.0/24 -d <EXTNET > -p tcp -m conntrack # R2
--ctstate NEW -j ACCEPT #
Listing 4.2: Example stateful rule set RA .
-d 192.0.2.0/24 -s <EXTNET > -p tcp -m conntrack # R1
--ctstate ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT #
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 192.0.2.0/24 -d <EXTNET > -p tcp -j ACCEPT # R2
Listing 4.3: Example rule set RB without explicit call of the conntrack module in R2.
4.4 Firewall Semantics with Implicit
State-Tracking
HyPaFilter+ uses netfilter/iptables as the software firewall compartment and
also relies on its syntax for describing rule sets. netfilter uses an implicit state-
tracking mechanism, meaning that any packet handled by the software firewall
can alter and affect states, even if it hits a stateless rule or the default policy. A
typical example for a stateful firewall policy is given in Listing 4.2.
Rule R2 allows to establish new, outgoing TCP connections. Afterwards, re-
turn traffic referring to one of the established connections can pass in. With
netfilter, however, every packet that is passed through the firewall is automati-
cally tracked by the state-tracking mechanism, without the need for the parameter
-m conntrack. This means that packets hitting rule R2 in the altered example
policy in Listing 4.3 will also create and affect connection states that can be
referred to by rule R1. The only difference of the two examples is therefore that
R2 in Listing 4.3 allows any outgoing TCP traffic, not just new connections and
does not explicitly specify the use of the conntrack module.
This behaviour necessitates special care at the analysis of the rule set if the goal
is to mimic an identical semantic for the hybrid system as it would be for a
standalone netfilter firewall: either, the administrator must ensure that all
rules that could possibly affect states for stateful rules contain the correspondent
parameter, or the analysis must be extended to respect those dependencies.
This extension can be achieved as follows. First, all traffic that does not match
a hardware rule in the FPGA must be passed to the software firewall. This is
trivially handled by the default hardware policy. Secondly, for all stateful rules,
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Algorithm 4 Compute the shunt vector from the rule set R, preserving implicit
state-tracking semantic.
1: function IS_SIMPLE_RULE(Rule R)
2: return G(R−) = G(R)
3: // flips source and destination fields, e.g. IP addresses and port numbers
4: function REVERSE_DIRECTION(Rule R)




9: function SELECTIVE_SHUNTING_ANALYSIS(Rule set R)
10: VRS ← [ ] // Initialize VRS with an empty vector
11: for i ∈ {1, . . . , |R|} do
12: if j = i then
13: continue
14: if IS_SIMPLE_RULE(R[i]) then
15: bit← 0
16: for j ∈ {1, . . . , |R|} do
17: if R[j]− ̸= R[j] then // check if rule R[j] is complex
18: if R[j].stateful = false then // rule is complex but not stateful
19: if j ≥ i then
20: continue
21: if G(R[j]−) ∩G(R[i]) ̸= ∅ then
22: bit← 1
23: else // rule is complex and stateful
24: if G(R[j]−) ∩G(R[i]) ̸= ∅ then
25: bit← 1
26: if G(R[j]−) ∩G(REVERSE_DIRECTION(R[i])) ̸= ∅ then
27: bit← 1
28: VRS ← VRS + [bit] // Append bit to VRS
29: return VRS
the dependency analysis must be expanded to the full rule set, in contrast to only
evaluating rules with higher priority. In order to cover return traffic, the reverse
direction of the given rule must also be considered, i.e., the analysis must be
run with flipped source and destination fields as well. This extended analysis is
given by Algorithm 4. As for the shunting analysis described in Section 4.3, all
dependent rules must then be set as shunting rules and incorporated in the rule
set of the software firewall compartment. Note that the conntrac module also
supports a referral to related connections. This can be used for protocols like, e.g.,
active mode File Transfer Protocol (FTP), where different ports are used for a data
and a control channel. This more advanced feature is not covered by the extended
analysis.
4.5 Software and Hardware Filter Adaptions
The selective shunting approach requires changes to the hardware classification
unit, as the former shunting decision in HyPaFilter was based on index comparison
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only. Furthermore, the geometric dependency analysis allows for an improvement
to one of the software classification strategies described in Section 3.4.
4.5.1 Software Strategy Improvement
Recall the cut set strategy introduced in Section 3.4. Here, β was defined as an
index such that a shunted packet can never match a rule Ri ∈ R with i < β. In the
case of index-based shunting, β is equal to shunt_index. For selective shunting, β is
the index of the most highly prioritized simple rule Rβ ∈ R with VRS [RS(β)] = 1.
We already know that no simple rule with an index less than β can match a packet
that has been forwarded to the software filter—otherwise the packet would have
been processed solely on the FPGA. In both cases, the rule set installed in the
software filter equals RC and in {Rj |Rj ∈ RS ∧ j ≥ β}.
With the same HSA calculations that we used in selective shunting, this rule set
can be further reduced, since the analysis exactly determines which rules of RS
the packet could match. Therefore, it is only necessary to install all rules in RC
and in {Rj |Rj ∈ RS∧VRS [j] = 1} in the software filter. We will call this improved
variant HSA cut set strategy. This reduction produces correct results, regardless
of whether index-based or selective shunting is used in the hardware matching
unit.
4.5.2 Hardware Classification Unit
The decision function, which was introduced in Section 3.4 to choose whether to
shunt or to forward a packet, was defined as match_index ≥ shunt_index. With
selective shunting, this function needs to be replaced by a decision on a per-rule
basis: packets are shunted if VRS [match_index] = 1. The same LLO filter—an
MPFC—as for HyPaFilter is used, but directly combined with the shunting vector
VRS . This vector is implemented as a simple bit vector register that can be written
at runtime from the host. Nevertheless, any matcher can be used as long as the
matching information for all rules—rather than only the one with the highest
priority—can be extracted.
4.6 Evaluation
HyPaFilter+ aims to achieve an additional performance increase over HyPaFil-
ter by reducing the number of shunted packets. Therefore, we investigate in our











































































Fig. 4.2: Evaluation setup showing the relevant components. Traffic is generated on the
sender and directed through the bridging HyPaFilter+ firewall.
software filter can be improved when used with HyPaFilter+, and how the per-
formance varies with rule set size and structure. Furthermore, we evaluate in
detail the impact of newly introduced shunting techniques over the index-based
shunting used in HyPaFilter on the number of packets that must be processed
on the host system. The measurement setup is similar to the one used for the
evaluation of HyPaFilter in Section 3.6, but uses different hardware for the host
system, sender and receiver. We used a different test procedure which allows a
better evaluation of the performance gains taking into account the new shunting
strategy under different conditions. No significant difference was measured for
the network latency as conducted in Section 3.6.4, the results are therefore not
shown again. Rule set update delays require additional computations when using
the HSA for selective shunting.
4.6.1 Test Setup
The measurement setup is similar to the setup used for evaluating HyPaFilter in
Section 3.6. A minor difference regards the host, sender and receiver systems.
Details of the configuration can be found in Table 4.1. The bridging firewall
scenario with the HyPaFilter+ components is shown in Figure 4.2. Further
network connections between the systems to remotely start the test cycles and
collect the results are not shown.
4.6.2 Test Rule Sets
The rule sets used for the evaluation were identical to those described in Sec-
tion 3.6.1. In contrast to HyPaFilter, the header fields (IP addresses and port
58 Chapter 4 HyPaFilter+: Mastering Rule Set Dependencies
Sender/Receiver Configuration
Host OS CentOS 6.6
NIC Intel 82599ES Dual 10 Gbit/s
CPU Intel E3-1270
FPGA Host Configuration
Host OS Debian 8.3
NIC Intel 82599ES 10 Gbit/s
CPU Intel Xeon E3-1230
FPGA PCIe Card NetFPGA SUME release 1.0.0
Development Software Xilinx Vivado 2014.4
Software Firewall netfilter and iptables v1.4.21
Tab. 4.1: System configuration.
numbers) of the rules are now decisive for the shunting decision. To better reflect
this in our evaluation, we again used the three real world rule sets1. As the focus
lies on the relationship between the rules with regard to the aforementioned
header fields, these rule sets were prepared in a similar way, i.e., set as UDP rules
and truncated to the same size as the synthetic rule sets. Further parameters
were neglected. Additionally, we created larger rule sets for a scalability test in
Section 4.6.7. These rule sets are about the same size as the original real world
rule sets.
In contrast to the insertion of complex rules at fixed positions with increased pri-
ority as used in the evaluation of HyPaFilter, the procedure was adapted to modify
the rule set during the test as follows: at k positions (k ∈ {1, 5, 10, 15, . . . , 50})
equally distributed over the rule set (i.e., at k = 1 the middle rule), the simple
rules at these positions were augmented with the same string matching and
probabilistic matching part as used for HyPaFilter. This is intended to show the
possibility for demanding worst-case complex rules.
For all rule sets, we used ClassBench’s trace_generator to generate a trace of 100 000
packet headers that will hit the corresponding rule set uniformly distributed, i.e.,
each rule will be targeted by approximately the same number of packets in the
trace.
4.6.3 Shunting Technique Effectiveness
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the two shunting techniques intro-
duced in Section 4.3 (using the standard analysis method for selective shunting)
1These rule sets were acquired from a customer’s firewall setup. For confidentiality reasons, they
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(b) Real rule sets.
Fig. 4.3: Number of shunting rules, index-based (IB) vs. selective (sel.) shunting.
in terms of the number of shunting rules and the number of actually shunted
packets. Recall that a packet P is shunted to the software filter if the most highly
prioritized matching simple rule is a shunting rule. Hence, if all simple rules in R
are shunting rules, every incoming packet will be processed in software. Likewise,
if there are no shunting rules in R, the entire traffic can be processed solely in
hardware at line speed. We measured these two quantities by performing the
following experiment for every synthetic and real rule set:
1) Load the initial simple rule set.
2) Add complex part to k (k ∈ {1, 5, 10, . . . , 50}) rules at equally-spaced posi-
tions from the initial rule set.
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3) Match the corresponding trace file using index-based and selective shunting
against the installed rule set.
4) Count the numbers of shunting rules and shunted packets.
The numbers of shunting rules and shunted packets are shown in Figures 4.3
and 4.4, respectively. It can be seen that the index-based shunting technique
results in shunting of a relatively large number of packets—all packets with
match_index greater than or equal to the lowest modified rule index. Selective
shunting reduces the number of shunting rules significantly. Of course, the actual
number of selectively shunted packets depends on the rule set characteristics, i.e.,
the number of simple rules that conflict with more highly prioritized complex rules.
Figure 4.3 reveals that ClassBench-generated rule sets are nearly independent
regarding header space, leading to an almost equal number of shunting rules
compared to the number of complex rules. Hence, selective shunting performs
particularly well.
However, the real rule sets are more diverse with regard to their intention and
have more header space variation. Depending on which rules are altered and
extended by a complex part in the test, this can result in fewer shunting rules,
even when more complex rules are used. Nevertheless, also in the case of real-
world rule sets, the number of non-shunting rules in case of selective shunting
is still at least one order of magnitude greater than in the case of index-based
shunting, as shown in Figure 4.3. With index-based shunting, the number of
shunting rules is identical for all rule sets, which is why only one line is shown.
Since the packets generated by ClassBench’s trace generator activate the rules
with an approximately uniform distribution, the number of shunted packets shows
a distribution that is similar to the number of shunting rules, as confirmed by
Figure 4.4. The figure indicates that selective shunting significantly reduces the
number of software-processed packets and is therefore superior to index-based
shunting with regard to the overall system performance.
The extended dependency analysis described in Section 4.4 ensures the software
firewall compartment sees every packet that could possibly affect states that are
referred to by stateful firewall rules. This can increase the number of shunting
rules, as additional types of dependencies are regarded. The next evaluation will
therefore determine and compare the number of shunting rules for both analysis
methods. Figure 4.5a shows the result of this test for the synthetic ClassBench rule
sets. As seen before, the ClassBench rule sets show few dependencies between the
rules. Hence, the extended analysis causes only a minor average increase of the
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Fig. 4.4: Number of shunted packets, index-based (IB) vs. selective (sel.) shunting.
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(a) Synthetic ClassBench rule sets (averaged, with standard deviation).


























Rule set 1 STD Rule set 1 EXT
Rule set 2 STD Rule set 2 EXT
Rule set 3 STD Rule set 3 EXT
(b) Real rule sets.
Fig. 4.5: Percentage of shunting rules in the hardware filter, with complex rule
dependencies analysed agnostic to implicit state tracking (standard, STD) or
extended (EXT).
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a greater influence of the rule set can be observed. The increase of the number
of shunting rules reaches from a minor increase to a significant one of about one
order of magnitude. This shows that the full support of this rule set semantic with
implicit state tracking can be costly, but still feasible on HyPaFilter+.
4.6.4 Software Strategy Comparison
Although the use of shunting strategies, especially of selective shunting, can
significantly reduce the workload on the host system, every shunted packet must
still be processed in software. Strategies for mitigating the software processing
delay and accelerating the classification were already introduced in Section 3.4
and evaluated in Section 3.6. However, as we used different hardware and a
different testing procedure, the evaluation was repeated to provide comparable
results. We evaluate the strategies in terms of the number of rules that must be
traversed to classify all shunted packets. Since the rules are typically traversed
linearly in software, this provides a direct indication of the amount of additional
work performed on the host system. Here, the examined packets are identical to
the shunted packets in Section 4.6.3 using index-based shunting, so the software
workload is identical in all test runs. For every shunted packet (for a specific
number of complex rules and the selected strategy), we determined the number
of rules (the rule path length) it traverses in software until it was fully classified.
The sums of these path lengths are shown in Figure 4.6.
The average results for the ten synthetic ClassBench rule sets are shown in
Figure 4.6a, including their respective standard deviations (using ten test runs).
The adapted evaluation setup and test procedure confirms the assumptions and
results of Section 3.6.3. In particular, the interval strategy provides the lowest
number of traversed software rules for most of the evaluated cases. With real rule
sets and more overlap in the header space of the rules, the differences become
clearer as it can be seen in Figures 4.6b and 4.6c. Figure 4.6c also emphasizes the
different characteristics of the real rules—one single rule may have a significantly
greater overlap than n other rules—causing a shorter HSA cut set and therefore
less traversed rules at, e.g., five inserted complex rules. These deterministic results
clearly demonstrate that the additional processing efforts for the interval or HSA
cut set strategies are worthwhile by resulting in significantly lower workload in
the software classification engine.








































































































































(c) Real rule set 3.
Fig. 4.6: Number of traversed software rules for shunted packets using different
strategies. Real rule set 2 omitted as the results are similar to rule set 1.
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4.6.5 Packet Rate Measurements
Up to this point, we evaluated the different shunting techniques and approaches
to software rule set organization in isolation. In this experiment, we put the pieces
together and perform throughput measurements using both index-based shunting
and selective shunting (standard analysis) on our hardware platform. We used
the interval strategy to organize the rules in the software filter, as this strategy
proved to be the most efficient one with respect to classification performance.
The measurement method is identical to the packet loss test in Section 3.6.2.
We compared the packet throughput rate of HyPaFilter and HyPaFilter+ against
a reference measurement of the equivalent software firewalling setup, using
netfilter and the NetFPGA running as a simple NIC. The procedure for (k ∈
{1, 5, 10, 15, . . . , 50}) is described in the following and was repeated for all test
rule sets.
1) Implement the initial test rule set onto the FPGA and set shunting vector to
match everything in hardware.
2) Modify k rules at equally-spaced positions from the initial rule set and add
the complex part.
3) Update the software filter using the interval strategy.
4) Calculate and set shunting registers on the FPGA.
5) Execute the test run.
6) Repeat from step 1.
Figure 4.7a shows that the index-based shunting of HyPaFilter—while still faster
than software-only—achieves its best results as expected when only a few complex
rules are used. This is mainly due to the fact that, with equally-spaced complex
rules, an increased number of complex rules results in such rules appearing at
higher priorities in the rule set. Therefore, a large amount of traffic is shunted. On
the contrary, since only few packets need to be shunted, the selective shunting of
HyPaFilter+ is able to maintain a constant packet rate. Compared to the equivalent
software-only setup, the results show a 30-fold performance increase.
The results in Figure 4.7b confirm that these numbers are still valid for real rule
sets. As explained in Section 4.6.3, in comparison to synthetic rule sets, the real
rules have more diverse characteristics. This causes the greater variation and
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(b) Real rule sets (averaged over 10 runs, with standard deviation).
Fig. 4.7: Packet throughput of HyPaFilter+ compared to software-only with index-based
(IB) and selective (sel.) shunting.
non-monotonic behaviour during this test. As for each k, the same rules are
modified and, in contrast to the synthetic rule sets, the results are not averaged,
this has therefore no effect on the standard deviation.
4.6.6 Rule Set Update Delay
Another interesting parameter is the time required to update the rule set using
the different strategies. We therefore measured the time for modifying rules and
updating the shunt_index or shunting vector registers on the FPGA. The delays
for the insertion were determined for consecutive rule insertions. The software



























Interval    (IB shunting)
Interval (Sel. shunting)
Fig. 4.8: Rule set update latency for consecutive insertion using different software
strategies and index-based (IB) or selective (Sel.) shunting (averaged, with
standard deviation).
method in order to better distinguish between the delay for the strategies and the
calculation of the shunting vector for selective shunting. The following tests have
been conducted, taking the time for all steps:
a) for the full set strategy: update a single rule with iptables and set shunt_index,
b) for the cut set strategy: truncate the rule set, insert and load this set with
iptables-restore, set shunt_index,
c) for the HSA cut set strategy: calculate the shunting vector and create the
corresponding rule set, insert and load this set with iptables-restore, set
the shunting vector registers on the FPGA,
d) for the interval strategy with index-based shunting: calculate intervals,
insert the chained rule set with iptables-restore, update the driver and
set shunt_index,
e) for the interval strategy with selective shunting analysis: calculate inter-
vals, insert the chained rule set with iptables-restore, update the driver,
calculate the shunting vector and set the shunting vector registers.
Figure 4.8 shows the result of this test, as an average of all 13 test rule sets used
in the evaluation. Setting one register on the FPGA from the host alone takes
1 µs. This confirms that even the demanding updates of the interval strategy with
selective shunting could be carried out with a tolerable delay.
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Fig. 4.9: Packet throughput scalability comparison using synthetic ClassBench rule sets
of size 1100 (averaged over 10 test runs, with standard deviation).
Updating the logic optimized rule set on the FPGA was only necessary once for
every test rule set. Bitfile generation and FPGA programming time took approxi-
mately the same time as for HyPaFilter, i.e., 45 minutes and 17 s, respectively.
4.6.7 Scalability
A greater ratio of complex to simple rules will further increase the number of
shunting rules, even for the synthetic rule sets with only few dependencies.
The possible performance gain of HyPaFilter+ is therefore expected to decrease
approximately linearly with an increased ratio. This is confirmed by Figure 4.9,
which shows the behaviour for a ratio of up to 1000 complex to 1100 simple
rules.
The HyPaFilter+ approach can also be used for larger rule sets than shown so far.
The (interchangeable) hardware matching unit can be configured in a pipelined
layout which we successfully tested with five stages of 1000 rules each. This
increases the latency by 13 clock cycles (72.2 ns at a clock rate of 180 MHz) per
stage, without affecting the throughput.
To evaluate the behaviour of the system if a greater number of rules is placed into
the FPGA and further, more rules are adapted to require complex processing, we
repeated our former tests with 5000 rules and up to 1000 complex rules. In this
case, the number of shunting rules is, on average, 68.6% greater than the number
of complex rules. As with this setup a larger fraction of the rules are changed to





































Number of complex rules
Sel. shunting (Rule set 1)
Sel. shunting (Rule set 2)
Sel. shunting (Rule set 3)
IB shunting (Rule set 1)
IB shunting (Rule set 2)
IB shunting (Rule set 3)
Fig. 4.10: Worst-case scenario speedup using index-based (IB) and selective (sel.)
shunting, using real rule sets of size 5000.
level, as shown in Figure 4.10. At 1000 complex out of a total of 5000 rules, the
speedup vs. software still reaches 19.7× on average.
Regarding update latency, the critical step is the calculation of the HSA vector,




. In the worst case, this operation took up to
18.3 s in this evaluation. All other update operations (i.e., registers) scale with
O(|R|).
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, a major performance-improving extension for HyPaFilter was
introduced. The former approach demonstrated an efficient hybrid structure
for combining the parallel matching capabilities of specialized hardware with
the extensive matching semantics of software packet filters. While HyPaFilter’s
algorithmic optimization was focussed on speeding up the software classification
for shunted packets, HyPaFilter+ aims at additionally reducing the number of
shunted packets and hereby reducing the overall software workload. To achieve
this goal, we leverage a geometric rule representation to analyse dependencies
between rules in order to allow an optimal shunting decision. With this selective
shunting strategy, our evaluation demonstrates that also with real-world rule sets
and a large number of complex rules, software processing can be avoided for
a large share of the traffic. As a result, our HyPaFilter+ prototype based on a
combination of a NetFPGA SUME FPGA and a Linux host system demonstrates up
70 Chapter 4 HyPaFilter+: Mastering Rule Set Dependencies
to 30-fold increases in the achievable throughput over a software-only approach.
While the maximum performance increase is equal to HyPaFilter, HyPaFilter+ can
sustain a significant increase also with demanding rule set constellations.
The pipelined approach offers the possibility to integrate a fast dynamic state
table on the FPGA that can be used to directly handle stateful rules in hardware.
This way, stateful rules could be handled entirely in hardware, which also avoids
the additional workload for the software firewall compartment by the extended
dependency analysis. Ideally, this table could be altered by the host system as
well. Classification circuits with this capability would further allow to place the
geometric reduction of complex rules into the fast hardware classification system,
which would likely further improve the result. Furthermore, HyPaFilter+ could be


































The continuous increase in the performance and capabilites of FPGAs has led
to a widespread adaption of FPGAs for numerous applications, with computer
networks being just one of them. The challenges and limitations for hardware
implementations of network functions have been described in the preceding
chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 highlighted how these challenges could be mitigated
by a hybrid approach. The results of Chapter 4 further clearly demonstrated the
importance of keeping a large share of the workload on the FPGA in order to
achieve performance gains. Following these findings, this chapter will identify
further tasks that could be implemented in hardware, in particular on FPGAs.
As introduced in Chapter 2, hardware components are best suited for tasks that
have a high potential for parallelization. In contrast, standard software systems
with fast general purpose CPUs perform better whenever random access to large
memory or a large number of interdependent operations are required.
In this chapter, we will introduce approaches that are feasible to be implemented
on hardware and have the potential to further increase the capabilities of hybrid,
FPGA-based firewall systems like HyPaFilter+. First, we focus on FPGA-based
packet classification with dynamic rule storage, which is challenging particularly
for large rule set capacities [49]. As a compromise, we augment our rule-specific,
generated FPGA classification circuit which was used for HyPaFilter+, with a
dynamic rule storage. This allows for a trade-off between efficient utilization of
the FPGA’s resources and the capability for dynamic updates without the need for
costly updates of the full FPGA configuration.
Secondly, HyPaFilter+ could benefit from a stateful extension, allowing stateful
packet classification in the hardware classification system. Therefore, a central
building block for stateful packet classification using hash tables is examined: the
hash function. Typical hash functions used for this purpose are highly optimized
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for CPU implementation to allow fast calculation on standard software-based
systems. On the contrary, these popular hash functions are not necessarily well-
suited for hardware implementation [81]. To achieve fast lookups with hash
tables, drawbacks with regard to security due to inadequate algorithms are often
approved [24, 117, 118]. In this chapter, we will compare different hash functions
and propose a solution that is suitable for FPGA implementation and provides a
reasonable level of security against certain attacks on hash tables.
5.2 Efficient Classification Circuits for Online
Updates
The hybrid firewalling approaches HyPaFilter and HyPaFilter+rely on the software
back-end for fast rule set updates, even if the updated rule is in fact a simple
rule that could be natively implemented in the fast FPGA classification circuit.
Hence, a potential performance improvement could be achieved if such simple
rule set updates could be handled by a hardware classification circuit that has the
ability for simple online updates. For HyPaFilter and HyPaFilter+, a logic-level
optimized MPFC was used instead, as circuits with dynamic update capabilities
have limitations with regard to FPGA implementation when a feasible rule set
capacity and performance is required. Examples for dynamically updatable circuits
include the popular TCAM [73], decision tree, and bit vector searches [10, 36,
54, 71]. Such a circuit allowing dynamic updates can not gain from logic-level
optimizations as it is the case for rule-set specific circuitry like the one used in [5].
In comparison to the optimized circuit, such an approach requires more resources
per rule and would therefore fit less rules. However, if this circuit only needs to fit
updates to simple rules, a significant improvement could be achieved even by an
additional small, dynamically updatable classification engine. This is based on
the assumption that rule set updates in typical firewall setups are rather selective,
leaving a large part of the original rule set unaffected [34].
This motivates an extension of the logic-level optimized circuit of [5] in a hybrid
way by an additional, smaller classification unit that can be dynamically updated.
In the following, a rule set specific matcher will be called Mllo with its correspond-
ing, derived rule set Rllo. Analogously, a generic matcher and its derived rule set
will be called Mgen and Rgen, respectively. Since this setup is, again, a variation
of the hybrid conjunction of different classification engines, similar optimization
techniques as introduced in Chapter 4 can be applied. In particular, an HSA-based
dependency analysis can be used to avoid redundancies between the classification
engines.

























































Fig. 5.1: A generic four-element TCAM.
5.2.1 Hardware-centric Classification Circuits
Different hardware-based packet classification approaches have already been
introduced in Chapter 2. Here, we will briefly describe the approaches that are
used in this section, along with their characteristics. The most prominent and
de-facto standard generic classification engine is the TCAM architecture [73]. A
TCAM is composed of N parallel match lines. Each line is capable of storing
a single rule in a configuration memory, as sketched in Figure 5.1. Incoming
packet headers are matched against every line in parallel in a single clock cycle.
The result of each match line is stored in a result vector at the corresponding
position.
FPGA-tailored generic classification architectures are often inspired by decision
tree or bit vector search algorithms [33, 49, 72]. These approaches either map
decision trees or bit vectors that are generated from the specified rule set onto
static random-access memory (SRAM) pipeline stages on the FPGA. In comparison
to a TCAM, they require more clock cycles for classification, but have lower power
dissipation and hardware resource footprints. For example, the StrideBV ap-
proach [33] is particularly well suited for FPGA implementation. Its classification
operation only requires a small fixed number of SRAM accesses together with a
vectorized AND operation per RAM access. Just as a TCAM, StrideBV generates a
result vector for an incoming packet header H, but splits the matching process
over k pipeline stages. In each stage, W = |H|k bits of the packet header are used
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Fig. 5.2: A StrideBV circuit.
as an index for an SRAM that stores a match vector for these particular bits. The
pipelined vectorized AND of these match vectors finally results in the result vector,
as shown in Figure 5.2.
The described approaches are examples for generic matching circuits that store
their utilized search data structures in application-level configuration memories.
For instance, TCAMs use the rule storages sketched in Figure 5.1, while StrideBV
relies on the vector RAMs shown in Figure 5.2. In contrast to dynamic circuits,
the actual rule set can directly be evaluated in the implementation process and
translated into a specific matching circuit [37, 39, 77]. The MPFC approach [39],
which is also used for the hardware classification compartment in the previous
chapters, translates each rule in the rule set into a corresponding match circuit, as
sketched in Figure 5.3. Note that this circuit is similar to the TCAM in Figure 5.1,
with the difference that the MPFC circuit does not have configuration memories,
as each match circuit is tailor-made for the corresponding rule. However, this
comes at the cost of a time-consuming circuit re-synthesis if the rule set changes.
In the following, we examine and evaluate an hybrid combination of the MPFC
with either a TCAM or StrideBV classification unit in order to achieve low power
dissipation, a small hardware resource footprint, and quick update capabilities at
the same time.

































Fig. 5.4: A sketch of the HyPaFilter pipeline with a brief depiction of its components.
5.2.2 Hybrid On-Chip Classification Circuit
The classification pipeline1 arranges the classification systems Mllo and Mgen in a
processing pipeline, as sketched in Figure 5.4. For each packet, the header parser
extracts the header fields from the packet and forwards the header tuple H to
the first classification system (Mllo). As in HyPaFilter, the packet itself is stored in
a parallel data pipeline until the action has been determined. The Mllo matches
the packet against Rllo in a single clock cycle operation. The result of this step
is a preliminary classification result, i.e., the index of the matching rule in Rllo:
illo∈ {1, . . . , |Rllo|} ∪ {ϵ}. Moreover, the action Allo of either a matching rule Rlloillo
or the default policy is forwarded along with the original header tuple H.
To allow updates of the rule set R to take effect without updating Mllo, the header
tuple H is classified by Mgen against Rgen. This classification unit also determines
a matching index igen ∈ {1, . . . , |Rgen|} ∪ {ϵ} in Rgen and the action Agen.
1The implementation details in this section are provided for reference only. They are described
in [1] and are part of Sven Hager’s work, including the tool hardbit.
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However, this time igen is not only used to lookup the action Agen from a config-
uration RAM, but also an insertion index iins that is stored alongside Agen. The
insertion index iins represents the position in the rule set Rllo, from which all rules
Rlloi with i ≥ iins have a lower priority than R
gen
igen
, with respect to the total rule set
R. Accordingly, we define iins to be the index of the first rule Rlloiins ∈ Rllo which is
directly behind Rgenigen in the total rule set R.
The previously computed matching information Allo, illo, igen, iins, and Agen are
then fed to the last step of the classification pipeline, the action consolidation
unit. Based on the given matching information, this unit acts as an arbiter and
decides whether result action Ares should be the action Allo, the action Agen, or a
default policy. The decision process itself is relatively simple: if neither Mllo nor
Mgen found a matching rule, the default policy is executed. Otherwise, if either
Mllo or Mgen found a matching rule, the action provided by the corresponding
matcher is executed. Finally, if both matchers found a matching rule, then the
indices illo and iins must be compared in order to check whether Allo or Agen takes
precedence: if illo < iins, then the overall most highly prioritized rule with regard
to R is Rlloillo ∈ Rllo, and the action Allo must be applied. This is true, because
the rule Rgenigen ∈ Rgen found by the generic matcher is, with respect to R, placed




a lower priority than Rlloillo . Following an analogous reasoning, if illo ≥ iins, then
Rgenigen takes precedence over R
llo
illo
, and thus the action Agen is chosen. The source
code for the pipeline can be generated by the newly written tool hardbit, which
allows the parametrization of the components.
5.2.3 Implementation Results
The important metrics to evaluate the hybrid on-chip approach are update latency,
resource and power consumption. We compare different existing approaches with
this regard when implemented on a Virtex-7 690T FPGA. It is the same target
platform as it was used in Chapters 3 and 4 and is also based on the same internal
data pipeline. Other parameters, such as the clock rate of 180 MHz and the design
software Vivado 2014.4 are also identical. Synthesis and implementation steps
were evaluated on a CentOS 6 machine with an Intel® Xeon E3-1270 CPU and
16 GB RAM.
As mentioned, one of the main drawbacks of MPFC circuits is the need for re-
synthesis for every rule set update. This step takes about 46 minutes and is almost
independent from the actual number of rules, as can be seen in Figure 5.5. We
use synthetic rule sets with 100, 200, . . . , 1 000 rules generated by the ClassBench
benchmark suite [89] which specify source and destination IPv4 addresses, the
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Fig. 5.5: Mean update time for MPFC, with standard deviation.








































Fig. 5.6: Mean update times (split in computation and FPGA transmission) for StrideBV
and TCAM matchers, with standard deviation for total time (note the different
y-axes).
transport protocol, as well as source and destination ports. For each rule set size,
we generate ten different rule sets.
In order to update the MPFC matcher, three steps are required. Those steps are
identical to the initial configuration of the FPGA for HyPaFilter and HyPaFilter+:
1. the software tool translates the rule set into a matching circuit defined in
the VHDL,
2. the matching circuit is synthesized, placed, and routed,
3. the generated bitfile is used to configure the FPGA.
This process is time-consuming due to the second step. The VHDL generation
can be completed in less than 6 ms and the bitfile transmission finishes in about
17.3 s.
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In contrast, updating a generic matcher is significantly faster, as the rule set only
has to be translated (computation) into the corresponding search data structure,
which is subsequently transmitted (transmission) via DMA to the StrideBV or
TCAM configuration memories on the FPGA. Figure 5.6 confirms that, for the
regarded rule sets, rule set updates can be executed in less than 5 s for StrideBV
or 0.2 seconds for TCAM, respectively.
Hardware Resource Requirements
In order to investigate the circuit properties of stand-alone MPFC, StrideBV,
and TCAM matchers, we insert each of these matchers, one at a time, into the
processing pipeline. Subsequently, we synthesize, place, and route the design
and finally generate an FPGA configuration bitfile. For each matcher, we examine
the number of required FFs, LUTs, and matcher power dissipation for different
matcher capacities between 100, 200, . . . , 1 000 rules. In case of the specialized
MPFC, we use ten different ClassBench-generated rule sets for each capacity.
In contrast, the StrideBV and TCAM matchers must only be built once for each
capacity, since their circuitry does not change if their configuration memory
contents change. StrideBV can be built based on either distributed RAM or
BRAM. The evaluation using distributed RAM proved to be exceptionally resource-
intensive, up to designs that could not be implemented by Vivado. For this reason,
we are relying on the BRAM variant for our experiments. Furthermore, the TCAM
matchers did never meet our timing requirements. The packet processing pipeline
uses a single clock domain and a clock source of 180 MHz. Although the design
could still be built for some of the configurations, it is therefore not actually
usable, as all data propagations rely on correct timing. The TCAM results are still
provided for comparison purposes, but we point out that these results should be
taken with a grain of salt.
For the rule-set-specific MPFC matcher, the mean values for the ten rule sets for
each size are shown, the standard deviation is too small to be visible. In Figure 5.7,
we see that the generic StrideBV matcher requires about an order of magnitude
more LUTs than the specialized MPFC circuits for every regarded rule set size.
Likewise, the TCAM matcher requires an additional order of magnitude of LUTs
when compared to StrideBV, as a direct result of their more complex matching
circuitry. Figure 5.8 draws a similar picture for the amount of required FFs: MPFC
needs the least FFs, the TCAM matchers the most, and StrideBV is in between.
The less extreme difference between MPFC and StrideBV can be explained by the
fact that StrideBV, in contrast to MPFCs or TCAMs, utilizes additional block RAMs
to store its data structure. Finally, Figure 5.9 depicts the power dissipation of the
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Fig. 5.7: Hardware resource requirements: relative LUT usage.


















Fig. 5.8: Hardware resource requirements: relative FF usage.















Fig. 5.9: Power dissipation.
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three matchers. In case of TCAMs with more than 600 entries, the implementation
process of Vivado completely failed to route the design. A reduced clock frequency
of 80 MHz instead of 180 MHz allowed this step to at least complete—the final
timing constraints were still not met. While this has a negligible effect on the
resource requirements, the lower clock frequency drastically reduces the power
dissipation since it is directly caused by the process of switching logic gates.
Therefore, these data points are not shown. As expected, the MPFC circuit has
significantly less power requirements than both the generic StrideBV and TCAM
approaches due to its significantly smaller matching circuitry.
As a result summary, Table 5.1 shows the mean hardware resource and power
requirements of the three regarded matchers per rule. These values were deter-
mined by applying a linear regression on all corresponding data points of the
previous test cycle. The results clearly underline that the ability for fast updates,
as possible with StrideBV and TCAMs, comes at the price of significantly higher
per-rule resource and power usage in comparison with the rule-set-tailored MPFC
circuits.
Module LUTs/rule FFs/rule BRAMs/rule µW/rule
MPFC 2.01 3.46 0.00 37.75
StrideBV 11.65 13.70 0.27 387.00
TCAM 65.82 193.40 0.00 1 075.00
BRAM capacity: 36 Kb
Tab. 5.1: Resource utilization per rule.
Hybrid Configuration
Having seen the significant differences of MPFC, StrideBV, and TCAM with regard
to circuit size and power dissipation, we now investigate these properties for a
hybrid on-chip matching circuit. To this end, we use MPFC as the Mllo matcher and
either StrideBV or TCAM as the Mgen matcher. We measure LUT usage, FF usage,
and power dissipation for the hybrid matcher with 1 000 rules, with different
distributions of the rules in Rllo and Rgen. More specifically, we use ClassBench to
generate ten different rule sets of each size (k ∈ {0, 100, 200, . . . , 1 000}) that are
used for Rllo. The generic matcher Mgen is configured with a capacity of 1 000− k
rules. Subsequently, the matchers are synthesized, placed, and routed by the
Vivado design software. For MPFC/TCAM combinations, we experienced the same
limitations as mentioned for TCAMs with more than 600 entries and discarded
these data points for the power dissipation.



































































































































Fig. 5.11: Mean relative FF usage of hybrid matcher combinations, relative to FPGA
resources.






























































Fig. 5.12: Mean power dissipation of hybrid matcher combinations, relative to FPGA
resources.
The mean LUT usage, FF usage, and power dissipation of the hybrid circuits
are shown in Figures 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12, respectively. Again, the standard
deviations are too small to be visible. In these figures, we observe a linear increase
in LUT usage, FF usage, and power dissipation when the generic matcher capacity
is increased and the number of rules in the specialized matcher is decreased.
Although not shown in the figures, this also holds for the block RAM resources
used by the StrideBV/MPFC combination.
These results show that the implementation of a fraction of the rule set in Mllo
leads to smaller overall circuit sizes and lower power dissipation, when compared
to a purely generic matcher. Even when considering a dynamic environment,
where 900 of 1 000 rules are implemented in the generic matcher and only 100
rules are implemented by the specialized matcher, the hybrid architecture achieves
an average reduction factor of 6.3× for LUTs, 15× for FFs and 2.9× for power
dissipation compared to a TCAM and about 1.09×/1.06×/1.08× when compared
to StrideBV. When considering a less dynamic scenario (such as a firewall with
many static rules) with a capacity of 200 rules in Mgen and 800 rules implemented
in Mllo, these factors increase to 19× for LUTs, 25× for FFs and 12× for power
dissipation compared to a TCAM and 3.3×/1.8×/3.8×when compared to StrideBV.
The power dissipation for the TCAM was linearly extrapolated where necessary.
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5.2.4 Summary on Hardware Centric Classification
Circuits
The FPGA evaluation of different types of hardware circuits for network packet
classification confirmed major differences with regard to resource usage, update
latency, and power consumption. Given that in practical applications, a sufficient
part of the rule set is static and not affected by rule set updates, a hybrid combina-
tion of different classification types can significantly reduce resource and power
consumption, while still enabling dynamic updates of different sizes. This way,
the circuit can be tailored for the specific application, which allows it to be imple-
mented on smaller and cheaper FPGAs. A hybrid firewall like HyPaFilter+ could
benefit from a hardware matching circuit with the capability for dynamic updates,
as the slow software path could be avoided for simple rule updates.
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5.3 Fast Hash Functions on FPGAs
Hash functions are used to calculate a fixed-size hash value from a given input
of arbitrary length. They have numerous applications, e.g., hash tables, integrity
protection, Bloom filters [14], or authentication, making them a vital component
in almost any computer system. These applications are built on top of standard
CPU-based systems as well as dedicated hardware like FPGAs. Nevertheless,
the requirements for a fast and efficient algorithm differ substantially between
software for CPUs and hardware description for FPGAs. The advantage of a
hardware implementation lies in the potential for massive parallelization at a
comparatively low clock rate. In practise, many fast hash functions used for hash
tables were designed as CPU-optimized software algorithms and do not perform
well when implemented in hardware [81].
This problem becomes even more relevant if the hash application requires multiple,
independent hash values of the same key. Examples for these applications are
hash tables with double hashing [15], cuckoo hashing [66], or Bloom filters [14].
When implementing this task in hardware, the developer has to choose between
re-using one hashing instance, which increases the latency for the calculation,
or implementing multiple hash instances at the cost of higher resource usage.
As both methods have significant drawbacks, the question arises whether it is
possible to exploit the fact that the required hash size is often significantly smaller
than the actual size of the hash function’s output. If there are no weaknesses in
the output of a given hash function, the hash could simply be split into multiple
sub-hashes. Although some authors argue that small flaws in the hash calculation
are acceptable for hash tables when the full hash value is used [18], it is not clear
if this is still the case when only parts of the hash are used.
Many non-cryptographic hash functions reveal issues when their avalanche effect is
analysed [30, 115], in the sense that some input bits do not optimally propagate
through the function. One of our goals is to determine the implications of those
weaknesses with regard to our desired sub-hashes. It should be noted that a
good avalanche effect of the function still does not necessarily imply there are no
weaknesses in the hash, as can be seen for, e.g., the MurmurHash [118].
As previously mentioned, one must be aware that fast and efficient hash function
designs for CPUs and hardware differ. Regarding the hardware implementation,
the most important metrics of a hashing algorithm are resource utilization, la-
tency l in clock cycles, and execution time as a result of the maximum possible
clock rate. Hash algorithms usually rely on calculation rounds with feedback of the
last round’s result. Due to this constraint, typical hardware hash implementations
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are not fully pipelined, meaning they are occupied until one calculation finishes.
A significant fraction of common hash functions suffer from large latencies when
implemented in hardware [81], making them less suitable for, e.g., high-speed,
low-latency network applications. Furthermore, to gain full advantage of a highly
parallelized processing pipeline, it is often necessary to process one input key per
clock cycle. In order to do so, the hash functions must be implemented l times
in hardware and used in a round-robin manner or implemented as a pipeline
that can store the internal state for each of the l stages. When the algorithm is
implemented as a dedicated processing block (e.g., a hard IP core), a higher clock
frequency of the hashing function may mitigate the latency drawback. However,
such cores are typically not common on standard systems and may further not be
accessible for custom applications.
The growing importance of dedicated, feature-rich hardware components led to a
shift in requirements when new standard algorithms are defined. For example, the
winning candidate for the Secure Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA3) [104] was required
to perform well in hardware. This raises the question whether such a hardware-
optimized cryptographic hash function is more suitable even for non-cryptographic
applications like hash tables than the non-cryptographic alternatives mentioned
above.
This section evaluates properties of different hash functions for hardware imple-
mentation:
1. We show how statistical relevant weaknesses in the avalanche effect of a
hash function can affect the uniformity of sub-hashes, as hardware imple-
mentations are more likely to be limited to simpler hash functions.
2. We examine the characteristics of several hash functions when implemented
for a multi-hash FPGA use case.
3. Based on these results, we demonstrate that SHA3 is currently a better
choice for many FPGA use cases regarding the trade-off between resource
consumption and security in comparison to non-cryptographic hashes.
5.3.1 Hash Table Implementation
The key-value lookup accomplished by hash tables is important for a variety of
networking tasks like stateful packet filtering, route lookup, or intrusion detection.
Since dedicated hardware is increasingly used for these types of applications, hash
table implementations for FPGAs have been widely discussed [18, 83].
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Fig. 5.13: Basic structure of a Bloom filter.
Bloom filters [14] can be a fast and efficient alternative when the only task is to
query if a key is present in the filter. Since this is the case for many classification
tasks in networking systems, Bloom filters are widely used in this field [17]. This
type of filter is based on a bit array. For each key, k addresses to bit positions are
derived by feeding the key to k hash functions, as depicted in Figure 5.13. An
insertion sets the bits on each position to 1, while the lookup probes for a 1 on all
positions. The lookup result can be a false positive, as the queried positions might
have been set to 1 by the insertion of other keys. In contrast, false negatives are
impossible. The variant counting bloom filter [65] utilizes a counter array instead
and also allows the deletion of keys as long as the counters do not reach their
maximum value. The feasibility of Bloom filters on FPGAs has been shown in [8,
83]. With memory lookups being the critical factor, SONG et al. suggested using
Bloom filters to reduce the amount of hash table operations by first probing a
Bloom filter if the lookup is required in the first place [83]. If the query is negative,
no expensive hash table lookup is necessary.
Good hash functions are of major and ongoing interest [104, 81]. Countless
hash functions—cryptographically secure or not—have been introduced, quite
a few of which have been shown to have significant flaws with regard to the
expected qualities of a good hash function [52, 118]. Hardware implementations
of several hash functions were analysed in [81], with the result that most of
them perform badly, causing a calculation latency too high for network processing
applications [83].
When hash functions are used for hash tables, the main security concern arises
from attackers being able to generate hash collisions with different keys. This
can degrade the performance of hash tables and allow for denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks [24]. Such flaws also led to security advisories, e.g., [117, 118]. BAR-
YOSEF et al. were able to successfully attack the hash table in Linux’ netfilter
firewall [12], even though a randomization technique was implemented to protect
from such attacks.
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Fig. 5.14: Splitting one large hash value into independent sub-hashes for multi-hash
applications.
From the variety of applications for hash functions, we focus on FPGA use cases
requiring multiple, independent hash values for, e. g., hash tables using open
addressing by double hashing [15], cuckoo hashing [66], or Bloom filters [14].
There are different ways of generating the required i independent hash values out
of the same key:
1) using different hashing algorithms hi(k),
2) using the method of double hashing, where two different hash functions are
employed to compute the hashes: hi(k) = (h1(k) + i · h2(k)),
3) mixing distinct seeds si to the key before feeding it to the same hash function
hi(k) = h(k ⊕ si), and
4) splitting one hash value into non-overlapping sub-hashes hi(k) = h(k)i, as
depicted in Figure 5.14.
The drawback of the first two options is that they either lead to higher resource
usage or increased latency, due to the fact that multiple hash functions need to be
computed. For the third option, it can be chosen whether to implement multiple
hash modules at the cost of logic resources or re-use one implementation and
thereby increasing the latency until all results are calculated. The last option is
the only option that saves both space and latency, but requires a hash function of
sufficient quality and hash value length.
5.3.2 Attack Scenario
An attacker might try to generate hash collisions to degrade the performance for
a DoS attack, since in case of collisions expensive computations must be per-
formed [24]. If the hash function under consideration has statistical weaknesses
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in one of its sub-hashes, such collisions are more likely to occur than for a hash
with uniformly distributed outputs.
If a Bloom filter is used to reduce the hash table workload as suggested in [83],
an attacker would want to provoke false positives by purposefully filling the filter
with ones. In the worst case, each “real” query would then result in a false positive,
thereby enforcing an expensive hash table lookup. Also in this case, the likelihood
and degree of the attacker’s success strongly depend on the uniformity of the
hash function’s output. It is helpful for the attacker if he can make assumptions
on how changes in the input data affect the output data in another way than a
pseudorandom behaviour, as it would be the case for a good hash function.
Non-cryptographic hash functions employed in practise are the Jenkins hash [46],
as used in the Linux packet filter netfilter [25] or its successor SpookyHash
[46]. Other examples include MurmurHash [118], CityHash [98], and SipHash
[9]. The motivation for using these hashes are efficient implementations, and
the mere requirement of uniform outputs. However, in applications like packet
filters it is often not complicated to attack those kinds of functions if the attacker
has control over their inputs [118]. In this section, we focus on a specific attack,
where we exploit weaknesses in the so-called avalanche effect of the function [30]
to actually generate hash values distributed in a non-uniform way, yielding a
potential hash table DoS attack.
More formally, the avalanche probability for input bit i and output bit j of a hash




2n · |{x ∈ {0, 1}
n | h(x)j ̸= h(x(i))j}|,
where x(i) is x with bit i flipped and n is the (in our case always finite) input
size for the hash function h. Ideally, this probability should be close to 1/2 for
all admissible choices of i and j. This property can also be seen in the hamming
distance of consecutive output values, which should be close to output size2 for any
flipped input bit i. However, the hamming distance alone is a necessary, but not a
sufficient measure for the quality of the avalanche effect. To measure the distance
to this desired probability, we define the bias to be |pi,j − 1/2|. Intuitively, when
this bias is large, the avalanche effect for the function differs for input bit i and
output bit j considerably from optimal.
A good hash function should not have statistical weaknesses in this regard. In fact,
there are many hash functions available which do not suffer from this weakness,
most prominently cryptographic hashes such as SHA3 [28]. These functions have
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the additional benefit that many other attacks (such as differential attacks) do
not work either. A practical example of why even apparently small flaws can be
problematic will be given in the next section.
We begin our evaluation with an analysis of an avalanche-weak hash function
and show how the described method of splitting a hash value into sub-hashes is
affected. Afterwards, different examples of hashing algorithms are implemented
for an FPGA and the results are evaluated.
5.3.3 Impact of Weaknesses in the Avalanche Effect
We first demonstrate that small weaknesses in the avalanche property of a hash
function can be used to produce a non-uniform output distribution of the function,
yielding potential hash table DoS attacks. For illustration of the effect, we pur-
posefully selected the avalanche-weak Jenkins hash function and split the 32 bit
hash value into four one-byte chunks. The other considered non-cryptographic
hash functions, i.e., SpookyHash and SipHash, do not have any known weakness
in this regard. The Jenkins function family comprises of different algorithms. We
considered the latest lookup2 and lookup3 in our analysis.
For our experiments, we selected in a first step for both routines an input/output
bit pair with large bias for 34 byte inputs—a flawless hash function would not
allow finding such a pair. To find it, we empirically determined the bias for
each input and each output bit by first selecting 105 random input values. We
then successively flipped each input bit and counted the resulting flips over the
105 choices. We verified that this comparatively small number of samples is
representative, since multiple runs of our experiments (with different random
selections) gave comparable results. For further analysis, we selected a single
input/output bit pair with bias larger than 0.025. Specifically, we considered
for lookup2 the pair (i, j) = (248, 27) with bias 0.1685 and for lookup3 the pair
(i, j) = (216, 25) with bias 0.03277.
In a second step, now with the fixed input/output pair (i, j), we generated 105
random inputs to the hash function, excluding those where the output bit j was 0.
This was done in order to evaluate the effect of the bias, which would otherwise
not be visible due to the random input data. We then flipped the bit i of the input
and computed the distribution of the last two bytes of the function. Note that
one of them contains output bit j. The results are depicted in Figure 5.15 and
Figure 5.17. Figures 5.15b and 5.17b show a clear non-uniform distribution of
the byte containing the output bit j. In Figure 5.15b, the origin of the pattern
is emphasized by an additional set of generated random data where one bit has
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(a) Non-critical 3rd byte.















Data points Random data (bit 24 fixed 0) Mean
(b) Avalanche-critical 4th byte.
Fig. 5.15: Distribution of Jenkins’ lookup2 sub-hashes scaled by 105.
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Fig. 5.16: Cumulative distribution of Jenkins’ lookup2 sub-hashes.
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(a) Non-critical 3rd byte.
















(b) Avalanche-critical 4th byte.
Fig. 5.17: Distribution of Jenkins’ lookup3 sub-hashes scaled by 105.

























3rd byte 4th byte
Fig. 5.18: Cumulative distribution of Jenkins’ lookup3 sub-hashes.
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intentionally been set to zero. This bit in the 8 bit output data is the one with
the weight 24, which derives from the selected bit pair (j = 27 in the 32 bit
output data). The deviation can also be seen in the corresponding density plots
in Figure 5.16 and Figure 5.18, where the observed data differs from the desired
result of a straight line. For comparison, the byte not containing bit j is distributed
close to the expected value 105/28 ≈ 390 for uniform distributions as can be
seen in Figure 5.15a and 5.17a. This shows that even the presence of a single
input/output bit pair with large bias can be used to easily induce skewness in the
output distribution of the resulting hash.
To counteract this attack, we argue that one should be careful with the selection
of a hash function and that even small statistical weaknesses can be exploited
in practise. Nevertheless, we are aware that our experiments are rather a toy
example than a fully-fledged attack on a concrete implementation.
5.3.4 FPGA Implementation Results
We selected four hash functions for implementation:
1) Jenkins (lookup2) [46], as it is used in Linux’ netfilter firewall,
2) SpookyHash [46], the latest hash function of Bob Jenkins,
3) SipHash [9], the proposed alternative for hashes like MurmurHash and
CityHash, and
4) SHA3 [28], as a current state-of-the-art cryptographic hash function.
While the avalanche-weak Jenkins was included in our evaluation for reference,
CityHash and MurmurHash were not further considered due to reported weak-
nesses [98, 118].
All implementation results were determined for a fixed-size input key of 288 bit,
which corresponds to the quadruple of two IPv6-addresses and two port num-
bers. The target frequency for the FPGA clock domain of all implementations
was 200 MHz. The results were determined using Xilinx Vivado 2014.4 with a
Virtex 7 690t, speed grade -2 as the targeted FPGA. Both Jenkins and Spooky-
Hash were implemented natively based on the available source code [46]. For
a comparison, we also applied high-level synthesis to directly derive a hardware
design with Vivado HLS based on the publicly available C program code. The
tool achieved comparable results to our native implementation. For SipHash, we
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Hash Size [bit] LUTs FFs Lat. [CC/ns] Ex. use case LUTs Ex. use case FFs
Jenkins 64 2, 874 3, 419 76 / 380 436, 848 (101.0%) 519, 688 (56.0%)
SpookyHash 128 3, 220 4, 161 27 / 135 86, 940 ( 20.1%) 112, 347 (13.0%)
SipHash 32 944 789 52 / 260 196, 352 ( 45.3%) 164, 112 (19.0%)
SHA3-512 512 6, 005 2, 212 20 / 100 120, 100 ( 27.7%) 44, 240 ( 5.1%)
Tab. 5.2: Virtex 7 690t FPGA resource utilization.
used the referenced Verilog implementation [122], for SHA3 a SHA3-512 core
from [109]. The latency was determined by simulating the HDL implementation
of each core.
As can be seen in Table 5.2 for the evaluated hash functions and their hash value
size, there are significant differences in terms of the usage of lookup tables LUTs,
FFs, and the inherent latency (CC, in clock cycles and ns at 200 MHz) for the
computation. To improve comparability, we included an example computation for
a use case requiring eight independent 16-bit hash values of the same key, with the
capability of processing one key per clock cycle. This means the hash core has to
be replicated n = ⌈desired hash sizenative hash size ⌉ × latency times. Note that for SHA3, a smaller
variant (e.g., SHA3-224) could be used since the hash size is larger than the
required use case output size. The result for Jenkins is only given as a reference,
as we already demonstrated a weakness with regard to the use case of splitting
the hash value. The percentages illustrate clearly that a significant amount of
the Virtex 7 FPGA resources are occupied for this use case. Moreover, a high
latency alone can be a criterion for exclusion depending on the application. For
comparison: in [83], the MD5 hash was deemed unsuitable for packet processing
applications due to the latency of 64 clock cycles based on speed requirements
present in the year 2005. Hence, from our evaluated candidates only SpookyHash
and SHA3-512 can be considered suitable for low-latency FPGA applications.
As can be seen for the use case, the implementation results depend on the desired
size and amount of independent hash values, as well as resource usage and latency
of the hash functions. Two additional plots visualize this for different hash value
sizes, provided that all can be split into independent sub-hashes of arbitrary size.
Figure 5.19 assumes the total size is achieved by multiple, parallel hash modules.
In contrast, Figure 5.20 shows how the latency is affected if the necessary calcula-
tions are executed in series on one single hash module, thus maintaining almost
constant resource usage. Combined with the demonstrated, possible implications
of non-cryptographic hash functions, we argue that nowadays the cryptographic
hash SHA3 should be the default choice for hardware implementations, also for
non-cryptographic applications.
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Fig. 5.19: FPGA utilization for parallel hash cores: LUT usage.
























Fig. 5.20: Latency for serial hash core usage.
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5.3.5 Summary of Hash Functions on FPGAs
Good hash functions are essential for a variety of applications, with hash-based
data structures being just a few of them. For this evaluation, we focused on use
cases like certain types of hash tables and Bloom filters, where several independent
hash values of the same key are required. We demonstrated that the method
of splitting one hash value into sub-hashes for multi-hash use cases may show
non-optimal behaviour if the used hash function suffers from weaknesses with
regard to the avalanche effect. Further, we analysed the recent cryptographic
hash SHA3 and compared it against common hash table hash functions as an
alternative for hardware applications. Our results show that most hardware hash
applications benefit from the use of SHA3 instead of non-cryptographic hashes
optimized for CPU-based systems.
5.4 Summary
Network packet processing involves a large number of different tasks on different
levels. In order to fulfill the demand for higher throughput, there is an increasing
interest to migrate those tasks to faster hardware components. However, more
than with standard software implementations, system designers have to cope with
limited hardware resources and capabilities. In this chapter, we demonstrated how
a hybrid conjunction of logic-level optimized and dynamic packet classification
circuits can be used for a resource-efficient realization. While the LLO circuit
implements policies using a significantly smaller resource footprint than a generic
circuit, a smaller variant of the latter is used to preserve the dynamic update
capability. Given the property that in many setups, a fair share of the policies
is static, this approach allows to implement the required design on smaller and
cheaper FPGAs.
One further crucial sub-task for many network processing applications is the
calculation of hash values. A comprehensive analysis revealed that popular, CPU-
optimized hash algorithms for this type of applications are not suitable for FPGA
implementation. In particular, no advantage could be gained from parallelization,
while the lower clock rate of an FPGA compared to modern CPU results in even
higher latencies. Further, many of these highly CPU-optimized hash functions
suffer from weaknesses with regard to security properties. This prohibits, e.g.,
the hash value to be split into independent parts, as the effect of the weaknesses
may increase. We compared the modern, cryptographic hash function SHA3
with classical hash table hash functions targeting a scenario where multiple
sub-hashes are required. We could demonstrate that, although SHA3 exceeds
the requirements, it outperforms these functions due to the hardware-centric
specification.
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FPGA-based network packet processing has the potential for adapting to fur-
ther tasks and further optimizations. Nevertheless, in all work introduced in
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the FPGA part required a specific implementation and
the utilization of FPGA-based hardware. We will therefore further examine how
standard networking hardware like SDN devices can be used to apply the hybrid
approach.
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For larger scale networks, SDN has become a widely adopted concept [53].
The separation into control plane, data plane, and SDN applications allows
administrators to flexibly adapt the network to new requirements, without the
need to replace hardware components. In this chapter, we use such SDN hardware
as a replacement for the FPGA-based packet classification system, as SDN devices
are available COTS and are not only cheaper, but also often already available and
integrated in existing network infrastructure. On the downside, the restriction to
standardized features of SDN hardware will prevent using some of the specific
features we achieved by our own implementation of the hardware classification
circuit. In particular, there is no dedicated communication channel available for
the forwarding of matching information as it is used in Chapter 3.
Typical SDN hardware is well suited for simple classification tasks. An exam-
ple is simple stateless classification based on IP addresses or port numbers. Its
capabilities are similar to hardware classification systems as introduced in Sec-
tion 5.2—in fact, they are often based on TCAMs. As network security is a topic
of major interest, there are also approaches to implement firewalls based on SDN
natively [105, 41]. As introduced in Chapter 2, firewalls often rely on advanced
matching criteria like deep packet inspection (DPI) [26]. A typical dedicated SDN


















Fig. 6.1: Basic setup for an SDN firewall. Here, rules with complex checks force packets
via the bottleneck control link to the SDN application, which executes the
complex checks.
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-d 192.0.2.1/32 -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT # Rule R1
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 192.0.2.3/32 -p udp --dport 8200 -m string # Rule R2
--string " SELECT " --algo bm -j DROP #
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 192.0.2.7/32 -p udp --dport 53 -m string # Rule R3
--hex - string "|11|2|00|" --algo bm -j DROP #
#––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-d 192.0.2.9/32 -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT # Rule R4
Listing 6.1: Example rule set R in iptables syntax.
Therefore, complex analysis cannot be handled solely on the fast data plane,
but involves the application plane via the control plane in order to enable the
SDN firewall application to make a classification decision. Nevertheless, the link
between the switch and the controller is mainly designed for relatively infrequent
control messages and not intended to be used for large amounts of data. Hence, it
represents a bottleneck when many packets need to be sent to the controller [27].
An example setup of a native SDN firewall is sketched in Figure 6.1.
For demonstration, an example rule set is given in Listing 6.1. Rules R1 and
R4 can easily be implemented by an SDN switch in the data plane, since both
only specify simple header field checks. On the contrary, R2 and R3 rely on
string matching (payload analysis), which exceeds the capabilities of typical SDN
hardware.
Due to the bottleneck to the application plane, the performance of such a firewall
greatly depends on the range of operations the switch can handle directly at the
data plane, which is dependent on the switch hardware and the protocol the
SDN switch supports. There is currently no development towards SDN switches
that would natively implement features comparable with standard software fire-
walls [64]. Nevertheless, the high performance classification capabilities of SDN
hardware motivates their integration into a hybrid concept that employs a direct















Fig. 6.2: Basic setup of a hybrid firewall with policy separation for differing capabilities
of the compartments. Traffic is kept on fast links, while control links have
modest requirements.

















Fig. 6.3: FIREFLOW setup for an SDN firewall. FIREFLOW offloads the complex rule
processing to a software firewall and thus removes the bottleneck via the
control link.
The proposed FIREFLOW approach also uses a central rule management tool for
analysing and distributing the firewall’s rule set to a standard software firewall
and an SDN switch via the OpenFlow protocol. SDN components are easily
available at reasonable cost and provide high link capacities. By using SDN
hardware, FIREFLOW can seamlessly be integrated into existing infrastructure.
The FIREFLOW approach handles simple decisions within the data plane’s scope of
the SDN switch with full line speed, as sketched in Figure 6.3. From another point
of view, the SDN switch can be seen as a high-performance shunting mechanism
for a standard software firewall. Note that the FIREFLOW architecture allows the
use of a P4-enabled switch or network card as well [16]. Nevertheless, in this
chapter we focus on the integration of existing OpenFlow infrastructure whereas
leveraging P4 remains future work.
As described in Chapters 3 and 4, one key challenge of the hybrid design is the
distribution of the policies and handling rule set dependencies. To this end, a
similar strategy based on HSA is applied to reduce the workload in FIREFLOW. In
terms of possible performance gains, we further rely on properties of rule sets and
traffic that have been shown in these sections. In particular, rule sets must not
have too many dependencies with regard to overlap in header space; whereas
the majority of the traffic must be processable by using simple policies only (also
shown in [7]).
In summary, this chapter will answer the third research question (application of
the approach to other packet classification systems) and provide the following
contributions:
• We describe the challenges and present solutions for hybrid setups of SDN
and standard software firewalls.
• We show how the approach can be applied as a performance-increasing
measure for software firewalls.
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• We demonstrate how existing SDN infrastructure can be upgraded seam-
lessly into a fully fledged firewall.
• We evaluate the feasibility of FIREFLOW and demonstrate an over 23-fold
classification speed-up with real-world rule sets compared to a software
firewall.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in Section 6.2, we discuss
relevant related work. Afterwards, we describe the setup of a FIREFLOW system
in detail in Section 6.3. The following Section 6.4 is dedicated to explain the
underlying packet routing algorithm and interaction in FIREFLOW. An evaluation
by measurement in Section 6.5 shows the effectiveness of the approach and other
relevant parameters. Finally, we summarize our results in Section 6.6.
6.2 Related Work
Previous work in the field focuses on three major topics:
1) Proactive SDN firewalls,
2) Reactive SDN firewalls, and
3) Hybrid SDN software firewalls.
Proactive SDN firewalls implement security policies by statically deploying rules in
the SDN switches. This is the predominant mode of implementation in real world
controllers (e.g., [105, 125]), as it is easy to implement, resilient, and efficient.
However, the size of the rule memory in SDN switches is fixed and limits the
deployment of large policies.
In the literature, reactive SDN firewalls are more prominent (e.g., [23, 41, 47, 67,
95]). In general, security policies are kept in the controller and a new flow is
checked against them. If accepted, suitable flow rules are pushed into the switches.
None of these approaches are able to deal with complex policies including rules
that are not implementable by the means offered by the switch hardware. Without
further research, the naive approach to enable complex policies through reactive
SDN firewalls would include the handling of the corresponding flows in the
controller abandoning further rule establishment.














Fig. 6.4: High-level setup of FIREFLOW.
Hybrid designs focus on offloading network traffic by combining SDN switches as
accelerators and classical firewall appliances. In [62], a Linux netfilter based
firewall is used to filter traffic and to offload predefined connections, e.g., data
transfers known to be resource intensive, in a stateful manner automatically. A
similar approach is performed by [40] which supervises a legacy firewall with
sFlow and offloads congested connections. A major drawback of these two
approaches is the limited shared space available for flows and policies in the SDN
switch. One rule can create a large number of flows, which means storing single
flows instead of policies is also less resource efficient. Thus, the feasibility of this
approach highly depends on the capacity of the switches. Moreover, offloading a
flow prevents further, deeper analysis of its contents.
In [60], a hybrid design featuring SDN and NFV is proposed. A similar approach
is demonstrated in [68]. The design aims to support complex filtering through vir-
tualised legacy firewalls while leveraging the SDN to offload suitable connections
into the fast switching hardware. However, a performance study is still missing.
The drawbacks of using the control plane for actual traffic in terms of latency have
been evaluated in [27]. The authors showed that a significant delay is caused by
packets’ context switches, while the delay through the processing itself is present,
but short in comparison. FIREFLOW circumvents this bottleneck by keeping all
data traffic within the context of the data plane.
6.3 System Setup
A FIREFLOW system is intended to be either built on top of a standard SDN
infrastructure or as a measure of accelerating a standard software firewall. As
depicted in Figure 6.4, several logical components are utilized.
6.3 System Setup 103
SDN Switch The SDN switch provides the data plane switching functionality. It
is connected to the software firewall via high-speed network links, and the SDN
Controller via a control link.
SDN Controller The SDN controller is the central element of the control plane.
It uses the OpenFlow protocol [61] to communicate with the SDN switch and can
be configured from the management compartment.
Software Firewall A standard software firewall like iptables [127], pf [119],
or ipfw [111] can be used as the back-end for FIREFLOW. As the traffic is not
altered or encapsulated, no special modifications to the firewall are required. This
also enables the use of commercial firewall appliances. However, it needs to be
remotely administrable via a suitable protocol, as it is not statically configured by
a local administrator.
Management Compartment The management compartment keeps track of the
configured rule set and is used to administer the FIREFLOW system. It is the only
component that needs to be exposed to the administrator. The management tool
has both access to the SDN controller to set rules on the SDN switch and the
software firewall in order to configure the rule set.
For the remainder of this chapter, we define the following naming convention for
the SDN switch network ports as shown in Figure 6.4:
1) SDN switch to and from external networks E2S (ingress) and S2E (egress),
2) SDN switch to and from software firewall S2F and F2S,
3) SDN switch to SDN controller (both directions) S2C.
The SDN controller, the software firewall, and the management tool can be placed
onto one single physical system, or separated into different virtual or physical
machines. The connections between SDN switch and software firewall should be
of sufficient capacity to deal with a reasonable fraction of the data plane traffic.
Depending on the scenario, however, they may be of significantly lower bandwidth
than the external connections from and to the SDN switch (see the evaluation
results in Section 6.5).
There are no specific requirements for the link between SDN switch and SDN
controller, which is typically a low-performance connection [27, 53]. Configu-
ration updates from the management tool are distributed either directly within
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-s 192.0.3.0/24 -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT # RA1
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 192.0.4.0/24 -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT # RA2
Listing 6.2: Example rule set RA .
-s 192.0.3.0/24 -m string --string " SELECT " --algo bm -j DROP # RB1
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 192.0.1.0/24 -m string --string "BAD" --algo bm -j DROP # RB2
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 192.0.2.0/24 -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT # RB3
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 192.0.4.0/24 -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT # RB4
Listing 6.3: Rule set RB .
the operating system’s context if placed on the same machine or via any suitable
communication channel, e. g., using Secure Shell (SSH).
6.4 Hybrid SDN Packet Processing
The key for achieving significant performance gains with FIREFLOW lies in the
packet routing decision and fast software processing. Hence, our goals are to
keep as much workload as possible on the fast SDN data plane and reducing the
software firewall policies to the necessary minimum. A further goal is limiting
the size of the rule set on the SDN switch: while typical hardware classification
approaches, such as TCAMs, achieve line-speed classification rates, the size of
the configuration memories used by these techniques is strictly limited [31, 39,
48, 49]. For example, in our evaluation setup, the Aruba 3810m switch [108]
could hold less than 1 500 rules with the desired expressiveness. Rule set sizes
exceeding the limit will therefore be forced to be processed in significantly slower
compartments, in the worst case the SDN controller itself.
To demonstrate the operation of FIREFLOW, we start with the example rule set
RA shown in Listing 6.2. Note that for better readability, the chain parameter
-A FORWARD used in iptables is omitted in all following examples. Here, only IP
addresses, port numbers, and protocol types are examined. As both rules only
consist of simple checks, they can be implemented easily as SDN hardware-only
rules on the SDN switch that forwards matching packets from port E2S to port
S2E.
The next example in Listing 6.3 introduces two rules RB1 and RB2 for string
matching. As SDN switches are usually not capable of payload analysis, FIRE-
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-s 192.0.3.0/24 -m string --string " SELECT " --algo bm -j DROP # RC1
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 192.0.2.0/24 -m string --string "BAD" --algo bm -j DROP # RC2
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 192.0.2.0/24 -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT # RC3
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 192.0.4.0/24 -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT # RC4
Listing 6.4: Rule set RC .
FLOW will therefore redirect correspondent packets to the software firewall, which
contains the rules RB1 and RB2.
The redirection can be accomplished as follows. A first method, called rule divert,
places two correspondent SDN hardware rules into the switch before rules RB3
and RB4. This is given by the function PARTITION_RULE_SET_RULE_DIVERT in
Algorithm 5, which is based on [5] and takes O(n2) time. These additional rules
correspond to the geometric reduction of the complex rules (i.e., R−B1 and R
−
B2)
and divert all traffic matching the addresses and protocol from switch port E2S to
port S2F. Hence, the switch will classify the packet against a part of each complex
rule that it can handle in hardware, leaving the rest to the software firewall.
Further, this method takes care of the dependencies inherently.
Two further SDN hardware rules will forward any traffic from the software firewall
to the corresponding switch output ports (F2S to S2E). This action will be applied
by a generic rule at the bottom of the rule set. In order to respect all rule
dependencies for both methods, an HSA can be used to identify all simple rules
that interfere with any of the complex rules not present in the SDN switch.
The software firewall must then be loaded with either the full rule set, or only
complex and HSA-dependent rules. The latter is comparable to the HSA cut set
strategy described in Section 4.5.1. It should be noticed that with first rule match
processing order, there is no further interference between the shown rules.
The next example shown in Listing 6.4 also includes string matching rules similar
to the former example. Like in the example of Listing 6.3, FIREFLOW would place
diverting rules to the software firewall for packets matching the stated subnets
and software rules including the string matching part in the software firewall.
However, in contrast to the former example, this rule set contains a possible
interference between rules RC2 and RC3. This can occur whenever a packet from
the source network 192.0.2.0/24 arrives, but does not match the string in RC2
in the software firewall. It can still match rule RC3, though. Therefore, one
must take care of these dependencies and place appropriate rules in the software
firewall as well. In this example, the software firewall would contain the rules
RC1, RC2, and RC3.
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Algorithm 5 Partition rule set R.
1: function OVERLAP(Rule Ri, Rule Rj)
2: return G(R−i ) ∩G(R−j ) ̸= ∅
3: function IS_COMPLEX(Rule Ri)
4: return G(R−i ) ̸= G(Ri)
5: function IS_HSA_DEPENDENT(Rule Ri, Rule set Rcomplex)
6: for Rule Rj ∈ Rcomplex do
7: if OVERLAP(Ri, Rj) then
8: return true
9: return false
10: function MAKE_DIVERT_RULE(Rule Ri)
11: Rdiv ← COPY(Ri)
12: set Rdiv’s action to divert
13: return Rdiv
14: function PARTITION_RULE_SET_RULE_DIVERT(Rule set R)
15: Rsimple ← [ ]
16: Rcomplex ← [ ]
17: for Rule Ri ∈ R do
18: if IS_COMPLEX(Ri) then
19: Rcomplex ←Rcomplex + [Ri]
20: Rsimple ←Rsimple + [MAKE_DIVERT_RULE(R−i )]
21: else if IS_HSA_DEPENDENT(Ri, Rcomplex) then
22: Rcomplex ←Rcomplex + [Ri]
23: Rsimple ←Rsimple + [Ri]
24: else
25: Rsimple ←Rsimple + [Ri]
26: return (Rsimple,Rcomplex)
27: function PARTITION_RULE_SET_DEFAULT_DIVERT(Rule set R)
28: Rsimple ← [ ]
29: Rcomplex ← [ ]
30: for Rule Ri ∈ R do
31: if IS_COMPLEX(Ri) then
32: Rcomplex ←Rcomplex + [Ri]
33: else if IS_HSA_DEPENDENT(Ri, Rcomplex) then
34: Rcomplex ←Rcomplex + [Ri]
35: Rsimple ←Rsimple + [MAKE_DIVERT_RULE(Ri)]
36: else
37: Rsimple ←Rsimple + [Ri]
38: return (Rsimple,Rcomplex)
A second method, called default divert, can be used if it is desirable to reduce the
number of SDN hardware rules. It is not necessary to insert the geometric reduc-
tion R− of all complex rules into the SDN switch. Instead, only the subset of all
simple rules can be used, with the HSA-dependent rules set to divert. All other di-
vert operations are handled by a default divert rule at the bottom of the switch rule
set. This method is given by the function PARTITION_RULE_SET_DEFAULT_DIVERT
in Algorithm 5, again with time complexity O(n2).
Figures 6.5a and 6.5b show a comparison of both diversion methods for the given
rule set. It should be noted that in Figure 6.5a, rule R3 in the SDN switch can
never be hit due to the complete overlap of the diverting SDN switch rule R2.




-s 192.0.3.0/24 -m string
--string "SELECT" --algo bm
R2 DROP
-s 192.0.2.0/24 -m string
--string "BAD" --algo bm
ACCEPT
-s 192.0.2.0/24
-p tcp --dport 80R3
R1 -s 192.0.3.0/24 DIVERT
R2 -s 192.0.2.0/24 DIVERT
R4
-s 192.0.4.0/24
-p udp --dport 53 ACCEPT
R5 <all from F2S> ACCEPT
ACCEPT
-s 192.0.2.0/24






-s 192.0.3.0/24 -m string
--string "SELECT" --algo bm
R2 DROP
-s 192.0.2.0/24 -m string
--string "BAD" --algo bm
ACCEPT
-s 192.0.2.0/24
-p tcp --dport 80R3
R4
-s 192.0.4.0/24
-p udp --dport 53 ACCEPT
R6 <all from F2S> ACCEPT
 R5 <all from E2S> DIVERT
DIVERT
-s 192.0.2.0/24
-p tcp --dport 80R3
(b) Default divert.
Fig. 6.5: Packet diversion methods for example rule set RC of Listing 6.4 in comparison.
-s 192.0.3.0/24 -m string --string " SELECT " # RD1
--algo bm -j DROP #
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-s 192.0.3.0/24 -p tcp --dport 21 -j ACCEPT # RD2
#–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
-p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP # RD3
Listing 6.5: Rule set RD .
We call such rules dead rules. A similar case can be seen in Figure 6.5b, where
rule R3 is redundant, as all matching packets would also be diverted by rule R5.
However, this is not necessarily applicable for all simple rules in all rule sets. In
particular, take the rule set example in Listing 6.5. When looking at the matching
criteria, one can see a partial overlap between the complex rule RD1 and the
simple rule RD2 (source address), between simple rules RD2 and RD3 (protocol),
but not between RD1 and RD3. If RD2 would be omitted due to the overlap with
RD1, rule RD3 could be hit by packets that would otherwise match RD2 before,
leading to an incorrect classification result. For this reason, the HSA dependency
analysis is necessary. Although the detection and removal of dead rules is not
implemented in the setup introduced in this chapter, it can readily be integrated
into the partition algorithms by, e. g., applying the redundancy removal technique
presented in [55].
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 illustrate the former example of the rule set in Listing 6.4
(sketched in Figure 6.5a) with two different packets, using the rule divert method.
Both packets are diverted to the software firewall due to the required string match-




























-s 192.0.3.0/24 -m string
--string "SELECT" --algo bm
R2 DROP
-s 192.0.2.0/24 -m string
--string "BAD" --algo bm
ACCEPT
-s 192.0.2.0/24
-p tcp --dport 80R3
ACCEPT
-s 192.0.4.0/24
-p udp --dport 53R4
R1 -s 192.0.3.0/24 DIVERT
R2 -s 192.0.2.0/24 DIVERT
R3
-s 192.0.2.0/24
-p tcp --dport 80 ACCEPT
R4
-s 192.0.4.0/24
-p udp --dport 53 ACCEPT
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-s 192.0.4.0/24
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-p tcp --dport 80 ACCEPT
R4
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-p udp --dport 53 ACCEPT








Fig. 6.7: Packet accepted due to complex software firewall rule (rule divert method).
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ing operation. Packet P1 matches the corresponding DROP rule and is therefore
discarded directly at the software firewall. Packet P2, however, does not match the
string part in software rule R2 (which corresponds to RC2) and must be further
analysed by the following rules. It matches software rule R3 (corresponding to
RC3), redirecting it back to the SDN switch for further transmission by SDN rule
R5. Due to the approach of partitioning the rule set directly, no packet reordering
takes place for any flow during normal operation.
6.5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the packet classification performance gain that can be
reached with FIREFLOW under different conditions. The performance of the hybrid
setup is assessed in relation to a standard software firewall. As in Chapters 3 and
4, a set of synthetic and real-world firewall rule sets provides the basis for our
measurements. We compare overall packet classification rates and packet loss due
to complex rule processing. We further measure the time required for deploying
rule set updates of different size.
6.5.1 Evaluation Setup
The test setup is similar to the one used for evaluating HyPaFilter and HyPaFil-
ter+ in Chapters 3 and 4. Again, the classification performance is the main
evaluation goal, so we aim at placing a high workload on the classification engine.
Therefore, the payload is kept small and packets are sent at the highest rate
possible. As shown in Figure 6.8, a setup of two machines is used to generate and
count packets (called sender and receiver). These machines are equipped with
an Intel E3-1270 CPU and a dual-port 10 Gbit/s NIC, which is also used for the
connection to the SDN switch.
A bridging-type firewall setup is realized by placing the SDN switch in between.
An additional system is used for the SDN controller, the software firewall, and the
FIREFLOW management tool. This machine uses an Intel Xeon E3-1230 CPU, 16
GB RAM and is connected to the SDN switch via 10 Gbit/s links. Version details
can be found in Table 6.1.
We generated ten synthetic rule sets of 1 100 rules each with the tool Class-
Bench [89]. These rules contain checks on IP address ranges, port ranges and
protocol type. The number of rules was chosen to leave enough distance to the
maximum number of rules on the switch, which, when exceeded, results in the
automatic incorporation of a slow software-based compartment in the switch. In











Fig. 6.8: Evaluation setup.
SDN Controller Ryu 3.3
SDN Switch Aruba 3810m [108]
SDN Protocol OpenFlow 1.0
Software Firewall iptables v1.4.21
Tab. 6.1: Version details.
addition to the synthetic rule sets, the three real world rule sets that we already
used for evaluating HyPaFilter and HyPaFilter+, allowed us to compare the syn-
thetic results to measurements closer to real conditions. In preparation, all rules
were set as UDP rules with the action ACCEPT. This was done in order to focus on
the classification performance. The Aruba 3810m switch supports a total number
of 10 000 entries in the IPv4 hardware-based routing table [108]. However, with
the desired expressiveness that also requires matching port numbers and protocol
types, this number drops to less than 1 500 entries—the exact number depends on
the rule set’s characteristics.
In Section 6.4, we described two different diverting methods for recombining
traffic of the software firewall. Throughout this evaluation, the rule divert method
was used. A comparison measurement using the default divert method with this
setup showed no notable difference with regard to the classification performance,
which was expected due to the O(1) classification in the switch hardware. Thus,
this step takes the same time for both approaches. Nevertheless, the default divert
method is more resource efficient concerning the switching table, since it thins
out the deployed simple rule set.
Traffic generation relies on trace files, which were generated by ClassBench’s
trace_generator according to the rule sets. The sender generates packets based on
the trace files, which will hit the rule set evenly distributed.
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6.5.2 Reference Measurement
In order to measure reference performance values, the same firewall tasks that
were used to evaluate FIREFLOW are applied to the software firewall as stand-alone
setup. The test rule sets are first configured to contain only simple rules. Then,
we adapt an increasing number of rules to require a complex string matching
operation. For the reference measurement, this only increases the processing
complexity for the software firewall. In the following hybrid setup evaluation,
however, these rules force a diversion of packets from the hardware accelerator
to the software firewall. We also evaluated a native SDN firewall setup using
the SDN controller via OpenFlow for complex rule processing, with the expected
constraints due to using the control link for data traffic. For each of the rule
sets, k ∈ {50, 100, 150, . . . , 1 100} rules at equally spaced positions are modified
for complex processing and the setup is updated via the management tool. Then,
for each k, ten test cycles of 20 seconds are conducted, counting the number of
successfully classified and forwarded packets. The number of packets arriving at
the ingress port of either setup was about 30 million in 20 seconds.
6.5.3 FireFlow as a Software Firewall Accelerator
The evaluation of the hybrid system follows the same procedure as the reference
measurement. The software workload for simple rules is expected to be reduced
and instead of using the SDN control channel, complex decisions are diverted to
the software firewall compartment.
In Figure 6.9, one can clearly see an almost constant number of packets pro-
cessed in the reference measurement, where all packets are solely classified by
the netfilter software firewall. The increasing number of complex rules only
has a minor effect on these numbers. This shows that the limitation of the soft-
ware firewall arises from the software processing overhead rather than from the
complexity of the actual rules. Figures 6.9a and 6.9b show the performance gain
of FIREFLOW when compared to the reference software firewall. FIREFLOW can
improve the performance especially when many simple rules can be offloaded to
the SDN switch, where it reaches a 23-fold performance gain.
6.5.4 FireFlow as an SDN extension
In contrast to the software firewall reference, complex rules in a plain SDN
firewall setup force packets to be sent to the SDN controller. Note that while
in the case of FIREFLOW, the software firewall actually applies the complex
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(a) Real rule sets.




























(b) Synthetic rule sets.
Fig. 6.9: Throughput comparison of FIREFLOW and stand-alone software firewall
(netfilter) for varying numbers of complex rules. The data points show
averaged throughputs for three real rule sets in 6.9a, and ten synthetic rule sets
in 6.9b. The error bars show the respective standard deviations.
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(a) Real rule sets.




























(b) Synthetic rule sets.
Fig. 6.10: Throughput comparison of FIREFLOW and a plain SDN switch/firewall
application setup for varying numbers of complex rules. The data points show
averaged throughputs for three real rule sets in 6.10a, and ten synthetic rule
sets in 6.10b. The error bars show the respective standard deviations.
rule part, this is not the case for the plain SDN setup, since the SDN controller
software does not implement such algorithms. Instead, packets are sent back to
the SDN switch directly. This can be seen as a best-case measurement for the
SDN reference, as only the overhead of sending packets to the control plane and
back is involved. For the evaluation results this means the performance-increasing
effect of FIREFLOW would be even greater if the complex processing at the SDN
application is taken into account, too. The negative impact due to the diversion to
the control plane is still clearly visible.
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As expected, the second reference using a native SDN firewall setup severely
suffered from the slow control channel as soon as complex rules were inserted.
This can be seen in Figures 6.10a and 6.10b. In comparison, FIREFLOW processed
about 500 times more packets.
6.5.5 Processing of Diverted Packets
Another interesting parameter is the number of packets that are lost due to
the diversion operation to the slower software firewall or the SDN controller,
respectively. Figures 6.11a and 6.11b show a comparison between the number of
packets that are diverted and those that are successfully processed by the back-end
(either the software firewall or the SDN application). Even with few complex
rules, most of the packets sent to the SDN application are lost, which means
connections targeting complex rules will suffer immense packet loss. The software
firewall back-end of FIREFLOW can sustain the workload better, especially if only
few complex rules are present.
6.5.6 Update Latency
For operational purposes, the update latency for deploying rule set updates is
also of interest. The update process involves several steps. First, the rule set
must be configured via the management tool. For each update, the header space
dependencies must be regarded and the corresponding subsets for the SDN switch
and the software firewall must be calculated. The management tool then updates
the SDN switch in our setup via REST API, as well as the software firewall with the
standard iptables-restore command. We measured the time required for this
process for an increasing number of complex rules. Figure 6.12 shows the latency
and how it is affected by the number of rules. The computation effort for the HSA
scales with O(n2) and therefore increases with more complex rules. However,
in our case we can reduce the computation effort, since already identified HSA-
dependent rules can be omitted for analysis. Furthermore, the number of rules
that must be placed in the switch is decreasing with a larger fraction of complex
rules. Since the REST API calls placing those rules consume a significant share
of the update latency, this results in a decreasing update latency after a certain
fraction is reached.
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Diverted packets Processed packets (netfilter)
Processed packets (SDN firewall)
(a) Real rule sets.


































































Diverted packets Processed packets (netfilter)
Processed packets (SDN firewall)
(b) Synthetic rule sets.
Fig. 6.11: Average number of diverted packets and share of the diverted packets that
could be processed by the SDN controller and firewall application (SDN
firewall) compared with the FIREFLOW software firewall compartment
(netfilter). The error bars show standard deviations. Percentages indicate the
fraction of processed vs. diverted packets, the remainder are lost packets.
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Synthetic rule sets Real rule sets
Fig. 6.12: Average time required to update the rule set in the evaluation FIREFLOW
setup, depending on the number of complex rules. The error bars show
standard deviations.
6.6 Summary
Building a powerful SDN-based firewall setup bears several challenges, which we
could identify in this chapter. FIREFLOW was introduced as a measure to set up a
fast and flexible hybrid SDN firewall setup. The concept primarily relies on the fast
SDN data plane to process the majority of the traffic. Only decisions too complex
to be processed within the SDN switch are diverted to a powerful software firewall
within the context of the firewall’s data plane. By applying an algorithm based on
the already previously successfully utilized HSA, we can ensure that all decisions
are still correct after the separation onto two different classification compartments
with respect to the master rule set defined by the administrator. Still, we do not
need to place the entire rule set onto the software firewall which again improves
performance. Only standard components are used—in our example setup a
COTS SDN switch and a software firewall based on netfilter/iptables. The
evaluation shows that significant classification performance gains can be achieved.
The approach further enables portability to other technologies, e.g., P4 hardware




In this thesis, we discussed design approaches for hybrid network packet pro-
cessing systems, with an emphasis on network security appliances. Fundamental
challenges in setup, operation, and administration could be identified for the
proposed structure of combining high-performance networking hardware with the
comprehensive analysis capabilities of software firewalls. This work contributes
to the applicability of such hybrid designs by describing practical approaches that
can exploit the strengths of hybrid network packet processing systems.
The basic challenges of network packet classification were described in Chapter 2.
The chapter continued with an analysis of existing approaches used for network
packet processing and classification, reaching from software-based systems to
dedicated network processing hardware. The advantages and weaknesses of these
approaches were discussed, which further justify the effort for building hybrid
systems.
In Chapter 3, the first hybrid approach HyPaFilter—exploiting a standard software
firewall in combination with a newly developed FPGA classification circuit—was
introduced. Here, an FPGA serves as the primary classification system, diverting
only packets to the software firewall where a complex decision (i.e., a complex
rule) must be analysed. This concept demonstrated the general feasibility of hybrid
network packet processing using these technologies as compartments. We further
identified challenges occurring with this approach, in particular, dependencies
among the rules of the rule set. The flexibility of a custom hardware circuit
allowed us to exploit further possibilities for improvement. Most notably, the
usage of matching meta information from the FPGA’s classification circuit could
be used to speed-up the subsequent software classification process. This enables
an up to 30-fold performance increase compared to a standard software firewall.
The evaluation confirms the approach as an answer to the first research question
of this thesis: How can we realize a combination of two packet classification systems
so that each compartment processes the tasks it is best suited for in order to achieve
high throughput, flexibility and comprehensive analysis capabilities?
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Chapter 4 expands Chapter 3. While the former approach primarily optimized
the software classification process, the focus was now shifted towards better
avoidance of the expensive diversion to the software firewall. To this end, the
decision whether a packet needs to be diverted was determined by an algorithm
based on header space analysis (HSA), which uses a geometric representation of
the rules in order to find dependencies. One remarkable result of the evaluation
is that neither the synthetic nor the real rule sets were subject to exceeding
dependencies amongst the rules. Consequently, the implementation of the HSA
dependency analysis allowed major parts of the traffic to be handled solely by
the FPGA, even for more complex and demanding scenarios than those we used
during the evaluation in Chapter 3. This allows the hybrid firewall to sustain the
performance increase even with many and scattered complex rules.
With the goal of delegating more network-related processing natively to the FPGA,
Chapter 5 described potential suitable network processing tasks and their applica-
tion. Afterwards, two important applications were identified and analysed. First,
an approach for resource-efficient, hybrid on-chip classification circuits that can be
updated dynamically was introduced. This approach was evaluated and compared
against standard hardware classification circuits, where it showed significantly
reduced resource and power consumption. Secondly, hash functions, key building
blocks for numerous network processing applications, are evaluated on their
implementability on FPGAs. It could be shown that the recent hash function
SHA3—while exceeding the requirements for this task—is better suited for FPGAs
than weaker algorithms that are optimized for CPU-based implementation. Both
findings support the proposition for further integration of networking tasks into
FPGAs, hereby contributing to answering the second research question: Which
network packet processing tasks are desirable and feasible for FPGA implementation
and what implementation approaches and optimizations are possible?
Finally, the portability of the hybrid approach was demonstrated in Chapter 6,
where the former FPGA-based hardware classification system was replaced by
a commodity SDN hardware switch. Although the limitation of using standard
hardware has constraints with regard to possible performance-enhancing exten-
sions, a significant increase of the classification rate could be shown. Furthermore,
FIREFLOW allows for an easy extension and integration into existing network
infrastructure. The results answer the third research question, since standard
SDN components without further modification are successfully used: How can
the hybrid classification approach be applied to other types of packet classification
systems if one goal is to avoid modifications to the components themselves? Table 7.1
shows how the contributed approaches compare against the state-of-the-art that
was described in Chapter 2.
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Approach COTS Open Src. Flexibility Analysis Features HW-Offl. Perf.
Linux netfilter Yes Yes High Comprehensive None Limited
Linux eBPF Yes Yes High Comprehensive None Limited
DPDK/pfSense [63] Yes Yes Limited Limited None Up to line speed
The shunt [92] Partly1 Partly2 Medium Comprehensive Flows Up to line speed
NFShunt [62] Yes Yes Medium Comprehensive Flows Up to line speed
FPGA stand-alone Partly Partly2 Medium Limited Full Up to line speed
Com. HW firewall No3 No Limited Varies Full Up to line speed
HyPaFilter+ Partly Partly2 High Comprehensive Policies Up to line speed
FIREFLOW Yes Yes High Comprehensive Policies Up to line speed
Tab. 7.1: Qualitative comparison of different packet classification approaches for
firewalling, including the contributed ones.
1Modifications required to standard software components.
2Design contains closed-source components.
3Vendor-specific, not interchangeable.
The introduced approaches are designed to allow for flexible extensions. This way,
technologies like stateful packet filtering can be integrated into the hybrid system.
Moreover, a porting to other platforms, like NPUs or programmable network
hardware based on P4, seems feasible.
Summarizing the results, this thesis provides a novel hybrid packet processing
approach that can be utilized in different setups and environments. The ap-





Publications by the Author
[1]A. Fiessler, S. Hager, and B. Scheuermann. „Flexible line speed network packet
classification using hybrid on-chip matching circuits“. In: HPSR ’17: Proceedings of
the 2017 IEEE 18th International Conference on High Performance Switching and
Routing. Campinas, Brazil, June 2017, pp. 1–8 (cit. on pp. 23, 73, 77).
[2]A. Fiessler, S. Hager, B. Scheuermann, and A.W. Moore. „HyPaFilter - A Versatile
Hybrid FPGA Packet Filter“. In: ANCS ’16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM/IEEE Ninth
Symposium on Architectures for Networking and Communication Systems. Santa
Clara, CA, USA, Mar. 2016, pp. 25–36 (cit. on pp. 19, 24, 49).
[3]A. Fiessler, D. Loebenberger, S. Hager, and B. Scheuermann. „On the Use of
(Non-)Cryptographic Hashes on FPGAs“. In: Applied Reconfigurable Computing.
Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 72–80. ISBN: 978-3-319-56258-2 (cit.
on p. 73).
[4]A. Fiessler, C. Lorenz, S. Hager, and B. Scheuermann. „FIREFLOW – High Perfor-
mance Hybrid SDN-Firewalls with OpenFlow“. In: LCN ’18: Proceedings of the 2018
IEEE 43rd Conference on Local Computer Networks. Chicago, IL, USA, Oct. 2018,
pp. 227–230 (cit. on p. 99).
[5]A. Fiessler, C. Lorenz, S. Hager, B. Scheuermann, and A. W. Moore. „HyPaFilter+:
Enhanced Hybrid Packet Filtering Using Hardware Assisted Classification and
Header Space Analysis“. In: IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 25.6 (Dec.
2017), pp. 3655–3669. ISSN: 1063-6692 (cit. on pp. 19, 49, 74, 106).
[6]S. Hager, P. John, A. Fiessler, and B. Scheuermann. „Minflate: Combining Rule
Set Minimization with Jump-based Expansion for Fast Packet Classification“. In:
ANCS ’16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM/IEEE Ninth Symposium on Architectures
for Networking and Communication Systems. Santa Clara, CA, USA, Mar. 2016,
pp. 115–116 (cit. on p. 11).
123
Other Publications
[7]K. Accardi, T. Bock, F. Hady, and J. Krueger. „Network processor acceleration for
a Linux* netfilter firewall“. In: ANCS ’05: Proceedings of the 2005 Symposium on
Architectures for Networking and Communication Systems. Princeton, New Jersey,
USA, Oct. 2005, pp. 115–123 (cit. on pp. 17, 21, 22, 101).
[8]M. Attig, S. Dharmapurikar, and J. Lockwood. „Implementation results of bloom
filters for string matching“. In: FCCM ’04: Proceedings of the 2004 12th Annual IEEE
Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines. Napa, CA, USA,
Apr. 2004, pp. 322–323 (cit. on p. 88).
[9]J. Aumasson and D. J. Bernstein. „SipHash: A Fast Short-Input PRF“. In: Progress
in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2012. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 489–508.
ISBN: 978-3-642-34931-7 (cit. on pp. 90, 94).
[10]F. Baboescu and G. Varghese. „Scalable Packet Classification“. In: SIGCOMM ’01:
Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and
Protocols for Computer Communications. San Diego, CA, USA, Aug. 2001, pp. 199–
210 (cit. on pp. 11, 74).
[11]Z. K. Baker and V. K. Prasanna. „Automatic Synthesis of Efficient Intrusion Detection
Systems on FPGAs“. In: Field Programmable Logic and Application. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 311–321. ISBN: 978-3-540-30117-2 (cit. on p. 16).
[12]N. Bar-Yosef and A. Wool. „Remote Algorithmic Complexity Attacks against Ran-
domized Hash Tables“. In: E-business and Telecommunications. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 162–174. ISBN: 978-3-540-88653-2 (cit. on p. 88).
[13]E. Blanton and M. Allman. „On making TCP more robust to packet reordering“. In:
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 32.1 (2002), pp. 20–30. ISSN:
0146-4833 (cit. on p. 33).
[14]B. H. Bloom. „Space/time trade-offs in hash coding with allowable errors“. In:
Communications of the ACM 13.7 (1970), pp. 422–426. ISSN: 0001-0782 (cit. on
pp. 86, 88, 89).
[15]A. Bookstein. „Double hashing“. In: Journal of the American Society for Information
Science 23.6 (1972), pp. 402–405 (cit. on pp. 86, 89).
[16]P. Bosshart, D. Daly, G. Gibb, M. Izzard, N. McKeown, J. Rexford, C. Schlesinger,
D. Talayco, A. Vahdat, G. Varghese, et al. „P4: Programming Protocol-independent
Packet Processors“. In: ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 44.3 (July
2014), pp. 87–95. ISSN: 0146-4833 (cit. on pp. 14, 101).
[17]A. Broder and M. Mitzenmacher. „Network applications of bloom filters: A survey“.
In: Internet mathematics 1.4 (2004), pp. 485–509 (cit. on p. 88).
[18]A. Broder and M. Mitzenmacher. „Using multiple hash functions to improve IP
lookups“. In: INFOCOM ’01: Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Joint Conference of
the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Vol. 3. Anchorage, AK, USA, 2001
(cit. on pp. 86, 87).
124
[19]Y. Chang. „A 2-Level TCAM Architecture for Ranges“. In: IEEE Transactions on
Computers 55.12 (Dec. 2006), pp. 1614–1629. ISSN: 0018-9340 (cit. on pp. 12,
13).
[20]H. Chen, Y. Chen, and D.H. Summerville. „A Survey on the Application of FPGAs
for Network Infrastructure Security“. In: Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE
13.4 (2011), pp. 541–561. ISSN: 1553-877X (cit. on pp. 2, 16).
[21]M. Chen, M. Liao, P. Tsai, M. Luo, C. Yang, and C. E. Yeh. „Using NetFPGA to Offload
Linux Netfilter Firewall“. In: 2nd North American NetFPGA Developers Workshop.
Stanford, CA, USA, Aug. 2010 (cit. on pp. 17, 22).
[22]C. R. Clark and D. E. Schimmel. „Efficient Reconfigurable Logic Circuits for Match-
ing Complex Network Intrusion Detection Patterns“. In: Field Programmable Logic
and Application. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003, pp. 956–959. ISBN: 978-3-540-
45234-8 (cit. on pp. 14, 16).
[23]J. Collings and J. Liu. „An OpenFlow-Based Prototype of SDN-Oriented Stateful
Hardware Firewalls“. In: ICNP ’14: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE 22nd International
Conference on Network Protocols. Raleigh, NC, USA, Oct. 2014, pp. 525–528 (cit. on
p. 102).
[24]S. Crosby and D. Wallach. „Denial of Service via Algorithmic Complexity Attacks.“
In: Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Symposium. Washington, DC, USA, Aug.
2003, pp. 29–44 (cit. on pp. 74, 88, 89).
[25]A. Das, D. Nguyen, J. Zambreno, G. Memik, and A. Choudhary. „An FPGA-Based
Network Intrusion Detection Architecture“. In: IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security 3.1 (Mar. 2008), pp. 118–132. ISSN: 1556-6013 (cit. on pp. 2,
90).
[26]I. Dubrawsky. „Firewall evolution-deep packet inspection“. In: Security Focus 29
(2003) (cit. on pp. 2, 8, 99).
[27]R. Durner and W. Kellerer. „The cost of Security in the SDN control Plane“. In: ACM
CoNEXT Student Workshop ’15. Heidelberg, Germany, Dec. 2015 (cit. on pp. 100,
103, 104).
[28]M. Dworkin. FIPS PUB 202. SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-
Output Functions. Aug. 2015 (cit. on pp. 90, 94).
[29]P. Emmerich, S. Gallenmüller, D. Raumer, F. Wohlfart, and G. Carle. „MoonGen:
A Scriptable High-Speed Packet Generator“. In: IMC ’15: Proceedings of the 2015
Internet Measurement Conference. Tokyo, Japan, Oct. 2015, pp. 275–287. ISBN:
978-1-4503-3848-6 (cit. on p. 11).
[30]H. Feistel. „Cryptography and Computer Privacy“. In: Scientific American 228.5
(1973), pp. 15–23. ISSN: 00368733, 19467087 (cit. on pp. 86, 90).
[31]J. Fong, X. Wang, Y. Qi, J. Li, and W. Jiang. „ParaSplit: A Scalable Architecture
on FPGA for Terabit Packet Classification“. In: HOTI ’12: Proceedings of the 20th
Symposium on High Performance Interconnects. Santa Clara, CA, USA, Aug. 2012,
pp. 1–8 (cit. on pp. 16, 105).
125
[32]S. Gallenmüller, P. Emmerich, F. Wohlfart, D. Raumer, and G. Carle. „Comparison
of Frameworks for High-Performance Packet IO“. In: ANCS ’15: Proceedings of the
Eleventh ACM/IEEE Symposium on Architectures for Networking and Communications
Systems. Oakland, California, USA, May 2015, pp. 29–38. ISBN: 978-1-4673-6632-8
(cit. on p. 11).
[33]T. Ganegedara and V. Prasanna. „StrideBV: Single Chip 400G+ Packet Classifica-
tion“. In: HPSR’12: IEEE 13th Conference on High Performance Switching and Routing.
Belgrade, Serbia, June 2012, pp. 1–6 (cit. on pp. 23, 75).
[34]K. Golnabi, R. K. Min, L. Khan, and E. Al-Shaer. „Analysis of Firewall Policy Rules
Using Data Mining Techniques“. In: NOMS ’06: Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE/IFIP
Network Operations and Management Symposium. Apr. 2006, pp. 305–315 (cit. on
pp. 49, 74).
[35]P. Gupta and N. McKeown. „Algorithms for Packet Classification“. In: IEEE Network:
The Magazine of Global Internetworking 15.2 (Mar. 2001), pp. 24–32. ISSN: 0890-
8044 (cit. on pp. 7, 11).
[36]P. Gupta and N. McKeown. „Packet Classification using Hierarchical Intelligent
Cuttings“. In: HOTI ’99: Proceedings of the 7th Symposium on High Performance
Interconnects. Stanford, CA, USA, Aug. 1999, pp. 34–41 (cit. on pp. 11, 74).
[37]S. Hager, D. Bendyk, and B. Scheuermann. „Partial Reconfiguration And Special-
ized Circuitry for Flexible FPGA-based Packet Processing“. In: ReConFig ’15: 2015
International Conference on ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs. Mayan Riviera,
Mexico, Dec. 2015, pp. 1–6 (cit. on pp. 23, 76).
[38]S. Hager, S. Selent, and B. Scheuermann. „Trees in the List: Accelerating List-based
Packet Classification Through Controlled Rule Set Expansion“. In: CoNEXT ’14:
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Emerging Networking Experiments
and Technologies. Sydney, Australia, Dec. 2014, pp. 101–107 (cit. on pp. 11, 21, 30,
50).
[39]S. Hager, F. Winkler, B. Scheuermann, and K. Reinhardt. „MPFC: Massively Parallel
Firewall Circuits“. In: LCN ’14: Proceedings of the 39th Annual IEEE International
Conference on Local Computer Networks. Edmonton, Canada, Sept. 2014, pp. 305–
313 (cit. on pp. 16, 22, 76, 105).
[40]F. Heimgaertner, M. Schmidt, D. Morgenstern, and M. Menth. „A Software-Defined
Firewall Bypass for Congestion Offloading“. In: CNSM ’17: Proceedings of the 2017
13th International Conference on Network and Service Management. Tokyo, Japan,
Nov. 2017, pp. 1–9 (cit. on p. 103).
[41]H. Hu, W. Han, G. Ahn, and Z. Zhao. „FlowGuard: Building Robust Firewalls for
Software-defined Networks“. In: HotSDN ’14: Proceedings of the third workshop
on Hot topics in software defined networking. Chicago, IL, USA, 2014, pp. 97–102
(cit. on pp. 99, 102).
[42]„IEEE Standard for Verilog Hardware Description Language“. In: IEEE Std 1364-
2005 (Revision of IEEE Std 1364-2001) (2006), pp. 1–560 (cit. on p. 15).
[43]„IEEE Standards Interpretations: IEEE Std 1076-1987, IEEE Standard VHDL Lan-
guage Reference Manual“. In: IEEE Std 1076/INT-1991 (1992) (cit. on p. 15).
126
[44]Cisco Visual Networking Index. The zettabyte era–trends and analysis. https://
www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-
networking- index- vni/vni- hyperconnectivity- wp.pdf. Last access: Nov
2018. 2016 (cit. on p. 1).
[45]Intel Corporation. DPDK Intel NIC Performance Report Release 17.08. http://fast.
dpdk.org/doc/perf/DPDK_17_08_Intel_NIC_performance_report.pdf. Last
access: Dec 10, 2017. 2017 (cit. on p. 11).
[46]B. Jenkins. Various publications on hash functions. http://www.burtleburtle.
net/bob/hash/doobs.html and http://www.burtleburtle.net/bob/hash/
spooky.html and http://www.burtleburtle.net/c/lookup2.c and http:
//www.burtleburtle.net/bob/c/lookup3.c. Last access: Nov 15, 2016 (cit. on
pp. 90, 94).
[47]J. Jeong, J. Seo, G. Cho, H. Kim, and J. Park. „A Framework for Security Ser-
vices Based on Software-Defined Networking“. In: WAINA ’15: Proceedings of the
2015 IEEE 29th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and
Applications Workshops. Gwangiu, South Korea, Mar. 2015, pp. 150–153 (cit. on
p. 102).
[48]W. Jiang and V. Prasanna. „A FPGA-based Parallel Architecture for Scalable High-
Speed Packet Classification“. In: ASAP ’09: Proceedings of the 20th IEEE International
Conference on Application-specific Systems, Architectures and Processors. Boston, MA,
USA, July 2009, pp. 24–31 (cit. on pp. 14, 16, 105).
[49]W. Jiang and V. Prasanna. „Large-scale Wire-speed Packet Classification on FPGAs“.
In: FPGA ’09: Proceedings of the ACM/SIGDA 17th International Symposium on Field
Programmable Gate Arrays. Monterey, California, USA, Feb. 2009, pp. 219–228
(cit. on pp. 1, 2, 10, 14, 16, 73, 75, 105).
[50]P. Kazemian, G. Varghese, and N. McKeown. „Header Space Analysis: Static Check-
ing for Networks“. In: NSDI ’12: Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Symposium on
Networked Systems Design and Implementation. San Jose, CA, USA, Apr. 2012,
pp. 113–126 (cit. on p. 49).
[51]S. Kilts. Advanced FPGA design: architecture, implementation, and optimization. John
Wiley & Sons, 2007. ISBN: 9780470127896 (cit. on p. 15).
[52]V. Klima. „Tunnels in Hash Functions: MD5 Collisions Within a Minute.“ In: IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive 2006 (2006), p. 105. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/
2006/105.pdf (cit. on p. 88).
[53]D. Kreutz, F. M. V. Ramos, P. Verissimo, C. E. Rothenberg, S. Azodolmolky, and
S. Uhlig. „Software-Defined Networking: A Comprehensive Survey“. In: Proceedings
of the IEEE 103.1 (2015), pp. 14–76. ISSN: 0018-9219. URL: http://arxiv.org/
abs/1406.0440 (cit. on pp. 13, 14, 99, 104).
[54]T. Lakshman and D. Stiliadis. „High-Speed Policy-based Packet Forwarding Using
Efficient Multi-dimensional Range Matching“. In: SIGCOMM ’98: Proceedings of
the 1998 Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for
Computer Communications. Vancouver, BC, Canada, Aug. 1998, pp. 203–214 (cit.
on pp. 11, 50, 74).
127
[55]A. Liu and M. Gouda. „Complete Redundancy Detection in Firewalls“. In: Data and
Applications Security XIX. Storrs, CT, USA: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Aug. 2005,
pp. 193–206. ISBN: 978-3-540-31937-5 (cit. on p. 108).
[56]A. Liu, E. Torng, and C. Meiners. „Firewall Compressor: An Algorithm for Mini-
mizing Firewall Policies“. In: INFOCOM ’08: Proceedings of the 27th Annual Joint
Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Phoenix, AZ, USA,
Apr. 2008, pp. 176–180 (cit. on pp. 11, 21).
[57]D. Liu, B. Hua, X. Hu, and X. Tang. „High-performance Packet Classification Al-
gorithm for Many-core and Multithreaded Network Processor“. In: CASES ’06:
Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Compilers, Architecture, and
Synthesis for Embedded System. Seoul, Korea, Oct. 2006, pp. 334–344 (cit. on p. 14).
[58]J. W. Lockwood, N. McKeown, G. Watson, G. Gibb, P. Hartke, J. Naous, R. Raghura-
man, and J. Luo. „NetFPGA–An Open Platform for Gigabit-Rate Network Switching
and Routing“. In: MSE ’07: Proceedings of the International Conference on Microelec-
tronic Systems Education. San Diego, CA, USA, June 2007, pp. 160–161 (cit. on
p. 34).
[59]J. W Lockwood, A. Gupte, N. Mehta, M. Blott, T. English, and K. Vissers. „A low-
latency library in FPGA hardware for high-frequency trading (HFT)“. In: HOTI ’12:
Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on High-Performance Interconnects. IEEE.
Santa Clara, CA, USA, Aug. 2012, pp. 9–16 (cit. on pp. 2, 16).
[60]C. Lorenz, D. Hock, J. Scherer, R. Durner, W. Kellerer, S. Gebert, N. Gray, T. Zinner,
and P. Tran-Gia. „An SDN/NFV-Enabled Enterprise Network Architecture Offering
Fine-Grained Security Policy Enforcement“. In: IEEE Communications Magazine
55.3 (Mar. 2017), pp. 217–223 (cit. on p. 103).
[61]N. McKeown, T. Anderson, H. Balakrishnan, G. Parulkar, L. Peterson, J. Rexford,
S. Shenker, and J. Turner. „OpenFlow: Enabling Innovation in Campus Networks“.
In: ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 38.2 (Mar. 2008), pp. 69–74
(cit. on pp. 14, 104).
[62]S. Miteff and S. Hazelhurst. „NFShunt: A Linux firewall with OpenFlow-enabled
hardware bypass“. In: NFV-SDN ’15. San Francisco, CA, USA, Nov. 2015, pp. 100–
106 (cit. on pp. 18, 103, 121).
[63]Netgate. Further (a roadmap for pfSense). https://www.netgate.com/blog/further-
a-roadmap-for-pfsense.html. Last access: Dec 06, 2017. 2015 (cit. on pp. 11, 18,
121).
[64]B. Nunes, M. Mendonca, X. Nguyen, K. Obraczka, and T. Turletti. „A Survey of
Software-Defined Networking: Past, Present, and Future of Programmable Net-
works“. In: IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials 16.3 (Feb. 2014), pp. 1617–1634
(cit. on pp. 14, 100).
[65]D. H. Nyang. Counting bloom filter. US Patent 9,740,797. Aug. 2017 (cit. on p. 88).
[66]R. Pagh and F. Rodler. „Cuckoo hashing“. In: European Symposium on Algorithms.
Springer. 2001, pp. 121–133 (cit. on pp. 86, 89).
[67]J. Pena and W. Yu. „Development of a Distributed Firewall Using Software Defined
Networking Technology“. In: ICIST ’14. Apr. 2014, pp. 449–452 (cit. on p. 102).
128
[68]B. Pfaff, J. Scherer, D. Hock, N. Gray, T. Zinner, P. Tran-Gia, R. Durner, W. Kellerer,
and C. Lorenz. „SDN/NFV-enabled Security Architecture for Fine-grained Policy
Enforcement and Threat Mitigation for Enterprise Networks“. In: SIGCOMM ’17.
Los Angeles, CA, USA, Aug. 2017, pp. 15–16 (cit. on p. 103).
[69]A. Putnam, A. M. Caulfield, E. S. Chung, D. Chiou, K. Constantinides, J. Demme,
H. Esmaeilzadeh, J. Fowers, G.P. Gopal, J. Gray, et al. „A reconfigurable fabric for
accelerating large-scale datacenter services“. In: ISCA ’14: Proceedings of the 41st
International Symposium on Computer Architecture. Minneapolis, MA, USA, June
2014, pp. 13–24 (cit. on p. 20).
[70]Y. Qi, B. Xu, F. He, B. Yang, J. Yu, and J. Li. „Towards High-performance Flow-level
Packet Processing on Multi-core Network Processors“. In: ANCS ’07: Proceedings of
the 3rd ACM/IEEE Symposium on Architectures for Networking and Communication
Systems. Orlando, Florida, USA, Dec. 2007, pp. 17–26 (cit. on p. 14).
[71]Y. Qi, L. Xu, B. Yang, Y. Xue, and J. Li. „Packet Classification Algorithms: From The-
ory to Practice“. In: INFOCOM ’09: Proceedings of the 28th Annual Joint Conference
of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Apr.
2009, pp. 648–656 (cit. on p. 74).
[72]Y. Qu and V. Prasanna. „High-Performance and Dynamically Updatable Packet
Classification Engine on FPGA“. In: IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems 27.1 (Jan. 2016), pp. 197–209. ISSN: 1045-9219 (cit. on p. 75).
[73]D. Qunfeng, S. Banerjee, J. Wang, and D. Agrawal. „Wire Speed Packet Classification
Without TCAMs: A Few More Registers (And A Bit of Logic) Are Enough“. In:
SIGMETRICS ’07: Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGMETRICS International Conference
on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems. San Diego, CA, USA, June
2007, pp. 253–264 (cit. on pp. 12, 23, 74, 75).
[74]R. Ramanathan and J. Redi. „A brief overview of ad hoc networks: challenges
and directions“. In: IEEE communications Magazine 40.5 (2002), pp. 20–22. ISSN:
0163-6804 (cit. on p. 9).
[75]L. Rizzo. „Netmap: A Novel Framework for Fast Packet I/O“. In: USENIX ATC ’12:
Proceedings of the 2012 USENIX Conference on Annual Technical Conference. Boston,
MA, 2012, p. 9 (cit. on p. 11).
[76]O. Rottenstreich, R. Cohen, D. Raz, and I. Keslassy. „Exact Worst Case TCAM Rule
Expansion“. In: IEEE Transactions on Computers 62.6 (June 2013), pp. 1127–1140.
ISSN: 0018-9340 (cit. on p. 12).
[77]R. Sangireddy and A. Somani. „High-Speed IP Routing With Binary Decision Dia-
grams Based Hardware Address Lookup Engine“. In: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications 21.4 (May 2003). ISSN: 0733-8716 (cit. on p. 76).
[78]D. Scholz, D. Raumer, P. Emmerich, A. Kurtz, K. Lesiak, and G. Carle. „Performance
Implications of Packet Filtering with Linux eBPF“. In: ITC 30: Proceedings of the
2018 30th International Teletraffic Congress. Vol. 01. Vienna, Austria, Sept. 2018,
pp. 209–217 (cit. on p. 12).
[79]D. V. Schuehler and J. W. Lockwood. „A Modular System for FPGA-Based TCP Flow
Processing in High-Speed Networks“. In: Field Programmable Logic and Application.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 301–310. ISBN: 978-3-540-30117-2 (cit. on
pp. 14, 16).
129
[80]E. S. Al-Shaer and H. H. Hamed. „Discovery of policy anomalies in distributed
firewalls“. In: INFOCOM ’04: Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Joint Conference of the
IEEE Computer and Communication Societies. Vol. 4. Hong Kong, China, Mar. 2004,
2605–2616 vol.4 (cit. on p. 17).
[81]Z. Shi, C. Ma, J. Cote, and B. Wang. „Hardware implementation of hash functions“.
In: Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust. Springer, 2012, pp. 27–50. ISBN:
978-1-4419-8080-9 (cit. on pp. 74, 86–88).
[82]S. Singh, F. Baboescu, G. Varghese, and J. Wang. „Packet Classification Using
Multidimensional Cutting“. In: SIGCOMM ’03: Proceedings of the 2003 Conference on
Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communications.
Karlsruhe, Germany, Aug. 2003, pp. 213–224 (cit. on p. 11).
[83]H. Song, S. Dharmapurikar, J. Turner, and J. Lockwood. „Fast hash table lookup
using extended bloom filter: an aid to network processing“. In: ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review 35.4 (2005), pp. 181–192. ISSN: 0146-4833 (cit.
on pp. 87, 88, 90, 95).
[84]H. Song and J. W. Lockwood. „Efficient Packet Classification for Network Intrusion
Detection using FPGA“. In: FPGA ’05: Proceedings of the ACM/SIGDA 13th Interna-
tional Symposium on Field Programmable Gate Arrays. Monterey, California, USA,
Feb. 2005, pp. 238–245 (cit. on pp. 10, 14, 16).
[85]I. Sourdis and D. Pnevmatikatos. „Fast, Large-Scale String Match for a 10Gbps
FPGA-Based Network Intrusion Detection System“. In: Field Programmable Logic
and Application. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003, pp. 880–889. ISBN: 978-3-540-
45234-8 (cit. on p. 16).
[86]E. Spitznagel, D. Taylor, and J. Turner. „Packet Classification Using Extended
TCAMs“. In: ICNP ’03: Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Conference on
Network Protocols. Atlanta, Georgia, USA, Nov. 2003, pp. 120–131 (cit. on p. 12).
[87]V. Srinivasan, S. Suri, and G. Varghese. „Packet Classification using Tuple Space
Search“. In: SIGCOMM ’99: Proceedings of the 1999 Conference on Applications,
Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communications. Cambridge,
MA, USA, Aug. 1999, pp. 135–146 (cit. on p. 11).
[88]D. Taylor. „Survey and Taxonomy of Packet Classification Techniques“. In: ACM
Comput. Surv. 37.3 (Sept. 2005), pp. 238–275. ISSN: 0360-0300 (cit. on p. 7).
[89]D. Taylor and J. Turner. „ClassBench: a packet classification benchmark“. In:
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 15.3 (June 2007), pp. 499–511. ISSN: 1063-
6692 (cit. on pp. 36, 37, 78, 110).
[90]K. Thompson, G. J. Miller, and R. Wilder. „Wide-area Internet traffic patterns and
characteristics“. In: IEEE network 11.6 (1997), pp. 10–23. ISSN: 0890-8044 (cit. on
p. 7).
[91]M. Varvello, R. Laufer, F. Zhang, and T. Lakshman. „Multi-Layer Packet Classifi-
cation with Graphics Processing Units“. In: CoNEXT ’14: Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference on Emerging Networking Experiments and Technologies.
Sydney, Australia, Dec. 2014, pp. 109–120 (cit. on p. 14).
130
[92]N. Weaver, V. Paxson, and J.M Gonzalez. „The shunt: an FPGA-based accelerator for
network intrusion prevention“. In: FPGA ’07: Proceedings of the ACM/SIGDA 15th
International Symposium on Field Programmable Gate Arrays. Monterey, California,
USA, Feb. 2007, pp. 199–206 (cit. on pp. 17, 18, 20, 121).
[93]F. Yu and R. H. Katz. „Efficient Multi-Match Packet Classification with TCAM“. In:
HOTI ’04: Proceedings of the 12th Symposium on High Performance Interconnects.
Stanford, CA, USA, Aug. 2004, pp. 28–34 (cit. on pp. 12, 13).
[94]L. Yuan, H. Chen, J. Mai, C. Chuah, Z. Su, and P. Mohapatra. „FIREMAN: a toolkit
for firewall modeling and analysis“. In: S&P ’06: Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy. Berkeley/Oakland, CA, USA, May 2006, pp. 15–
(cit. on p. 8).
[95]S.s Zerkane, D. Espes, P. L. Parc, and F. Cuppens. „A Proactive Stateful Firewall
for Software Defined Networking“. In: Risks and Security of Internet and Systems.
Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 123–138. ISBN: 978-3-319-54876-0
(cit. on p. 102).
[96]N. Zilberman, Y. Audzevich, G.A. Covington, and A.W. Moore. „NetFPGA SUME:
Toward 100 Gbps as Research Commodity“. In: IEEE Micro 34.5 (Sept. 2014),
pp. 32–41. ISSN: 0272-1732 (cit. on pp. 16, 20, 32).
Online
[97]ARM. AMBA AXI and ACE Protocol Specification. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. URL:
http://www.gstitt.ece.ufl.edu/courses/fall15/eel4720_5721/labs/
refs/AXI4_specification.pdf (cit. on p. 34).
[98]J. Aumasson and D. Bernstein. C++ program to find universal (key-independent)
multicollisions for CityHash64. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. URL: https://131002.
net/siphash/citycollisions-20120730.tar.gz (cit. on pp. 90, 94).
[99]L. Byungjoon, J. Shin, and S. H. Park. Openflow Controller by ETRI. Last access:
Nov. 3, 2018. 2015. URL: https://github.com/openiris/IRIS (cit. on p. 46).
[100]ClassBench parameter files from 12 real filter sets. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. URL:
https://www.arl.wustl.edu/classbench/parameter_files.tar.gz (cit. on
p. 37).
[101]CompaniesHistory.com. Xilinx, Inc. History. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. URL: http:
//www.companieshistory.com/xilinx/ (cit. on p. 16).
[102]EE Times. Design Criteria for Searching Databases: Part 1. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018.
URL: https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1202975 (cit. on p. 12).
[103]EE Times. Xilinx UltraScale FPGA Offers 50 Million Equivalent ASIC Gates. Last access:
Nov. 3, 2018. URL: https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1320345
(cit. on p. 15).
[104]Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 212. Last access: Nov 3, 2018. URL: http://csrc.
nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/documents/FR_Notice_Nov07.pdf (cit. on pp. 87,
88).
131
[105]Floodlight - Firewall REST API. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. 2015. URL: https://
floodlight . atlassian . net / wiki / spaces / floodlightcontroller / pages /
1343614/Firewall+REST+API (cit. on pp. 99, 102).
[106]Fortinet. Improving FortiGate performance with flow-based UTM scanning. Last
access: Nov. 3, 2018. 2015. URL: http://docs-legacy.fortinet.com/cb/html/
index.html#page/FOS_Cookbook/UTM/cb_utm_av_flow-based_scanning.html
(cit. on p. 19).
[107]genugate firewall. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. URL: www.genua.de/en/solutions/
high-resistance-firewall-genugate.html (cit. on pp. 2, 19).
[108]Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP. Data Sheet Aruba DS 3810 Switch
Series. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. URL: http://www.arubanetworks.com//assets/
ds/DS_3810SwitchSeries.pdf (cit. on pp. 105, 111).
[109]H. Hsing. SHA3 (KECCAK). Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. 2012. URL: http : / /
opencores.org/project,sha3 (cit. on p. 95).
[110]IEEE. 200 Gb/s and 400 Gb/s Ethernet Task Force. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. 2016.
URL: http://www.ieee802.org/3/bs/index.html (cit. on p. 1).
[111] IPFW Firewall. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. URL: https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/
man.cgi?ipfw (cit. on pp. 19, 104).
[112]Juniper Networks, Inc. Configuring Sophos Antivirus Feature Profile. Last access: Nov.
3, 2018. 2017. URL: http://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/
topics/example/utm- antivirus- sophos- configuring- feature- profile.
html (cit. on p. 19).
[113]Juniper Networks, Inc. SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 Services Gateways. Last
access: Nov. 3, 2018. 2017. URL: https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/
local/pdf/datasheets/1000254-en.pdf (cit. on p. 19).
[114]Kevin Deierling, The Next Platform. In Modern Datacenters, The Latency Tail Wags
The Network Dog. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. URL: https://www.nextplatform.
com/2018/03/27/in- modern- datacenters- the- latency- tail- wags- the-
network-dog/ (cit. on p. 44).
[115]Neustar, Inc. Choosing a Good Hash Function, Part 3. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. Feb.
2012. URL: https://research.neustar.biz/2012/02/02/choosing-a-good-
hash-function-part-3/ (cit. on p. 86).
[116]Neutronome Systems Inc. Agilio CX 2x40GbE SmartNIC. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018.
URL: https://www.netronome.com/media/documents/PB_Agilio_CX_2x40GbE.
pdf (cit. on p. 14).
[117]oCERT.org. #2011-003 multiple implementations denial-of-service via hash algo-
rithm collision. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. 2011. URL: http://www.ocert.org/
advisories/ocert-2011-003.html (cit. on pp. 74, 88).
[118]oCERT.org. #2012-001 multiple implementations denial-of-service via MurmurHash
algorithm collision. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. 2012. URL: http://www.ocert.org/
advisories/ocert-2012-001.html (cit. on pp. 74, 86, 88, 90, 94).
[119]OpenBSD Packet Filter. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. URL: http://www.openbsd.org/
faq/pf/ (cit. on pp. 8, 11, 19, 104).
132
[120]Palo Alto Networks. How to Implement and Test SSL Decryption. Last access: Nov. 3,
2018. 2010. URL: https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/docs/DOC-1412 (cit. on
p. 19).
[121]Quanta Computer Inc. QuantaMesh 5000 Series BMS T5016-LB8D. Last access:
Nov. 3, 2018. 2015. URL: https : / / www . qct . io / zh - CN / product / index /
Networking/Bare-Metal-Switch/Spine-Switch/QuantaMesh-BMS-T5016-LB8D
(cit. on p. 46).
[122]Secworks Sweden AB. SipHash Verilog. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. 2016. URL:
https://github.com/secworks/siphash (cit. on p. 95).
[123]Jisoo Shin. REST API List of OFMFirewall. Last access: Nov 3, 2018. 2014. URL:
https://github.com/openiris/IRIS/wiki/REST-API-List-of-OFMFirewall
(cit. on p. 47).
[124]SourceTech411, James Allen. Engineering Laws – Moore’s, Rock’s, Butter’s and
others. Last access: Nov 3, 2018. URL: http://sourcetech411.com/2012/12/
engineering-laws-moores-rocks-butters-and-others/ (cit. on p. 1).
[125]RYU Project Team. Ryubook 1.0 - Firewall. Last access: Nov. 2, 2018. 2014. URL:
https://osrg.github.io/ryu-book/en/html/rest_firewall.html (cit. on
p. 102).
[126]The Linux Foundation Project. Data Plane Development Kit. Last access: Nov. 3,
2018. 2017. URL: http://dpdk.org/ (cit. on p. 11).
[127]The netfilter.org project. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. URL: www.netfilter.org (cit. on
pp. 11, 19, 104).
[128]Ullrich, S. The Semantic Gap. Last access: Nov. 3, 2018. 2017. URL: https://noxxi.
de/research/semantic-gap.html (cit. on p. 19).
[129]Xilinx Inc. Vivado Design Suite. Last access: Nov 3, 2018. URL: https://www.




H Header field value
H Tuple of header field values H
D Range of non-negative integers
U Set of all possible header values
Ri Firewall rule with index/priority i
R− Simple reduction of a firewall rule R
RS Simple firewall rule
RC Complex firewall rule
R Prioritized list of rules Ri
RS Set of simple rules RS
RC Set of complex rules RC
G Group of consecutive simple rules RS
Q Group of consecutive complex rules RC
Q Set of complex rule groups Q
I Integer interval of rule indices i
I Set of integer intervals I
C Checks contained in any rule R
E Complex checks in any rule R
P Network packet with header values
A Action of any rule R
VR Shunting vector relative to rule set R
M Matching unit
Γi Set of complex rules in R with higher priority than Ri
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